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Abstract 
 Research on adolescent coping suggests that the link between stressors and adolescent 
psychopathology lies in the coping style employed (Dumont & Provost, 1999; Lazarus & Folkman, 
1987; Seiffge-Krenke, 2000).  Psychological flexibility (PF) is a construct that is a form of coping and 
is increasingly being seen as an emotion regulation construct and a psychological vulnerability in the 
development of a range of psychological disorders (Boulanger, Hayes, & Pistorello, 2010; Kashdan, 
Barrios, Forsyth, & Steger, 2006).  High PF employs mindfulness/acceptance strategies in the service 
of value-consistent behaviours. On the other end of the continuum, low PF involves 
avoidance/suppression strategies in the regulation of emotions, cognitions, and behaviour (Hayes, 
Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999).  Low levels of PF have been shown to be significantly associated with 
psychological distress, deficits in functioning, and deficits in relating towards oneself and others 
(Berrocal, Pennato, & Bernini, 2009).  Various emotion regulation strategies used by adolescents can 
be conceptualized to involve processes inherent in PF (Hughes & Gullone, 2011; Neumann, van Lier, 
Gratz, & Koot, 2010; Silk, Steinberg, & Morris, 2003).  Psychological flexibility is particularly 
relevant during adolescence since it is a period when adolescents are prone to experience high levels 
of negative emotions, low levels of positive emotions, and significant changes in their social support 
network (Helsen, Vollebergh, & Meeus, 2000; Henker, Whalen, Jamner, & Delfino, 2002).  Decreases 
in PF have the potential to adversely influence the experience of negative and positive emotions and 
perceptions of social support.  Reciprocal relationships between PF, specific emotions, and perceived 
social support (PSS) have not been investigated longitudinally before.  The longitudinal relationship 
between these variables has the potential to contribute to a better understanding of precursors in the 
development and maintenance of psychological disorders in adolescence.  This thesis examines the 
relationship between PF and specific emotions and between PF and PSS in adolescents in a two-wave 
longitudinal study and explores the temporal relationship between these variables.  
Participants were 884 adolescents drawn from an on-going longitudinal study investigating 
social and emotional well-being.  Students were surveyed in the second term of their third and fourth 
years (Year 9 and Year 10) of high school.  The variables assessed in this study included PF, five 
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specific emotions (fear, hostility, sadness, shame, and joy), and perceived quality and quantity of 
social support (PSS).  Structural equation modelling (SEM) analyses were used to assess the 
measurement structure of the variables and a SEM cross-lagged design was used to determine the 
antecedent, consequence, or reciprocal relationships between (i) PF and each emotion and (ii) PF and 
quality and quantity of social support.   
Psychological flexibility was found to be a precursor to hostility but emotions including 
sadness and shame were precursors of psychological flexibility.  No relationship was found between 
PF and joy.  Additionally, a reciprocal relationship was found between PF and fear.  Further analyses 
were conducted to investigate the strength of the reciprocal relationship and it was found that PF was 
a stronger predictor of fear than fear was of PF.   Psychological flexibility was found to be a precursor  
of both quality and quantity of perceived social support.  Gender did not moderate any of the 
longitudinal relationships.  
The findings in this study demonstrate that individual differences in the regulation of 
emotions were determined by specific emotions.  Specific emotions determine when regulatory efforts 
(i.e. PF in this case) will exert its influence, irrespective of valence of the emotion.  For some 
emotions, such as hostility and fear, the role of PF was that of a psychological vulnerability, while for 
some emotions, such as sadness and shame, PF processes were used to modulate the emotions.  The 
observed relationships between PF and each emotion were most consistent with the differential 
emotions theory (DET; Izard, 2010) and the appraisal theories of emotions (Lazarus, 1991; Roseman, 
1984) that assert that the interplay of emotional components in each emotion determines its 
regulation.  Addtionally, emotions of the same valence were found to recruit regulation at different 
points in the emotion generation process model, i.e before an emotion is triggered and after an 
emotion has been generated (Gross, 1998), suggesting that it is important to consider regulatory 
processes in the context of the emotion being regulated rather than only in the context of its adaptive 
or maladaptive consequences.  Further, the finding that PF is a precursor of PSS suggests that the 
willingness to be open and accepting acts as a prerequisite for higher numbers of people in 
adolescents’ social networks and higher levels of satisfaction with social networks.  Future research 
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should focus on longitudinal studies with multiple time points while also considering adding measures 
of psychological outcomes so that mediating and moderating effects between PF, emotions, PSS, and 
psychological outcomes such as depression and anxiety can be determined.  The current study has 
advanced theoretical knowledge that specific emotions are important to consider in emotion 
regulation and that the ability to regulate emotions effectively determines PSS.  Additionally, a further 
understanding of the role of mindful emotion regulation in the emotion generation process model has 
been gained.  The results of this study have implications for future studies investigating emotions and 
emotion regulation.   
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Chapter 1: Overview  
1.1 Purpose of Thesis 
Research evidence suggests that three factors consistently emerge as significant markers of 
risk in adolescence and contributes to the maintenance of psychological disorders. These factors 
are negative and positive emotions, perceived social support (PSS), and emotion regulation 
(ER) (Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema, & Schweizer, 2010; Cohen, 2004; Lengua, 2002; Michl, 
McLaughlin, Shepherd, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2013).  Each factor and its importance are 
elaborated below.   
Emotional feeling states are an important aspect of life as they play a key role in the 
evolution of consciousness, provide motivational information, and prompt people to act when 
necessary (Izard, 2009).  Emotions are inherently adaptive feeling states but they can become 
maladaptive and can lead to psychological difficulties.  Research suggests that maladaptive 
negative emotional states and deficits in positive emotional states contribute to a large 
percentage of the symptoms in psychiatric disorders such as anxiety and depression.  Research 
in specific emotions has grown exponentially but emotion theorists are still mired in theoretical 
debates about the importance of examining specific emotions versus examining the two broad 
emotional dimensions consisting of negative and positive affect.  Discrete emotion theorists 
suggest that each emotion is different because the interplay between emotional components (e.g. 
cognitions, physiology, action tendencies etc.) has different adaptive and functional purposes, 
irrespective of valence.  Although it is clear that specific emotions are distinct, there is a lack of 
clarity in whether specific emotions of the same valence are regulated similarly.  Research has 
shown that the ability to identify, describe, and differentiate between specific emotions is an 
important first step in recognizing how to cope effectively (Feldman Barrett, Gross, 
Christensen, & Benvenuto, 2001).         
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Social support is known to be an important protective factor and is one of the key 
predictors of happiness, health, and even mortality (Cacioppo & Cacioppo, 2014).  Perceived 
social support is an indication of the perceived quantity of people available in an individual’s 
social network and the perceived quality of those social relationships.  Substantial evidence 
suggests that the positive perception of social support is a significant protective factor against 
stress while the negative perception of social support is a significant risk factor that broadly 
affects mental and physical well-being across the life-span (Cacioppo & Cacioppo, 2014; 
Cornwell, 2003).  More recently, social support has been proposed in light of an interpersonal 
ER variable, suggesting the extent to which people are likely to rely on their external social 
support networks for regulating purposes (Marroquin, 2011).       
Emotion regulation is increasingly being considered a developmental task that improves 
and becomes more refined during adolescence.  Different ER strategies used for regulating 
emotions and managing social relationships often determine whether they are adaptive or 
maladaptive.  Research indicates that individual differences in ER predict personality 
development and social competence (Kochanska, Murray, & Harlan, 2000), are essential for the 
development of theory of mind (Izard et al., 2011), and contributes to school success and 
cognitive growth (Macklem, 2008).  Additionally, difficulties in ER have been found to play a 
central role in the emergence and maintenance of psychological disorders (Kring & Sloan, 
2009).  Emotion regulation can be considered an important risk factor particularly during 
adolescence as adolescents experience greater variability and intensity in emotional states and 
react more strongly towards emotional stimuli when compared to children and adults (Larson & 
Lampman-Petraitis, 1989; Larson & Richards, 1994; Silk et al., 2009; Tottenham, Hare, & 
Casey, 2011).  The ability to regulate emotions effectively is essential for well-being across the 
life-span.   
Despite the exponential growth in ER research, there is still a lack in conceptual clarity of 
the construct.  The wide range of ER strategies renders it more difficult to define and this has 
resulted in ambiguity in what constitutes ER (Lougheed & Hollenstein, 2012).  Currently, 
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research evidence is suggesting that rather than focusing on different ER strategies, it is more 
beneficial to focus on underlying ER processes.  Research is increasingly showing that 
underlying ER processes can be more meaningful in showing how people access and deploy 
different regulatory strategies across a variety of contexts.  Regulatory flexibility constitutes 
underlying ER processes in emotional self-regulation that has been shown to predict future well-
being while controlling for previous levels of well-being and cognitive abilities (Bonanno et al., 
2004).  But even flexible ER processes depend upon emotional awareness that has been referred 
to as attentional processes that are important for recognizing emotional arousal and 
differentiating between emotional experiences and its regulation (Lambie & Marcel, 2002).  In 
this regard, mindfulness has emerged as a construct that engenders qualities of awareness while 
also promoting regulatory flexibility processes.  On the other hand, the opposite of mindfulness 
consists of avoidant ER processes that have been shown to inhibit the functional and adaptive 
nature of emotions.  A mindful approach as an alternative to conventional ER responding 
approaches is widely being accepted but research is still lacking in how mindfulness approaches 
act as an ER construct in relation to the object it is regulating, (i.e. emotions).            
Emotions, perceived social support, and ER have been identified as potent risk and 
protective factors in adolescence and their influence on each other potentially plays a role in 
different disorders and in overall well-being (Kraemer, Stice, Kazdin, Offord, & Kupfer, 2001).  
In fact, findings from studies have shown that correlations between these risk and protective 
factors are high and that the intercorrelations between them are linked to the maintenance of 
psychological disorders, such as depression and anxiety (Carver, Scheier, & Weintraub, 1989; 
Chao, 2011; Lengua, 2002).  Currently, there is limited research that has examined how these 
specific risk and protective factors influence each other in normal populations.  Despite the 
explosion of research in ER in the past two decades, there seems to be a lack of clarity in the 
relationship between ER and specific emotions.  Additionally, although research in emotional 
development has suggested that emotion self-regulation is important for the development of 
social competence, little research has examined the role of ER in social experiences of 
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adolescents, particularly in the way social support is perceived.  Such gaps in the ER literature 
continue to undermine progress in improving conceptual clarity.  The main gaps in the literature 
are varied and are discussed accordingly in the following paragraphs. 
First, ER models have not taken into consideration discrete emotion theories, thereby 
contributing to an unclear understanding of mechanisms that influence the very object they are 
regulating.  The bulk of studies that have examined ER and emotions have mainly focused on 
the dimensional models of affect (i.e., positive and negative affect), or they have used measures 
of distress such as depression, anxiety, or anger to represent a whole range of emotional 
experiences (Power, 2006).  The larger part of emotion theories, such as the discrete emotion 
models, have been consistently ignored.  Discrete emotion models range from simple and basic 
physiological and behavioural models to more complex models of cognition and judgment and 
therefore discrete emotions are likely to be regulated differently.  More specifically, discrete 
emotions are usually associated with a causal object and this has important consequences for ER 
in the form of greater emotion knowledge in comparison to global affective states where 
emotional components are not targeted (Russell & Feldman Barrett, 1999).   
Second, the majority of ER models have mainly focused on self- models of ER while 
external models of ER have largely been ignored.  Self-models of ER are mainly concerned with 
the individual’s ability to use intrapersonal (intrinsic) resources to regulate emotions but people 
often also rely on others in their social network to help them regulate emotions (Campos, Walle, 
Dahl, & Main, 2011).  The perception of the amount of social support (i.e. number of people in 
social support network) and satisfaction with these supports provide a good indication of how 
much people involve supportive others in their personal lives and possibly implicitly obtain help 
with regulation (Marroquin, 2011).  Past research in determining the link between intrapersonal 
ER strategies and social support has been scant and there is little information on how these 
different modes of ER influence each other.   
Third, studies investigating ER have been conducted unsystematically and this has 
contributed to an unclear understanding of which behaviours constitute ER.  In addition to the 
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issue of the lack of ER investigations being grounded in discrete emotion theories, the 
fragmented investigation of ER behaviours has also introduced ambiguity in determining how 
regulation works.  The accumulated studies have examined a multitude of ER strategies that 
range from usage of short term strategies (e.g. suppression, avoidance) to long term strategies 
that involve regulatory attitudes such as emotional acceptance.  But the majority of studies have 
examined one or two ER strategies to demonstrate individual behavioural response tendencies. 
This ignores the full scale of an emotional experience whereby a majority of individuals engage 
in a variety of ER behaviours according to the demands of the context in conjunction with their 
personal predisposition.  As a result, very little research has been devoted to investigations of 
individual differences in ER flexibility.   
Fourth, gender differences in specific emotional experiences and perceived social support 
remain inconclusive.  Although evidence from many studies have shown that girls tend to be 
more depressed than boys (Zeman & Garber, 1996) and boys tend to be more hostile than girls 
(Hart,1999), these differences have not been consistent across the studies (Calvete, Orue, & 
Hankin, 2013).  Similarly, research shows that girls seem to be more receptive to positive social 
support than boys but inconsistencies have been found among these studies too (for e.g. Allen & 
Stoltenberg, 1995).  Moreover recent research has shown that gender differences in the use of 
ER strategies have not been uniformly consistent across empirical investigations as males and 
females tend to use different strategies for regulating emotions (see review by Nolen-Hoeksema, 
2012).  Overall, it is still unclear as to whether gender differences play a role in any of these risk 
factors.  
In an attempt to address the gaps in the literature, the purpose of the current study was to 
(1) examine the longitudinal relationship between psychological flexibility, a behavioural 
mindfulness and acceptance-based ER variable, and discrete emotions (i.e. fear, hostility, 
sadness, shame, and joy); (2) examine the reciprocal relationship between intrapersonal ER and 
interpersonal ER using a longitudinal design; (3) assess whether any gender differences exist in 
the relationships in (1) and (2).   
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1.2 The Current Study and Rationale 
This study investigated the longitudinal relationship between emotional and social 
experiences and emotion regulation during mid-adolescence.  In the current study, specific 
negative and positive emotions, such as fear, hostility, sadness, shame, and joy were used to 
operationalize emotional experiences.  Social experiences were operationalized by perceived 
social support (PSS).  Perceived social support is a measure comprised of the perceived quantity 
of people available for support and satisfaction with those supports.  Emotion regulation was 
operationalized by using the psychological flexibility (PF) measure for adolescents called the 
Action and Fusion Questionnaire for Youth (AFQ-Y; Greco, Baer, & Lambert, 2008).   
The aim of the present study was to explore potential reciprocal influences (i.e. “the effect 
of two or more variables on each other over time”; Hamaker, Kuiper, & Grasman, 2015, p. 103) 
between PF and emotional and social experiences in a two-wave study by using a structural 
equation modelling approach called the cross-lagged longitudinal panel design.  In a cross-
lagged panel design, the same variables are assessed repeatedly over time and this provides a 
means for gauging the stability of the constructs over time and for determining whether any 
changes in one variable has predictive change effects on changes in another variable.  Latent 
constructs ensure that measurements are a reflection of the latent trait as they are corrected for 
measurement error (any parts of the variables measured that are not a part of the true construct 
such as the situation or person-situation interactions on the occasion of testing; Steyer, Schmitt, 
& Eid, 1999) that might influence the reliability of measurement, and the method used to 
construct latent variables have the ability to establish content, criterion, and construct validity 
(Little, 2013).  In this study, the variables were measured a year apart approximately at the same 
time each year.  Furthermore, for each relationship the moderating influence of gender was also 
explored.  Girls and boys are known to experience different emotions more intensely but they 
may also experience some emotions in a similar manner.  For example, girls and boys may 
experience sadness and anger differently but they may experience shame in the same way.  
Further, gender differences in perceived social support and PF have been inconclusive so far 
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and therefore this study has the potential to provide further clarity for these variables.  The 
current study is exploratory in nature and the rationale is presented below.   
Psychological flexibility is a multidimensional construct that consists of six interrelated 
psychological processes including acceptance, present moment awareness, defusion, self-as-
context, and committed action (Ciarrochi, Sahdra, Marshall, parker, & Horwath, 2014; Gamez, 
Chmielewski, Kotov, Ruggero, & Watson, 2011).  The PF construct measures two ends of a 
continuum in which high PF consists of acceptance and contact with present moment processes 
while low PF is concerned with processes that involve rigid avoidance (i.e. cognitive fusion and 
experiential avoidance) of private events including thoughts, feelings, memories, sensations etc.  
Processes inherent in PF are considered behavioural dispositions or trait-like as these 
behaviours are often learned in the early years of life and continue to influence behavioural 
outcomes throughout life.     
The bulk of studies examining PF have reported high correlations between low PF and a 
range of psychological symptoms and disorders (Hayes et. al., 2006; Ruiz, 2010).  This has led 
to extensive research in understanding the involvement of PF in the development of 
psychological symptoms and consequently its role in the treatment of psychological disorders.  
Moreover, recent empirical research is suggesting that PF acts as a transdiagnostic factor across 
a range of diagnostic categories (Levin et al., 2014).  This has led to the emergence of PF as a 
mechanism of change whereby changes in outcome variables (for e.g. clinical symptoms and 
workplace-related productivity) have been shown to be fully or partially mediated by changes in 
PF in clinical and non-clinical populations.  The mediational influence of PF indicates that PF 
plays an important role in the development and maintenance of psychological symptoms and 
that coping through processes inherent in low PF further contributes to adverse emotional and  
social outcomes above and beyond the initial direct influence of other risk factors or stressors on 
the outcome.  The mediational role of PF has been examined in intervention studies for a variety 
of psychological difficulties, i.e. before and after delivery of PF-enhancing treatment protocols 
including at follow-up stages (for e.g. Bond & Bunce, 2000; Gifford et., 2004; Gregg et al., 
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2007; Lundgren, Dahl, & Hayes, 2008), and in survey studies seeking to understand the 
contribution of psychological flexibility alongside other coping and emotion regualtion 
strategies, biological (e.g. pain or injury; Orcutt, Pickett, & Pope, 2005) psychosocial stressors 
(e.g. anxiety sensitivity, childhood sexual abuse; Marx & Sloan, 2002; Reddy, Pickett, & 
Orcutt, 2006), and tempermental factors (e.g. emotional reactivity; Kashdan et al., 2006; 
Masuda et al., 2009) in predicting outcome variables such as depression and the various anxiety 
disorders (e.g. PTSD, trait anxiety; Kashdan, Morina, & Priebe, 2007).  Accumulated evidence 
from studies investigating the mediational role of PF has increasingly shown that PF acts as 
underlying emotional regulatory processes and also acts as a psychological vulnerability (Levin 
et al., 2014).   
The only problem with these mediational studies is that the majority of them have used 
cross-sectional designs, which are limited in determining directional pathways (for e.g., 
Kashdan & Breen, 2007; Kashdan et al., 2007).  Cross-sectional studies can provide a great 
advantage over longitudinal studies when there are funding and time constraints.  But cross-
sectional mediation studies can suffer from design disadvantages.  For example, in the cross-
sectional mediation studies examining PF processes, it  could only be demonstrated that changes 
in PF had occurred but it was not possible to determine which variable influenced the other or 
which variable preceded the other variable because the changes occurred at the same time as 
changes in specific outcomes.  Even though PF contributed to the development of psychological 
symptoms, it could very well also be true that psychological symptoms contributed to the 
development of PF, or the lack thereof.  However, a few intervention studies have shown that 
changes in PF preceded changes in the mediated variable, but the number of studies remain 
small (for e.g., Gifford et al., 2004; Hesser,Westin, Hayes, & Andersson, 2009; Zettle & Hayes, 
1986).  Additionally, a few short and longer term longitudinal studies have also demonstrated 
that PF acts as a risk factor/vulnerbaility for the future development of psychological difficulties 
(Bond & Bunce, 2003; Hayes et al., 2004; Marx & Sloan, 2005).  At present, it is unclear as to 
how PF contributes to adverse outcomes or well-being based on the current research evidence.  
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Therefore, the current study was undertaken to gain a better understanding of the role of PF in 
relation to other risk factors such as negative and positive emotions and perceived social 
support.   
The rationale for examining PF and negative and positive emotions and PF and social 
support stems primarily from the multidimensional aspect of the PF construct.  The basis for the 
rationale is showcased through (1) current empirical research in discrete emotion theories and 
ER (2) existing theoretical debates about emotions and ER, and (3) current theoretical and 
empirical research in intrapersonal and interpersonal ER.   
Empirical findings have emphasized the role of negative and positive affect in 
psychopathology in conjunction with the pervasive use of avoidant coping in the adolescent 
coping and ER literature.  Research has shown that high levels of negative affect and low levels 
of positive affect pose as vulnerabilities for the emergence of affective pathology in children 
and adolescents (Barlow, Chorpita, & Turovsky, 1996; Clark & Watson, 1991).  The tripartite 
model suggests that negative affect is a common factor shared by anxiety and depression while 
low levels of positive affect or anhedonia is a characteristic specific to depression and 
physiological hyperarousal is a unique feature of anxiety (Clark & Watson, 1991).  In clinical 
and nonclinical populations of children and adolescents, several studies have found that 
negative affect explained considerable overlap between anxiety and depression, while positive 
affect or anhedonia was found to be unique in depression (Chorpita, 2002; Joiner, Cataranzo, & 
Laurent, 1996; Laurent & Ettelson, 2001; Lonigan, Carey, & Finch, 1994).  Although research 
indicates that high levels of negative affect and low levels of positive affect render adolescents 
vulnerable to psychological disorders, very little research has been devoted to understanding the 
nature of specific emotions and how they may contribute to psychological difficulties in 
adolescents.  Specific emotions are especially relevant as research is increasingly suggesting 
that the ability to identify and describe different emotions and the capacity to differentiate 
among them is an important first step in recognizing how to cope with emotions effectively 
(Kashdan & Barrett, 2015).  
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It has also been argued that intense and fluctuating experiences of emotions during 
adolescence is characteristically inevitable during this developmental stage and that the majority 
of adolescents seem to proceed through this developmental stage with relative ease and appear 
to be comparatively free from significant emotional or social problems (Larson & Ham, 1993; 
Laursen, Coy, & Collins, 1998; Steinberg, 2001).  But research has demonstrated that mid to 
late adolescence can be a low point for adolescents as they are susceptible to considerably 
increased levels of negative affect and decreased levels of positive affect (Larson et al., 2002). 
Emotion-related changes during adolescence are unquestionably inevitable due to biological 
changes (e.g., pubertal and cognitive maturity) that can vary widely between individuals. And 
the resulting changes can continue to be an influence on behavioural outcomes later in 
adulthood (see Hollenstein and Lougheed, 2013 for review). Moreover, poor coping skills 
learned during the mid-adolescence stage can have ongoing detrimental effects and has also 
been shown to further influence mental health in emerging adulthood. 
Accumulated research has shown that the coping style employed explains the link between 
negative and positive affect and adverse outcomes in adolescents (Dumont & Provost, 1999; 
Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Seiffge-Krenke, 2000).  Research has shown that advanced skills in 
coping and ER often develop and become more refined during adolescence and therefore those 
with poor coping skills are prone to develop depressive symptoms (Eastabrook, Flynn, & 
Hollenstein, 2014).  Among the various adolescent stages, mid-adolescents are particularly at 
risk of developing psychological problems due to developmental transitions from early to mid-
adolescence.  Accumulated evidence suggests that adolescents predominantly use rigid forms of 
avoidant emotion regulation strategies to cope with emotional symptoms of anxiety and 
depression.  Both cross-sectional and longitudinal studies have pointed to the pernicious effects 
of avoidant strategies in emotional and behavioural problems in adolescents (Aldridge & 
Roesch, 2008; Asarnow, Carlson, & Guthrie, 1987; Compas, Malcarne, & Fondacaro, 1988; 
Ebata & Moos, 1991; Flouri & Mavroveli, 2013; Garnefski, Kraaij, & van Etten, 2005; Herman-
Stahl, Stemmler, & Petersen, 1995; Seiffge-Krenke, 1993, 1995; Silk et al., 2003).  
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Additionally, in more recent research of positive affect and its link with psychological disorders, 
it has been suggested that the possible experience of low levels of positive mood states could be 
attributed to avoidant forms of coping.  The attempt to avoid negative affect could possibly 
suppress the experience of positive affect and this can contribute to psychological symptoms as 
seen in anhedonia, social anxiety, bipolar disorder, externalizing disorders, and eating disorders 
in adolescents (Gilbert, 2012).  Despite the importance of negative and positive affect and 
avoidant forms of coping as correlates of adverse psychological outcomes, comparatively little 
research has used a multidimensional measure such as PF to explore its role in regulating 
specific negative and positive emotions.  The two ends of the PF continuum serve as means to 
explore the reciprocal relationship between specific emotions and PF.  Conceptually, the PF 
construct is suggested to represent the ability for flexible behaviour even in the presence of 
unwanted emotions, irrespective of their intensity and valence, and therefore PF is likely to 
enhance the functional and adaptive nature of emotions.  In other words, if a person is 
psychologically flexible, then it would not matter which emotion is being experienced as 
flexible coping behaviour would eventually lead to adaptation.  However, when a person is 
psychologically inflexible, then attempts to avoid, escape or control unwanted emotions 
predominate and people also become entangled with the interpretation of the emotion(s) itself, 
and this can eventually lead to maladjustment.  The avoidance of emotions can inhibit the 
unfolding of emotional processes, which contain important adaptive information about the 
emotion. Therefore, reciprocal relationships between PF and specific emotions in the context of 
psychological inflexibility are important in elucidating the significance of specific emotions.  
These relationships could be used to inform and guide investigations of ER processes in future 
research.   
The reciprocal relationships between PF and specific emotions also has the potential to 
clarify some of the existing debates in the literature reagrding emotions and ER and potentially 
lends further support to the investigation of a multidimensional ER variable and its role in 
specific emotions.  Some researchers argue that emotions and ER are facets of a single process 
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(Campos, Frankel, & Camras, 2004; Kappas, 2011) whereas other researchers claim that 
emotions and ER are separate constructs (Cole, Martin, & Dennis, 2004; Gross & Barrett, 2011; 
Thompson, 2011).  This debate is important in relation to the design and focus of investigation 
in this study as emotions and ER have been modelled as separate factors.  According to the 
single factor argument, emotions and ER are not a linear process as emotions can either be 
elicited first and then attempts to modulate can follow or regulatory responses (e.g. personal 
goals, hedonics, or emotional communciation) can dictate the generation of an emotion 
(Campos et al., 2004).  The single factor model is reflected  in Gross’s (1998) emotion 
generation process model where ER processes can determine the elicitation of emotions 
(antecedent-focused) or emotions can trigger ER responses (response-focused).  But at the same 
time, there is value in investigating emotions and ER processes separately as they serve other 
benefits.  With regard to this study, for example, there is value in separating the constructs so 
that individual differences in understanding the role of PF in specific emotions can be 
determined, which in turn can provide a better understanding of whether emotional processes 
should be separated as two factors instead of one.  Moreover, the examination of specific 
emotions in this debate is particularly relevant as the majority of past research has 
predominantly used dimensional scales, i.e. positive and negative affect, while emotions of the 
same valence are increasingly being shown to have distinct functions (Zimmermann & Iwanski, 
2014).  There is a possibility that reciprocal influences between emotions of the same valence 
and PF may be different and this could provide a basis for why emotions and ER should be 
examined as separate factors.  Another important aspect to consider in this debate is the trait-
like characteristic of the PF construct.  There is a possibility that psychological inflexibility acts 
as a psychological vulnerability in the experience of specific emotions.  Even though emotions 
can be experienced in one moment and attempts to regulate can be immediate, people who are 
already low in PF will often tend to use the same patterns of behaviour in regulating emotions as 
these have been learned and used in their past (Healy, Barnes-Holmes, & Smeets, 2000; Lipkens 
et al., 1993; Roche et al., 2000).               
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The same longitudinal research design will be used to explore the relationship between PF 
and PSS based on the following theoretical and empirical reasoning.  A theoretical notion that is 
gaining attention suggests that the regulation of emotions can be interpersonal (i.e., ER that 
occurs through the influence of social relationships or extrinsic processes) and intrapersonal (i.e. 
ER that occurs within an individual or intrinsic processes) and that both kinds of ER have the 
potential to improve understanding of mental health at the individual level (Campos, Walle, 
Dahl, & Main, 2011; Hofmann, 2014; Marroquin, 2011).  In the past, the extensive research 
emphasis on intrapersonal ER has mostly been investigated independently from interpersonal 
ER or emotion-regulatory processes that involve the effects of the social environment 
(Marroquin, 2011).  Consequently, very little research has examined the relationship between 
the two kinds of ER.  In this study, PSS was used to represent interpersonal ER and PF was used 
to represent intrapersonal ER.  The links between these two variables are largely supported by 
independent literatures. 
Perceived social support has been proposed to portray a key aspect of interpersonal ER 
(Marroquin, 2011).  PSS is thought to capture the effects of the social environment and the 
quality of interpersonal relationships as it considers recipient awareness and evaluation of the 
availability and quality of social support.  Adolescents with positive perceptions of social 
support generally tend to report better well-being while those with negative perceptions of 
social support report greater feelings of distress or depression (Cornwell, 2003).  Similarly PF 
can be considered as intrapersonal attempts that involve attentional awareness or avoidance of 
awareness to internal private events such as thoughts, emotions, memories, images, physical 
sensations etc.  Individuals high in PF have attentional awareness of the ongoing stream of inner 
cognitive and emotional responses and are therefore able to adapt their behaviour to ongoing 
changes in the environment while those who are low in PF use inattentive avoidant strategies to 
divert their attention from present moment awareness.  Both PF and PSS have established links 
with depression but the processes involved in how PF is associated with depression has been 
more clearly explained through theoretical and empirical studies while ER processes that may 
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influence PSS ,which in turn might influence depression are still unclear (e.g., Ciarrochi, Deane, 
Wilson, & Rickwood, 2002; Ciarrochi, Wilson, Deane, & Rickwood, 2003).  A good place to 
begin to understand the influences of PSS on depression and possibly other forms of 
psychopathological outcomes in adolescence would be to extend our understanding of the 
relationship between PSS and a multidimensional intrapersonal variable such as PF.  Prior 
research suggests that those who have low levels of PF are more likely to experience 
interpersonal problems due to the tendency to avoid distress in social situations (Gerhart, Baker, 
Hoerger, & Ronan, 2014).  It is possible that the PF construct may explain negative or positive 
evaluations and expectations involved in PSS.  Additionally, the examination of the temporal 
relationship between PSS and PF is likely to provide a better understanding of the connection 
between interpersonal and intrapersonal processes involved in influencing both positive and 
negative outcomes during adolescence.  Moreover, this study could provide some insight on 
factors that influence interpersonal relationships during adolescence.       
  Relationships among these risk factors have the potential to provide a better 
understanding of the development and maintenance of psychological disorders that tend to 
commence during adolescence (Cisler, Olatunji, Feldner, & Forsyth, 2010) and at the same time 
provide basic guidance for future research in this area.  The degree to which individuals are 
psychologically flexible has the potential to influence the experience of different emotions and 
enable individuals to differentiate between them.  Similarly, PF has the potential to influence 
perceptions of social support, which is an important first step in understanding what factors may 
have an effect on how adolescents perceive their social supports.   Although studies have shown 
that PF is associated with emotionally and socially- related psychological variables, potential 
reciprocal relationships between PF and specific positive and negative emotions (fear, hostility, 
sadness, shame, and joy) and between PF and PSS has not been investigated before.  It is still 
unclear as to how these variables affect each other during mid-adolescence over time.  This 
thesis aims to address this significant research gap by exploring the longitudinal relationship 
between PF and each specific emotion and between PF and perceived social support. 
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In view of the discrete emotion theories, the assumed location of PF in the emotion 
generation process model, the developmental origins of PF, and the mediating role of PF, no a 
priori hypotheses favouring PF, specific emotions, or PSS as precursors are proposed.  In 
addition, the moderating influence of gender was also explored given that gender differences in 
the experience of different emotions has been found in prior research.  The following research 
questions were addressed: 
Research Questions  
(i) Does greater PF contribute to more positive emotional experiences? 
– Will PF predict specific positive and negative emotions or will specific 
positive and negative emotions predict PF? Or will there be reciprocal 
relationships between PF and specific positive and negative emotions.  
(ii) Does PF influence the amount of and satisfaction with perceived social 
support?  
– Will PF predict PSS or will quantity of PSS predict PF? 
– Will PF predict the quality of PSS or will quality of PSS predict PF?  
(iii) Do boys and girls differ in the relationship between PF and specific 
emotions?  
– Does gender moderate the relationship between PF and each specific 
emotion? 
(iv) Do boys and girls differ in the relationship between PF and the amount of 
and satisfaction with PSS? 
– Does gender moderate the relationship between PF and quantity of 
PSS? 
– Does gender moderate the relationship between PF and quality of PSS? 
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1.3 Thesis Outline  
 This thesis contains 7 chapters.  Chapter 2 contains three sections.  The first section 
introduces a definition for emotions and further elaborates on the various components of 
emotions by exemplifying specific emotions.  This section also provides an account of the 
differences between emotions and moods and emotions and affect.  The second section 
establishes the theoretical underpinnings for the relationship between psychological flexibility 
and emotions based on the extant literature on emotion regulation and mindfulness.  The third 
section provides the theoretical underpinnings for the relationship between psychological 
flexibility and perceived social support based on intrapersonal emotion regulation and 
interpersonal emotion regulation.  In this chapter, current debates and supporting empirical 
studies are also presented to highlight the gaps in the literature. 
Chapter 3 focuses on defining psychological flexibility and providing empirical 
evidence for the PF construct.  Further supporting evidence has also been reviewed for 
psychological flexibility as a psychological vulnerability for a myriad of mental health 
problems.  In addition, adolescent coping styles and emotion regulation strategies are reviewed 
with an emphasis on theoretical overlaps and distinctions with psychological flexibility.   
Chapter 4 contains two sections.  The first section focuses on emotional and social well-
being as markers of risk in adolescence.  At the beginning of this section, biological and social 
changes in adolescence are reviewed to highlight that these changes are unique in this 
developmental stage and are therefore likely to contribute towards emotional and social 
processes in adolescence.  Further, the link between specific emotions and mental health and the 
links between perceived social support and mental health are established.  The second section 
focuses on the role of psychological flexibility in the emotional and social well-being of 
adolescents.   
Chapter 5 provides an overview of the methodology for the thesis.  A description of the 
larger research project and the approach in conducting the study is provided.  Some 
demographic details of the participants and the measures used for this study are also described.   
17 
 
Chapter 6 describes the results found.  First, results for the preliminary analyses are 
provided.  Second, longitudinal results are provided.  Structural equation modelling was used to 
determine measurement invariance across gender and time, for evaluating the moderating 
effects of the structural models, and to determine the temporal status of psychological flexibility 
in relation to specific emotions and perceived social support. 
Chapter 7 focuses on the significant findings of the longitudinal relationships between 
psychological flexibility and specific emotions and between psychological flexibility and 
perceived social support.  Furthermore, limitations and clinical implications for prevention and 
intervention are discussed.  Theoretical implications and recommendations for future research 
are also considered.  The chapter ends with an overall summary and conclusion of the thesis.    
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Background: Emotions, Emotion 
Regulation, and Perceived Social Support  
In the following sections, the extant literature in emotions, emotion regulation, and 
perceived social support are reviewed. An attempt is made to understand the relationship 
between emotions and emotion regulation and between emotion regulation and perceived social 
support.     
2.1  Emotions and Emotion Regulation                                      
This section will first focus on emotions and then on emotion regulation.  Emotion 
theorists have defined and described emotions in many ways.  An attempt is made to capture the 
elusive nature of emotions in order to demonstrate some critical aspects of specific emotions.  
Emotions can be understood from many perspectives and disciplines as presented by the various 
theories of emotion.  On the other hand, research from different cultures and different sub- 
disciplines in psychology indicate that emotions have some core functions and can be described 
with some core principles.  The focus of this section will thus be concerned with the multi-
componential aspect of specific emotions including affect, action readiness, appraisal, and 
physiology in differentiating each emotion.   Further, differences between emotions and mood 
and emotions and affect are discussed. 
In the section following emotion, various emotion regulation strategies are defined and 
differences among them are discussed.  An attempt is made to understand the whole emotional 
response experience including kinds of emotional strategies and processes, emotional 
awareness, and the role of context or situation.  Further, mindfulness and its role as an ER 
variable are explained.  Finally, PF is introduced as a form of mindful emotion regulation and 
the role of PF in the emotion generation process model is described.        
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2.1.1  Emotion  
The current conception of emotion is that human beings have emotions for adaptive 
purposes as opposed to earlier conceptions that emotions are disruptive and subordinate to 
reason (Salomon, 2000).  The evolutionary role of emotions in the life of humans is an adaptive 
one as it provides a signal for readjustments and reorganizations to be made internally (i.e. 
cognition, judgment, behavioural, experience, and physiological) in response to environmental 
demands and opportunities (Frijda, 1988; Izard, 1971; Levenson, 1994; Kopp, 1989).  Emotions 
are vital to human survival and well-being as they aid in preparing responses to potential threats 
(Damasio, 1999).  Emotions also facilitate learning, judgment, and decision-making (Lerner & 
Keltner, 2000).  The expression of emotion serves important attachment functions early in life 
and continues to facilitate social interactions in adulthood.  Emotions can be viewed as a 
dynamic system that organizes biological and psychological subsystems to prepare the 
individual for responding to the environment.   
Emotions have many functions in our daily lives as they occur due to many internal and 
external reinforcers.  Figure 2.1 below, adapted from Rolls (2013), provides a depiction of the 
wide range of emotions and variations of emotions that can be experienced when they are 
associated with different reinforcement of contingencies.  There is a variety of functions of 
emotions that range from autonomic responses to more goal-related conscious responses. 
Autonomic responses occur in conjunction with physiological changes, such as changes in heart 
rate or the release of adrenaline, which usually prepares the individual for action.  Functions of 
emotions that are goal-related are responses to reinforcing stimuli that serve as motivators.  
Motivators can be evaluated as rewarding or punishing and this kind of learning provides 
flexibility in action.  For example, humans can learn to obtain a reward or avoid a punishment 
just in one trial for the stimulus-reinforcer learning to occur.  Additionally, the value that is 
given to emotions by the individual and the value that emotions serve in their social 
relationships can also be referred to as functions of emotions.  Humans use emotions to 
communicate their feelings through facial expressions or other physical gestures (Ekman, 1993).  
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Similarly, emotions also function as a means of social bonding as with parents and their 
children or partners in a romantic relationship.  From a cognitive perspective, emotions can 
function as cues for cognitive evaluations of events, may facilitate the storage of memories, and 
act as triggers for the recall of memories (Rolls, 2013).      
Figure 2.1 Functions of discrete emotions-based contingencies of reinforcement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Accordingly, many definitions of emotions (a list of 92 definitions) have been proposed 
since the beginning of research on emotions (Kleinginna & Kleinginna, 1981). Based on the 
most prominent theoretical issues identified, these definitions were sorted into 11 categories: 
affective (phenomenal) experience, cognitive, physiological, expressive behaviour, disruptive, 
adaptive, multiaspect, restrictive, motivational, and its utility and status in science (Kleinginna 
& Kleinginna, 1981).  The assortment of categories has further been used to explain the various 
aspects of emotions which are now known as emotion components (these are discussed in more 
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detail further below in this section).  A definition of emotions should describe its purpose and 
function to the individual while emotion components provide information on a set of typical 
changes that are likely to occur when an emotion is experienced.  From a functional perspective, 
Campos and colleagues have provided a practical definition of emotions as “processes of 
establishing, maintaining, or disrupting the relations between the person and the internal or 
external environment on matters important to the individual” (Campos, Campos, & Barrett, 
1989, p. 395).   
Emotions can be classified as basic and secondary in nature.  Basic emotions include 
the natural kinds such as fear, anger, sadness, love, or joy whereas secondary emotions include 
self-conscious emotions like guilt, shame, or pride.  Distinctions between basic and secondary 
emotions are mainly based on biological and evolutionary priorities as espoused by the 
differential emotions theory (DET; Izard, 1984; Tomkins, 1987).  Basic emotions seem to 
appear earlier, in the period of 6 to 8 months of human development.  Their functional purpose 
is to address threats and opportunities in relation to survival needs and is useful for coordinating 
behavioural, attentional, cognitive, and physiological responses (Kim, Thibodeau, & Jorgensen, 
2011).  In addition, basic emotions are not dependant on development of cognitive abilities but 
they may contain cognitive elements as and when cognitive abilities develop.  On the other 
hand, secondary emotions or self-conscious emotions appear later in development in 
conjunction with cognitive abilities as they involve the development of a distinct self versus 
others and self-evaluative processes.   Self-evaluative processes often involve the ability to 
divert attention to the self for the purpose of self-reflection, understanding the self as an agent of 
behaviour, and attributing discrepancies between internal standards imposed by the self and the 
self’s behaviour.  Self-conscious emotions require more sophisticated and complex cognitive 
skills as their function is related to social and interpersonal survival and is crucial for 
evolutionary success (e.g. status maintenance, group acceptance, complex social structure 
negotiations).   
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Many models of emotion have been derived from the basic emotions model where it is 
thought that each discrete emotion has specific eliciting conditions accompanied by specific 
physiological, expressive, and behavioural patterns of reaction (Tomkins, 1964, Ekman, 1994, 
Izard, 1971, Levenson et al., 1992).  These emotion theorists have particularly emphasized the 
early patterning of discrete emotions (Izard, 1994; Izard et al., 1980, 1995), the discrete 
prototypical facial expressions, and the cultural universality of these patterns (Ekman, 1972, 
1994; Ekman et al., 1987; Izard, 1971, 1990; Levenson et al., 1992).  These basic emotion 
models later came to be known as discrete emotion theories.  As discrete emotion theories 
started developing, many other aspects of emotions came into focus.  For example, emotion 
lexicon was considered a basis for building an emotion model where the underlying structure of 
an emotion could be understood and common cultural interpretation patterns could be 
abstracted.  These were called lexical emotion models (Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987; Ortony, 
Clore, & Collins, 1988).  Further, social constructivist models claimed that the meaning of 
emotions is usually determined from sociocultural behaviour and value patterns (Averil, 1980; 
Harre, 1986; Shweder, 1993).  Cognitive and judgment aspects also came to be considered as 
components of emotion through appraisal theories (Lazarus, 1968, 1991).  The appraisal theory 
of emotion postulated by Lazarus (1991) was based on fundamental themes of appraisal for 
basic emotions and resembled some of the fundamental assumptions of the discrete emotion 
theories (Scherer, 2000).  According to appraisal theories, emotions are elicited through 
evaluations of events in relation to an individual’s goals.  The appraisal theories have been 
expanded in different ways by several appraisal theorists but overall, they tend to agree that 
specific physiological, expressive, and motivational changes are a result of appraisals unlike the 
earlier discrete emotion models where discrete emotions have considerably fixed 
neuropsychological circuits (Scherer, 2000).  In conclusion, the different discrete emotion 
theories described here focus on different emotion components.   
Discrete emotions are increasingly being investigated as independent variables that 
influence outcomes.  Substantial evidence has accumulated suggesting that discrete emotions 
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have unique effects on cognition, physiology, behaviour, and experience.  The functional aspect 
of discrete emotions refers to emotions as the evolutionary adaptive response that organizes 
these unique effects/components as a reaction to changes in the environment.  The elicitation of 
discrete emotions influences cognition (e.g., narrowing or widening of attention), judgment 
(e.g., risk or opportunity perceived in the environment), experience (e.g., the awareness of a 
characteristic of an emotion), behaviour (e.g., a tendency to take a particular action or a 
particular reaction), and physiology (e.g., changes in heart rate or respiration, changes in the 
brain or biochemical changes as in hormones) in varying degrees and each emotion either 
produces changes in all these systems or a subset of these systems (Lench, Flores, & Bench, 
2011) .  When these multiple components are efficiently coordinated, then they produce goal-
effective behavioural responses that result in flexible adaptation.  Most emotion theories (above) 
propose that changes occur in most components, but each theory emphasizes different 
components.  Experimental manipulations have predominantly been used to investigate emotion 
theories but these have often resulted in divergent views of the importance of each emotion 
component.  The divergent views have mainly been mired in disagreements over the way 
emotions are elicited in experimental manipulations, which in turn may have had effects on 
determining differences between the different models or theories of discrete emotions.  
Evidence for the discrete emotion models has been found in a meta-analysis that was conducted 
to determine the effect of discrete emotions on cognition, behaviour, physiology, and experience 
through experimental emotion elicitations (Lench, Flores, & Bench, 2011).   
The findings from the meta-analysis demonstrated that the experience of emotions 
occurred following the various modes of elicitation (e.g. films, pictures etc.) and that significant 
differences between components were observed between pairs of emotions (for e.g. sadness and 
anger).  The meta-analysis study also confirmed focal differences between discrete emotion 
models.  For example, behaviour, experience, and physiology covaried more strongly following 
the elicitation of different emotions, specifically in happiness, sadness, anger, and anxiety while 
cognition and judgment did not correlate with changes in other components.  Furthermore, it 
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was found that cognition and judgment were uncorrelated with one another suggesting their 
independent focus in discrete emotion models.  Findings from the meta-analysis provides some 
evidence for the discrete emotion models (outlined above) as theories that either emphasize 
experience, physiology, and behaviour or those that emphasize cognition and judgment.  
Discrete emotion theories based on patterns of neurophysiological circuits emphasize the 
correlation between behaviour, experience, and physiology while appraisal theories emphasize 
cognition and judgment.  Another important finding was in regard to the experimental method 
used in the studies analysed.  The experimental emotion elicitation method provided evidence in 
support of experience, physiology, and behaviour components but did not seem to support the 
priming of cognition and judgment.  Although there may be individual and situational factors 
involved in moderating the emotional elicitation effects on cognition and judgment, it is also 
possible that the experimental manipulation design may be less suitable in drawing out the 
complexities (e.g. motivations, valence, and expression) involved in cognition and judgment.  
On the other hand, research in appraisal theories has shown that implicit evaluations or 
appraisals of a situation can also influence the elicitation of emotions in a rapid and automatic 
fashion as much as perception can elicit emotions (Moors, 2006).  Clore and Ortony (2009) 
claim that cognitive appraisals can become mindless and automatic due to previously learned 
associations.  People can be unaware of cognitive cues that have previously been conditioned 
into neural networks and react in the same way in situations that have been previously 
experienced.  Additionally, according to the emotion generation process of Gross (1998), 
cognitive reappraisals of the situation can occur prior to the elicitation of an emotion and this 
can also influence appraisals and judgment in experimental studies.   
2.1.1.1 Discrete Emotion Components                 
Emotions are known to have multi-componential characteristics such as affect, 
behaviour, action tendencies, appraisal, and physiology. (Clore & Palmer, 2009; Firjda, 1986; 
Scherer, 2005).  Although the components are discussed separately below, it needs to be pointed 
out that these components usually occur in a synchronized fashion when an emotional 
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experience unfolds.  In the following sections, key components will be outlined with specific 
emphasis on emotions that have been examined in this thesis.  These emotions are: fear, 
hostility, sadness, shame, and joy. 
Affect 
Affect can be referred to as the hedonic tone that accompanies an emotional experience 
and each emotion can vary in the degree of affectivity, regardless of valence.  An emotion can 
be an experience of pleasure or pain and this further influences action and behaviour.  Pleasure 
is usually associated with approach whereas pain is associated with avoidance.  Affect is a 
subtle feeling that can prompt an individual to pay attention to a stimulus and initiate emotional 
responses such as changes in physiology, behaviour, or cognitive responses (Frijda, 1988).  
According to Russell’s (2003) circumplex, affect is a combination of pleasure/displeasure and 
activation/deactivation (can also be called arousal) and both aspects influence the experience of 
an emotion. 
In the case of negative emotions, displeasure is often experienced but activation varies.  
For example, a feeling of displeasure or pain is felt for fear, hostility, sadness, and shame but 
the degree to which displeasure is activated are different for each emotion.  Emotions like 
sadness or shame may be lower on activation while hostility may be higher on activation.  
Alternatively, fear could either be high or low in the activation domain depending upon the 
eliciting situation.  If fear has been detected due to some external threat then it would lead to 
higher levels of activation but if fear is an underlying learned behaviour then fear could also be 
at the lower end of activation.  Hostility is associated with displeasure and high activation 
(Heponiemi, Ravaja, Elovainio, & Keltikangas-Jarvinen, 2007).   
Appraisal and Coping Patterns 
 Appraisal patterns form one of the most important parts of an emotional experience.  
The age old debate between emotion theorists on equating emotion with cognition has brought 
to light the important role of appraisal in emotional experience (Clore & Ortony, 2008).  
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Appraisals involve cognitive activity in the emotion process that provides information about the 
person-environment interaction (Lazarus, 1991).  In 1960, Magda Arnold planted the seed that 
humans innately evaluate anything we encounter almost immediately and automatically in 
relation to personal significance (Clore & Ortony, 2008).  The planted seed gave birth to the 
appraisal theories of emotion.  Among the early appraisal theorists, Lazarus (1966) offered a 
theory of stress and coping in which appraisal takes place at two levels.  Primary appraisal 
occurs when a threat is perceived to oneself and secondary appraisal is concerned with cognitive 
processing of possible response options towards the threat.  When the appraisals are deemed as 
exceeding one’s resources and capabilities, then the person is likely to perceive the situation as 
stressful.  These appraisals often give rise to emotions that alerts an individual to the importance 
of a situation and in response, coping processes are triggered. Coping is the process of 
managing the perceived stress through cognitive and behavioural efforts (Lazarus & Folkman, 
1984).  A number of appraisal theories have since taken root with many variants of the different 
forms and theories of appraisal (Moors, Ellsworth, Scherer, & Frijda, 2013).  A common thread 
that runs through the many appraisal theories is that “emotions are adaptive responses which 
reflect appraisal features of the environment that are significant for the organism’s well-being” 
(Moors et al., 2013, p. 119).   
The current debate among appraisal theorists is whether emotions have distinct 
expressions, thoughts, feelings, neurochemistry, and behaviour or whether a core affect system 
consisting of positive and negative reactions and arousal defines emotions.  As per the core 
affect system, the situation determines the valence and the specific emotion elicited (Russell & 
Barrett, 1999).  For example, in a situation involving threat, fear is elicited whereas in a 
situation involving a loss, sadness is elicited.  According to Barrett (2006), discrete emotions are 
more loosely organized psychological states than tight modules of various components.  This 
debate has fuelled further questions about the nature of appraisals and appraisal processes and 
these claims are still being debated among appraisal theorists.  For the purposes of this thesis, 
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the view taken is that distinct appraisal patterns predict specific emotions as different emotions 
can be elicited even in the same situation (Siemer, Mauss, & Gross, 2007). 
An appraisal can be defined as “a process that detects and assesses the significance of 
the environment for well-being” (Moors et al., 2013, p. 120).  Appraisal theories have some 
commonalities and differences.  The commonalities provide an overview of the role of appraisal 
in emotion while differences show that there are issues that have remained unresolved about the 
appraisal process.  The issue of interest in this thesis in relation to appraisals is concerned with 
appraisals as a component of emotions and its influence in coping and emotion regulation 
processes.  Each emotion can be considered a function of the way each individual appraises the 
situation and therefore appraisals act as the interface between the person and the situation, 
providing the flexibility to respond accordingly (Moors et al., 2013).  In general, each individual 
discrete emotion has similar appraisals while the difference between discrete emotions can be 
attributed to different appraisals (Lazarus, 1991).  Therefore, to understand how discrete 
emotions are regulated or regulates, it is also crucial to understand the role of appraisals in 
emotions and current issues that have been unresolved.  Accordingly, some commonalities or 
core features of appraisals are discussed below followed by some differences among the 
theories.           
Commonalities and Differences in Appraisals 
Appraisals can be conscious or unconscious and eventually shapes the ensuing 
emotional experience that unfolds sequentially over time (Grandjean, Sander, & Scherer, 2008).  
According to appraisal theorists, the different emotion components are derived from the 
appraisal of the environment and the person-environment interaction (Lazarus, 1991; Moors et 
al., 2013).  Moreover, emotion components are likely to change as per changes in the appraisal.  
Unlike other discrete emotion theories, appraisal theories consider appraisals as the centre of 
emotional components that influences the elicitation and subsequent intensity of other 
components such as action tendencies, behaviour, physiology, and feelings (Clore & Ortony, 
2000, Frijda, 2007; Lazarus, 1991; Reisenzein, 1994; Roseman & Smith, 2001; Scherer, 2001).  
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Further, appraisals are also considered as the core component of feelings.  Feelings are a 
representation of the conscious reflection of changes in other emotional components (Lambie & 
Marcel, 2002).  As feelings unfold, a part of the unconscious appraisals or the appraisal output 
can become conscious and can shape motivational, somatic, and motor components (Moor et al., 
2013).  Additionally, appraisals can vary and multiply in number.  If only a few appraisals are 
made, then the emotional experience is likely to be less differentiated and more global.  But if 
the number of appraisals increases, then it is likely that the emotional experience is highly 
differentiated and specific (Moor et al., 2013).  Appraisals also determine how people vary in 
their response to the same situation.  According to the appraisal theories, although the relation 
between appraisals and emotions can be variable, the relation between appraisals and emotions 
remain stable.  In other words, people’s perceptions of an event can differ and therefore the 
appraisals lead to different emotions but similar appraisals made by different people can lead to 
the same emotion.     
Although differences in appraisal theories remain unresolved, these issues can also be 
seen as issues of the appraisal processes as a whole.  An important aspect of appraisals that has 
remained unresolved is the extent to which appraisals are central to emotions in as much as the 
extent to which other components are represented in emotions.  Additionally, issues surrounding 
the extent to which each component contribute to the quality of feelings and whether each 
component maintains a certain amount of granularity in feeling states have also been 
unresolved.  Appraisals form an important part of the unfolding of an emotional experience as 
they provide necessary information for coping or regulation.  According to Lambie and Marcel 
(2002), the unresolved issues depend on attentional variables that form a part of emotional 
experience.  The experience of an emotion commences in response to an event that triggers 
primary appraisal and physiological or physical changes simultaneously, followed by secondary 
appraisal consisting of either reappraisal or coping which are dependent upon an awareness of 
emotional phenomena (Lambie & Marcel, 2002).  The extent to which individuals are aware of 
emotional phenomena depends upon individual differences in attentional deployment and these 
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are different over the course of an emotional experience and between emotion experience 
occasions.  The issue of emotional awareness contributes to ambiguity between emotional states 
and emotion regulation.  Different degrees of awareness is likely to influence the degree to 
which people will perceive or experience higher levels of granularity in emotions and the extent 
to which people will be detached or immersed in the object of attention (i.e. components of an 
emotion) (Lambie & Marcel, 2002).  Essentially, even though appraisals are thought to precede 
the experience of an emotion, the extent to which an individual is emotionally aware is 
important for perceiving emotional components.  Based on this description of emotional 
awareness and the current knowledge of appraisals, it can be said that both emotional awareness 
and appraisals are interdependent and this is likely to further influence coping and emotion 
regulation.  An expanded discussion of the emotional awareness construct is continued in the 
emotion regulation section as it forms a part of the ER construct being explored in this thesis.   
Appraisal Patterns and Coping in Discrete Emotions 
According to Lazarus (1991), people usually experience a whole variety of emotions in 
a lifetime but their experience depends upon the ability to verbalize, distinguish, recognize, or 
label them.  Based on research findings, Lazarus (1991) proposed an approach to appraisal 
patterns for discrete emotions that consist of primary and secondary appraisal.  Primary 
appraisal components consist of goal relevance, goal congruence, and type of ego-involvement 
and secondary appraisals may involve blame or credit, coping potential and future expectations.  
Put together, primary and secondary appraisals create a diverse range of cognitive patterns 
which give rise to descriptions of relational meanings for each emotion and differences between 
them.  A brief appraisal pattern and coping tendency for each emotion is provided below. 
Hostile appraisal patterns are highly related to those of anger.  Those who are hostile 
often appraise the situation from a negative bias of beliefs about others in general (i.e. cynicism) 
and a belief that others are not to be trusted and therefore are to be blamed (Barefoot, 1992).  
The appraisal pattern for hostility is more related to secondary appraisal in anger where others 
are held accountable and therefore to be blamed.  Because of the negative beliefs held and the 
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non-trusting attitude, a hostile individual is mostly likely to remain in a psychological cycle of 
hostile cognitions unless the individual becomes capable of reappraising to counter their held 
beliefs.     
Fear can be conscious or unconscious (Ohman & Mineka, 2003).  The primary function 
of fear is to respond to an external threat.  Appraisal patterns for fear fall within the fright-
anxiety continuum.  The primary appraisal pattern for fear is more concerned with goal 
incongruence where there may be an external threat to well-being in the form of bodily harm 
and the secondary appraisal involves uncertainty in coping and future expectancy.  Primary 
appraisals for anxiety involve existential threats to a valued role or goal while secondary 
appraisals involve uncertain coping and an uncertain future expectancy.   
In sadness, the appraisal patterns involve an irrevocable loss where a sense of 
helplessness about restoring the loss is felt (Lazarus, 1991).  A loss can be of diverse kinds such 
as a loss of a valued role or (life) goal or the failure in achieving a goal, self-esteem or social 
status, or a moral value (Izard, 1991; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987; Lazarus, 1991; Power & 
Dalgleish, 2008).  Sadness can be temporary (temporary separation from a loved one) or 
permanent (e.g. death of a loved one).  In contrast with other emotions (e.g. anger, fear), sadness 
can be experienced for a short period of time and can extend to longer periods of time as in 
years.  The sadness and depression continuum can be distinguished through length of time, 
between feelings of helplessness and hopelessness, and future implications.  Depression can 
also be viewed as a reaction to loss but it often lasts longer and is experienced as a sense of 
hopelessness that extends to implications for the whole life (Lazarus, 1991).  Coping in sadness 
often occurs through resignation rather than a struggle and involves disengagement.              
Guilt and shame are overlapping emotions that involve internalized thoughts and 
actions that defy social norms and values (Lazarus, 1991).  The difference between guilt and 
shame lies in how thoughts and actions are internalized.  In guilt, the internalized thoughts and 
actions refer to norms and values that are expectations by parents and/or society.  In shame, the 
internalized thoughts and actions are about one’s ego-identity where discrepancies may arise 
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from what a person is and what he/she wants to be. The primary appraisal in shame involves the 
failure to live according to an ego-ideal and the secondary appraisal is concerned with blaming 
oneself for the failure.  Shame-prone individuals usually cope by redoubling their efforts 
towards achieving an ideal.  According to H. Lewis (1971), people who experience shame have 
internalized the feeling of shame as a failure to abide by parental standards and the assumed 
punishment for this is the underlying threat of rejection and/or abandonment.     
According to Lazarus et al., (1980), pleasant emotions represent an active striving for 
mastery and gain.  Joy is the only positive emotion that has been selected for this study as 
positive emotions have been shown to be less differentiated.  Joy is a pleasant feeling that is 
experienced as a reward for success when a valuable goal has been achieved or progress 
towards a value has been made (Lazarus, 1991).  Joy is also experienced when people are 
happy, delighted, excited, or even when they are feeling alive or lively.  In this respect, pleasant 
emotions are less differentiated than unpleasant or negative emotions and therefore their 
appraisals have also been found to be highly intercorrelated (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988).  In 
particular, joy and happiness have often been examined as substitutes as they appear to be 
generic, undifferentiated responses to pleasant situations (Weiner, 1985).  An appraisal of a 
situation as pleasant is not likely when the situation appears to be uncertain.      
Action Tendencies and Behaviour  
Action tendencies can be referred to as patterns of preparedness of expressive behaviour 
in response to an emotion eliciting event (Frijda, 1988, 1999).  An action tendency may or may 
not result in the expression of the behaviour.  Action tendencies are also considered biological 
urges such as impulses and may differ within the same emotion according to the meaning 
derived from the situation (Lazarus, 1991).  For example, the action tendency of aggression may 
be verbal or physical depending upon the eliciting situation.    
Action tendencies vary considerably with regard to individual emotions.  In fear, the 
action tendency is to avoid or escape or the impulse to get away from an imminent threat.  The 
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tendency of wanting to avoid or flee from a potential harm is different from anxiety as there is 
an obvious threat to the person’s well-being.  In anxiety, there is no concrete goal to facilitate 
the behaviour of avoiding or fleeing because there is nothing specific to get away from 
(Lazarus, 1991).  The action tendency for hostility includes the capacity for verbal and physical 
aggression which may or may not eventuate as expressed behaviour (Heponiemi, Ravaja, 
Elovainio, & Keltikangas-Jarvinen, 2007).  The action tendency for shame is to avoid and hide 
from public exposure or rejection in order to preserve one’s social status or one’s self-esteem 
(Folkman, Lazarus, Dunke;-Schetter, et al., 1986).  In sadness, the action tendency is obscured 
in inaction where withdrawal from the environment and focus on oneself leads to an 
immobilized state that can be viewed as expressed behaviour (Lazarus, 1991).   
Action tendencies of positive emotions such as joy are generally non-specific.  Based on 
Fredrickson’s broaden-and-build theory of positive emotions, discrete positive emotions do not 
necessarily have prototypical action tendencies when compared to negative emotions.  In fact, 
positive emotions allow for “free activation” as cited by Frijda (1986, p. 89)..  Positive emotions 
are associated with thought-action tendencies that are broader and possibly novel. This allows 
the individual to pursue thoughts and actions in free and unscripted forms.  Rather than having a 
specific function, joy broadens the capacity for readiness to interact with the environment in 
free form.    
Physiology 
Discrete emotions have distinct physiological patterns that are regulated by the brain.  
Emotions recruit the autonomic nervous system (ANS) in preparation for a physiological 
response (e.g. fighting, fleeing, freezing, bonding) to diverse situations (Levenson, 2003).  For 
example, the experience of fear prompts a person to get ready for an action that could involve 
the urge to flee and corresponds with distinct ANS activity patterns.  The ANS activates other 
relevant motor systems which results in a behavioural response for that particular situation.  The 
ANS activity is thought to be the underlying system for diverse action tendencies when discrete 
emotions are experienced (Frijda, 1999).  From another perspective however, physiological 
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responses for specific emotions cannot be cleanly distinguished because they emanate from a 
single nervous system, the ANS.  Moreover, the activation of physiological responses can occur 
within the range of autonomic and conscious responses.   
According to discrete emotion theorists, distinctive patterns of ANS activity are 
associated with a range of discrete emotions.  Findings from studies have revealed different 
patterns of autonomic responses in the form of elevated heart rate, rises in body temperature, or 
tension in particular body parts.for specific emotions such as fear, anger, sadness, happiness, 
and disgust (Ekman, Levenson, & Friesen, 1983; Levenson, Cartensen, Friesen, & Ekman, 
1991; Levenson, Ekman, & Friesen, 1990).   Further, a meta-analytic study also provided 
evidence for emotion-specific autonomic patterning but the findings appeared to be weak 
(Cacioppo et al., 1997; Cacioppo et al., 2000).  The weak findings can be attributed to 
inefficient methods employed in these studies.  Specifically, when research evidence from 
individual studies is compared, the intensity of physiological responses for each specific 
emotion does not correspond with each other and physiological responses for individual 
emotions do not necessarily activate the same motor systems.       
Physiological correlates of negative emotions such as anger, fear, and sadness were 
examined in more detail in other studies.  For anger and aggression, typical physiological 
responses included sympathetic activation where increases in cardiac output occurred along 
with the constriction of blood vessels and increases in blood flow to the skeletal muscles and 
brain (Folkow, 1993).  Similar sympathetic activation occurred when fear was experienced with 
the exception that the physiological responses prepared the individual for responding to an 
external threat.  Also, changes in facial expression were an obvious difference between anger 
and fear.  In the case of sadness, physiological distinctions in comparison to other emotions 
have consistently been absent but elevated heart rate and skin conductance has been observed in 
comparison to a baseline (Levenson et al., 1990; Levenson et al., 1992).   
Of the positive emotions identified in the literature, happiness has been the most 
examined positive emotion due to its status as a basic emotion and its broader scope in 
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representing many quality domains of life (Power & Dalgeish, 2008).  The positive emotion joy 
examined in this thesis is often used interchangeably with happiness (Lazarus, 1991).  In this 
respect, research identifying physiological correlates of happiness provides some insight about 
the physiological responses of joy also.  Physiological responses of positive emotions are also 
less differentiated than negative emotions.  Facial expressions of positive emotions are hard to 
distinguish as they share the Ducheene smile and likewise evidence for specific physiological 
responses has often been difficult to distinguish.     
      Research on discrete emotions and corresponding physiological responses is 
presently an active area of study and it seems that more refined computer-aided models for 
recognizing specific emotions are beginning to be used.  More sophisticated computer-aided 
technological advances have made it possible to collect data in real time by specifying emotions 
through a computer program simulation involved in the simultaneous tracking of micro facial 
expressions, cardio activity, skin conductance, and somatic activity. This will likely provide 
confirmation of specific physiological correlates for each emotion in the future.       
2.1.1.2  Discrete Emotions Versus Mood and Affect   
Emotion states can also be differentiated from moods and affect.  In the following 
sections, differences between emotions and moods and emotions and affect are discussed 
consecutively.  The main purpose is to draw out what is meant by emotion states in comparison 
to other emotion-related phenomenon.  It is imperative that an independent conception of 
emotion states is established so that the communication of the differences between emotions and 
its regulation also remain clear throughout the thesis.   
Emotions and Moods 
Emotions have been described as feeling states (Izard, 2009) and mental states (Ortony, 
Clore, & Collins, 1988).  As feeling states, emotions can be triggered either by internal or 
external states and can be activated by cognitive and noncognitive processes (Izard, 1993; 
Ledoux, 1996).    As mental states, emotions are elicited by the external environment and can 
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have phases of intensity that can be measured behaviourally, physiologically, or by self-report 
(Plutchik & Kellerman, 1989).  Behavioural and physiological measures have been useful in 
identifying the duration of emotions but these measures have not been consistent with self- 
reports of emotions.  Some theorists argue that these inconsistencies can be attributed to 
differences between emotions and moods.  Emotions and moods have often been distinguished 
based on a set of criteria consisting of underlying physiological processes and behavioural 
responses but these distinctions have not been supported by published data (Schimmack & 
Siemer, 1998, Unpublished Manuscript as cited in Beedie, Terry & Lane, 2005).  But 
nevertheless, some important criteria used for distinguishing emotions and moods are based on 
the following: (1) specific events that lead up to the elicitation of emotions whereas moods are 
more general and less involved with specific objects or elicitors  (2) the provocation of specific 
physiological patterns when specific emotions are elicited while physiological patterns in moods 
can bemore global or not even be present (3) the intensity in emotions is greater than in moods 
while moods are more diffuse and global affective experiences (4) emotions tend to be fleeting 
and shorter in duration while moods tend to be more enduring and stable over time (Beedie, 
Terry, & Lane, 2005).        
Most emotion theorists agree that the function of emotions is to draw the attention of a 
person to the importance of an event and using the corresponding information and appraisals 
(perceptions and cognitions) to adapt to the concurrent event (Barrett & Salovey, 2002; Cole, 
Martin, & Dennis, 2004; Frijda, 1996; Izard, 2009; Lazarus, 1991).  Emotions prompt us into a 
mode of action readiness.  For example, fear makes us ready to take an action that involves 
flight or fight.  Accordingly, one of the main functions of emotions is to reprioritize goals in the 
wake of internal changes or according to changes in the environment.  Moods on the other hand 
maintain continuity in action readiness as in irritability for example, where there is a 
predisposition to react with anger or hostility.  In this respect, it has also been argued that 
emotion biases behaviour while mood biases cognition (Davidson, 1994).  Further, even though 
moods are generally known to be more long lasting than emotions, emotions can also last for 
36 
 
longer periods of time without turning into a mood (Lambie & Marcel, 2002).  For example, 
jealousy can last for days or years and can manifest in behaviour continuously.  Another 
example is that of love or lust that can last for a longer duration of time and do not count as 
dispositions according to most criteria.   
Emotion theorists agree that emotions and moods share similar characteristics but they 
are also distinct phenomena.  The difference between emotion states and mood states are mainly 
quantitative rather than qualitative and therefore a rigid distinction is not possible.  But 
nevertheless, the focus on emotions in this thesis is primarily based on the view that emotions 
are brief and intense affective experiences that may or may not have been developed in the early 
years of life.   
Emotions and Affect 
Emotions are a subtype of a higher order category of valence states (i.e. positive or 
negative) called affect and are usually experienced when an organism encounters meaningful 
stimuli that require adaptation (Scherer, 1984).  Affect is either a positive or negative feeling in 
response to stress, emotions and moods, or other motivation impulses (Gross & Thompson, 
2007).  In addition, affect has also been referred to as affective style and emotionality.  The term 
“affect” or “affective” will generally refer to this higher order category in this thesis. 
Theories of emotion have several categories and affect belongs to the dimensional 
approaches category where two broad underlying structures, in particular valence and arousal, 
make up the structure.  Valence can be referred to as hedonic tone comprising of pleasantness 
and unpleasantness while arousal can be referred to as activation/deactivation or as actions or 
types of energies that describes the two ends of the continuum (Barrett, 1998; Russell & Barrett, 
1999; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988).  The dimensional approach has mainly been drawn 
from self-reports of feelings where participants were instructed to describe how they 
experienced emotions based on how true they found the adjectives applied to them.  After 
conducting a factor analysis, two clusters have generally emerged that represented valence and 
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arousal (Russell, 1980; Russell & Barrett, 1999) and positive and negative affect (Watson & 
Clark, 1994; Watson & Tellegen, 1985).  More recently, emotion theorists have organized the 
approaches to emotion into levels where valence and activation belong to the higher level 
followed by the affective approaches and then the discrete emotions.  The bulk of research that 
has examined dimensional approaches has mainly used the affective approach for investigations 
in studies and therefore comparisons between dimensional approaches and discrete emotions 
can only be used from the affective approach research.       
The affective-based dimensional approach has mainly been measured by Positive and 
Negative Affective Schedule (PANAS; Watson & Clark, 1994).  The development of the 
PANAS has been proposed as a hierarchical taxonomic scheme in which the higher levels 
represent two broad dimensions and the lower level is composed of distinguishable emotional 
states (Watson & Tellegen, 1985, Tellegen, Watson, & Clark, 1999).  An analysis of the 
hierarchical structure conducted by Tellegen et al., (1999) supported the three hierarchical levels 
namely, the general Happiness versus Unhappiness dimension, the positive affect and negative 
affect dimensions at the next level, and the discrete emotional states at the base level.  The 
researchers suggested that the use of the PANAS at different levels could provide meaningful 
comparisons between more global higher level affective experiences and lower level emotional 
states.  For example, the heuristic value of each level in the hierarchical structure allows 
researchers to determine more differentiated perspectives in relation to other psychological 
constructs.  This aspect of the PANAS is in direct contrast to other measures of emotions that 
measure only one emotion or that measure only the valence, arousal, physiology, approach-
avoidance, or behavioural (e.g. facial and vocal) aspects of emotions.   
Positive and Negative affect has consistently and reliably emerged as two dominant 
variables at the second higher level (Watson & Clark, 1994).  Additionally, the tripartite model 
of Clark and Watson (1991) have also found that positive and negative affect account for the 
majority of variance at the higher valence dimensional level.  Moreover, positive and negative 
can be said to be independent constructs as opposed to being on a continuum (Watson & Clark, 
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1994).  Those who experience higher levels of negative affect often report unpleasantness or 
upsetting feelings while those who experience low negative affect are usually more calm and 
relaxed (Watson & Tellegen, 1985).  Likewise, those who experience positive affect can be 
described as experiencing “a zest for life” with increased feelings of energy, interest, and 
alertness and those who experience low positive affect usually reporting feelings of drowsiness, 
sleepiness, and sluggishness (Watson & Tellegen, 1985).  Furthermore, research evidence has 
shown that the tripartite model provides a link between affect and psychopathology and also 
provides an explanation for both the comorbidity and differences between mood and anxiety 
disorders (Clark & Watson, 1991; Clark et al., 1994; De Bolle, De Clercq, Decuyper, & De 
Fruyt, 2011).  Psychiatric patients generally report higher levels of negative affect than non-
patients (Watson & Clark, 1994).  Trait-like negative and positive emotionality have also been 
shown to be strong predictors of psychological functioning and psychopathology (Watson, 
Gamez, & Simms, 2005; Watson, Kotov, & Gamez, 2006).  Negative emotionality, also referred 
to as neuroticism and behavioural inhibition, can be said to exist on a continuum as they are 
highly conceptually related and similarly positive emotionality or extraversion and behavioural 
activation are also on a continuum (Watson et al., 2005). 
Both negative and positive emotions play their own part in contributing to human 
survival and well-being.  According to cross-cultural anthropological accounts, emotions are 
elicited when evaluations in relation to important goals and needs are to be revised.  In this 
regard, negative emotions are experienced when universal goal-based problems in one’s social 
life are encountered and positive emotions are experienced when these situations are resolved 
(Lutz, 1988).  Positive and negative affective dimensions have been well researched and 
evidence for its links with psychopathology is well established but evidence for the complexity 
of specific emotions is increasingly gaining attention.  Although positive and negative affect has 
contributed considerably to our understanding of emotional disorders in psychopathology, the 
pathways in which affect exerts its influence in emotional disorders is still less clear.  The 
countless studies of negative affect has mainly focused on the influence of negative affect but 
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have not considered other possible mediating variables or other independent influences in the 
relationship between negative affect and psychopathology.  It is clear that affect acts as a global 
emotional indicator of patterns of comorbidity among anxiety and depressive symptoms but 
they do not fully account for the overlap between the syndromes.  It is likely that individual 
discrete emotions may have distinct effects that cannot be reduced to the function of their 
valence.  For example, anger and sadness have different effects on physiology and behaviour 
even though they are both negatively valenced.            
The affective-based dimensional approach can be compared with discrete emotion 
models based on what they are actually measuring.  Positive and negative affect as measured by 
the PANAS at the higher level (Watson & Tellegen, 1988) measures global mood states while at 
the lower base levels, distinct emotional states are being measured.  Even though the PANAS 
captures two broad dimensions at the higher level, research has shown that individuals are 
highly capable of distinguishing between discrete emotions at the lower levels (Tellegen et al., 
1999).  Furthermore, the higher level dimensions emphasizes the measurement of valence and 
arousal while at the lower level key components of emotions, such as physiology, 
behaviour/action tendencies, and appraisals are emphasized.    
Basic characteristic differences between affect and discrete emotions also offer an 
understanding of how they can have distinct effects on mental health and well-being.  Affect can 
be referred to as conscious or unconscious automatic responses that provide a quick feeling of 
whether something is good or bad or whether something is liked or disliked.  An emotion is a 
single longer lasting state of conscious feeling that is characterized by changes in arousal.  
Affect is mainly differentiated based on valence, i.e. positivity versus negativity, while there is a 
large assortment of emotions and moods that people experience (Roseman, 2001).  Affect lacks 
the complexity, the range, intensity, and variety of specific emotions because they are mostly 
rapid responses to a situation that may also dissipate as quickly as they are experienced.  
Emotions in this respect are slower to surface and dissipate.  Moreover, some discrete emotions, 
such as fear, sadness, and anger, are hard-wired, have distinct behavioural and physiological 
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characteristics, and are primarily concerned with survival-critical functions (Levenson, 2011).  
Affect may not entail elaborate cognitive processing but the information contained in affect (i.e. 
positive or negative) may influence subsequent cognitions and behaviour.  Emotions, on the 
other hand, are heavily involved with more detailed cognitions, especially evaluations 
(Roseman & Kaiser, 2001).   
The distinction between the dimensional approach and discrete emotions approach can 
also be gauged from how emotion affects behaviour.  Izard and Ackerrman (2000) have noted 
that the relation between emotion and behaviour develop early in life and tend to remain stable 
over time.  As a child grows, new behaviours add on to the repertoire for a specific emotion in 
line with the existing ones while retaining a similar function.  The ongoing stable relationship 
between emotion and behaviour has further been explored from a large body of empirical 
findings by Baumeister and colleagues.  Baumeister et al., (2007) proposed that in addition to 
the direct effects of emotion on behaviour (e.g. fear leads to flight, anger leads to fight), emotion 
is more likely to influence behaviour indirectly through feedback loops.  The theory proposed 
takes into account differences between affect and emotions as well as their coordinated and 
interrelated influences.  The speed and automaticity of affect can influence behaviour at a 
moment’s notice while emotions take time to stir up cognitive processing and physiological 
changes in order to influence behaviour.  In certain circumstances, human survival depends 
upon the ability to respond quickly to a situation.  When a situation is immediately appraised as 
bad or when confronted with a snake for example, then affect provides the ability for an 
immediate response to run.  In this respect, the evoked emotion, i.e. fear in this snake example, 
usually remains in the memory and is considered more long lasting and therefore often leaves an 
affective residue in association with the behavioural outcome.  This often influences future 
action/behaviour.  Before a similar behaviour is about to occur in another instance, the course of 
action is deliberated based on the memory of the previous behavioural outcome associated with 
the affective residue.  So before deciding to go for a walk in the bush, the last incident of 
spotting a snake is considered and a decision is made according to the affective residue.  As 
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such, affect can influence or preserve the information from previous emotional experiences and 
this can form a feedback loop where future action is chosen based on the anticipated emotion.  
For example, people make choices or changes in their behaviour with an intention to avoid guilt 
or regret.  According to Baumeister et al. (2007), affect provides a signal as to whether rules 
pertaining to the choice of action needs to be revised before future action is taken while a 
specific emotion may trigger ruminating thoughts about whether a different action would have 
led to a different outcome.  The experience of positive emotions generally provide a 
confirmation that the successful use of the particular rule has been effective and therefore a 
positive affective residue will presumably result in the future application of the same rule and 
similar behaviour.  Negative emotions signal that the rule needs to be revised as a result of a 
previous unsuccessful behaviour.  When the same old rule is about to be applied, then the 
negative affective residue provides a warning so that a similar mistake can be prevented.  This 
account of the emotion feedback loop provides one side of the picture as it seems to assume that 
people will generally approach a situation and learn from emotional cues.  However, another 
variable in the feedback loop that needs to be considered is emotion regulation. 
2.1.1.3  The link between emotions and emotion regulation  
The emotion feedback system generally occurs in an ideal scenario where it is assumed 
that people will learn from the emotion feedback loop.  In an ideal situation, the anticipation of 
an emotional outcome that is derived from feedback helps guide decision-making that is optimal 
and beneficial and this feedback system also provides the opportunity to learn a lesson in the 
form of an affective cue that guides future action or behaviour.  But not all situations are ideal 
because there are many other factors involved that can make learning go awry.  Learning is not 
facilitated when feedback is not taken into account in decisions for future action.  The difference 
between adaptive and maladaptive learning provides an indication of when the emotion 
feedback system can become ineffective.  Adaptive learning is promoted when an individual is 
conscious about the emotion.  The state of emotion consciousness facilitates learning through 
memory, by automatically activating affect, and through the anticipation of an emotional 
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outcome.  Learning becomes maladaptive when the desire to avoid or escape emotional distress 
produces a short-term focus whereby a pressing need is felt to feel better immediately.  The 
desire to avoid or escape prevents the processing of emotions including the suppression of any 
feedback that usually arises from processing.  In this way, a short term gain is usually linked to 
more harmful and delayed costs to the individual as this can result in a self-defeating 
behavioural trap.  An example of short term benefits that outweigh long term costs can be 
observed in the use alcohol.   
Research suggests that one of the main explanations for the excessive consumption of 
alcohol is to escape from acute emotional distress.  Usually, the short term intent is to get rid of 
bad feelings and emotions at the expense of long term benefits such as experiencing the emotion 
with full consciousness.  When this kind of learning enters the emotional feedback system, then 
the choice to consume alcohol takes over as the intent is to reduce emotional distress in the short 
term at the expense of being fully aware of lessons to be learned in the long term.  Another 
intention for choosing alcohol could also be to enhance good feelings.  This anticipation of an 
emotional outcome could also become a problem because when the behaviour (i.e. alcohol 
consumption) does not lead to the intended consequence (i.e. good feelings) then it can become 
a trap whereby the person can become increasingly insensitive to other behaviour-shaping 
consequences and the maladaptive behaviour is likely to continue.  This is only one example of 
how maladaptive learning can influence behaviour but many such examples can be seen in other 
behaviourally-related psychological disorders such as eating disorders, anxiety disorders, and 
depression.  
Research is increasingly showing that when people are unwilling to tolerate unpleasant 
emotional states, an effort to control, alter, or escape from them becomes the primary goal.  In 
order to change their emotional state, people are likely to engage in a variety of strategies to 
alleviate emotional distress.  According to Baumeister et al., (2007), when behaviour is aimed at 
promoting changes in emotional states, then the behavioural consequences are derived from 
emotion regulation instead of the emotion itself.  In other words, an emotion or an anticipated 
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emotion can indirectly influence behaviour through emotion regulation.  The kind of strategy 
used, whether conscious or unconscious can lead to adaptive or maladaptive behavioural 
consequences.  At present however, it is not clear whether all specific emotions of the same 
valence influence its regulation or whether learned emotion regulation strategies influence the 
elicitation of an emotion.  The temporal relationship between specific emotions and emotion 
regulation are still unclear.  Moreover, distinctions between specific emotions, specifically their 
different functions, suggest that each emotion may be regulated differently.  Further, the variety 
of emotion regulation strategies and their adaptive and maladaptive effects also have the 
potential to play a role in the way an emotion is regulated.   
At present, there is a paucity of studies where specific emotions and ER have been 
examined (these studies are discussed in more detail in chapter 4) but research has shown that 
the ability to identify and differentiate among specific emotions can contribute to more effective 
coping and emotion regulation (Feldman Barrett, Gross, Christensen, & Benvenuto, 2001).  
Most studies have either used dimensional model measures (i.e. positive and negative affect) or 
psychological symptom measures (e.g. measures of depression or anxiety) in conjunction with 
ER measures to investigate their combined effects on outcomes or to understand the role of 
emotions and ER in psychopathology.  One reason why specific emotions might have been 
ignored in research with ER could possibly be due to the focus of investigation in these studies 
and the limited availability of time and resources for conducting more elaborate research.  The 
use of  dimensional measures to assess emotions in conjunction with ER were possibly due to 
its ease of administration and corresponding ease in statistical analyses.  Moreover, positive 
affect and negative affect, as measured by the widely used PANAS because of its notable 
psychometric properties, have been shown to be independent constructs that reliably measure 
emotions and moods in everyday life and have therefore been considered adequate measures of 
emotions (Egloff, 1998).  Additionally, both positive and negative affect have been shown to 
maintain its relative independence and psychometric properties across time frames and research 
methodologies (e.g. experimental designs, surveys, or ecological momentary assessments).  
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Because positive and negative affect have been demonstrated as robust measures of global 
moods and emotions, it is possible that this has also influenced the focus of research 
investigations in the majority of studies.   
From another perspective, the use of dimensional measures and psychological symptom 
measures may possibly be due to a reason that is more theoretical in nature as this is concerned 
with whether emotions and ER are different facets of a single process or are two separate 
factors.  It seems that research investigations have not considered this the theoretical notion that 
emotions and ER either belong to a single dynamic emotional process or are two separate 
factors.  Therefore it might have been justified to examine ER constructs on their own (without 
emotions or affect) to determine its role in psychopathology.  The debate on this topic is 
ongoing but a short review of both sides of the debate is presented below. 
Emotion and Emotion Regulation as a one factor model or two -factor 
model? 
 An understanding of whether emotions and ER is a one-factor model or a two factor 
model has implications on how studies are designed and interpreted.  Some researchers propose 
that emotions and ER are conceptually separable and therefore methodologically they should be 
studied as two separate factors (Cole, Martin, & Dennis, 2004; Gross & Barrett, 2011; 
Thompson, 2011).  Other researchers, however, claim that emotions and ER are a one-factor 
model or a single process (Campos, Frankel, & Camras, 2004; Kappas, 2011).  Both sides of the 
argument are relevant in this thesis because there is still no clear consensus as to whether 
emotional experiences trigger ER or whether learned patterns of responding trigger emotions or 
the desired emotional experiences.          
Researchers who have proposed the two-factor model suggest a clear distinction 
between ER and emotions (e.g. Cole et al., 2004; Gross & Barrett, 2011; Thompson, 2011).  In 
contrast other researchers argue for a one-factor model (Campos, Frankel, & Camras, 2004; 
Kappas, 2011; Hollenstein, 2015).  According to Campos and colleagues, any distinction 
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between ER and emotions is analytical and conceptual at best and mainly serves research 
purposes.  Campos and colleagues argue that emotions are regulated as well as regulating and 
claim that emotions are seldom left unregulated.  Emotions can be regulating when an emotion 
drives the goal or purpose of its regulation and automatically influences perception and 
behaviour or in other words the response to the emotion.  For example, the emotion shame can 
be regulating and regulated as an individual would most likely want to avoid a situation where 
shame could be involved (regulating) and as a result that experience of shame is not felt 
(regulated).  Another way in which the idea can be expressed is by viewing emotions as a 
continuous emotional process where conscious or unconscious decisions are made as to whether 
an emotional state is experienced.  The single-factor model also lends further credence to the 
value in distinguishing between specific emotions as each emotion is likely to regulate and be 
regulated differently according to their specific function.  It is also argued that selecting among 
emotions is itself self-regulatory as responses are being considered or auto-regulated because 
the emotional reaction itself implies that there is a bias towards the emotion-eliciting situation 
and prompts the individual to take immediate action (Kappas, 2011).  Therefore, ER and 
emotions represent different facets of a single process (Campos et al., 2004; Kappas, 2011).  
Some reasons cited for the single process is based on the emotion generation process where (1) 
cortical regions can become activated before an emotion is generated, (2) previous regulatory 
patterns can influence subsequent choice of emotional experience, (3) the choice of an 
environment can also influence emotions, and (4) more than one emotion can be elicited 
through a single stimulus (Campos et al., 2004).  Furthermore, research has also shown that ER-
related or self-regulatory abilities are likely to develop earlier than cognitive meta-emotion 
capacities in early childhood.  According to the one-factor model, ER processes essentially 
belong to the larger emotion construct and attempts to separate the processes can potentially 
distort our understanding of emotional processes.  On the other hand, poorly regulated emotions 
can have some detrimental physiological and psychological effects.  This means that 
investigations of ER processes are essential for understanding optimal functioning.  Therefore, 
separating the constructs according to the two-factor model can serve other benefits.           
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Arguments for the two-factor model are varied.  One argument is that ER is not merely 
the down-regulation of negative emotions and the up-regulation of positive emotions.  As has 
been mentioned above, each specific emotion is potentially regulated differently or can 
potentially be regulating.  Research evidence on the different strategies used in the emotion 
generation process model (Gross, 1998) has shown that emotions may be initiated or subdued, 
increased or decreased, and/or maintained when elicited based on individual-specific goals 
which in turn depend on environmental contingencies.  For example, in nonclinical samples, 
expressive suppression strategies were used more often than re-appraisal strategies by those 
who experienced psychological distress and depression (Gross & John, 2002, 2003; John & 
Gross, 2004).  Furthermore, outcomes of regulated emotions also provide evidence for the two-
factor model.  For instance, the employment of rumination in response to the experience of 
negative emotions has been shown to predict the onset, duration, and recurrence of depression 
(Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema, Girgus, & 
Seligman, 1992).  Moreover, evidence for the ongoing use of maladaptive ER strategies, such as 
suppression in regulating sadness, can be seen even after remission of depression (Ehring, 
Tuschen-Caffier, Schnulle, Fischer, & Gross, 2010).  From an adaptive perspective, the ability 
to identify and label emotions in conjunction with an awareness of the experience of emotions 
increases the willingness to experience negative emotions and contribute towards better quality 
of life and life satisfaction (Gratz & Roemer, 2004; Hayes et al., 2006).  Furthermore, 
suggestions for different pathways in the regulation of positive emotions are also being 
proposed and contribute to the argument for a two factor model.  One pathway that has been 
suggested involves the dampening or suppression of positive emotions due to the experience of 
strong negative emotions.  In an attempt to regulate negative emotions through suppression, 
positive emotions may consequently be suppressed also (Carl, Soskin, Kerns, & Barlow, 2013).  
In another pathway, positive emotions are regulated by savouring (positive mental reflections) 
or capitalizing (behavioural strategies used to upregulate) (Langston, 1994).  Essentially, ER 
strategies are not limited to experiencing emotions only but are a complex, dynamic, and 
continuous response system that may be automatic or controlled (Gross & Thompson, 2007; 
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Kashdan & Rottenberg, 2010).  In addition, neurobiological research has shown clear and 
observable links between the prefrontal cortex and ER processes (Owen, 2002).  It has been 
shown that the prefrontal cortex and by extension ER processes plays a crucial role in regulating 
amygdala activity (emotional arousal), suggesting that neural correlates (i.e. the prefrontal 
cortex) of ER processes are different from the emotional arousal neural centre (Banks et al., 
2007; Quirk & Beer, 2006).   
In summary, evidential support for a two-factor model is more plausible than a one-
factor model; however, ER theorists acknowledge that the distinction is not clear cut.  For 
example, Gross and Barrett (2011) suggest that the distinction could merely be due to the design 
of the study and that the two factor model provides a theoretical way to understand how ER 
processes and emotions interact with one another.  Moreover, different specific emotions can 
potentially have different regulatory functions as suggested by Campos and colleagues.  From 
another perspective, it seems that ER strategies are capturing a broader set of processes than just 
the experience of emotions.  For example, worry, rumination, thought suppression, and 
automatic negative thoughts are components of reflexive processes in emotion dysregulation 
(Gruber, Eidelman, & Harvey, 2008; McLaughlin & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2011; McLaughlin, 
Mennin, & Farach, 2007; Wenzlaff & Luxton, 2003).  Moreover, repetitive negative thinking, a 
cognitive common factor in rumination and worry, is involved in the maintenance of emotional 
problems in a range of Axis I disorders (Ehring & Watkins, 2008).  Repetitive negative thinking 
has also been posited to represent a transdiagnostic factor in various psychological disorders 
(Ehring & Watkins, 2008).  The evidence and arguments from both sides show that a clear cut 
one factor or two factor model is difficult to achieve.  Other researchers have suggested that due 
to a lack of consensus of an operational definition of ER, a meaningful distinction between ER 
and emotions remains elusive (Chambers et al., 2009).  Moreover, current ER definitions and 
models may be lacking in their recognition of other inherent processes that are relevant in 
mental health problems (Bonanno & Burton, 2013; Chambers et al., 2014).  In the next section, 
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the definition of emotion regulation and various emotion regulation strategies are discussed 
along with more recent research on effective emotion regulation styles and processes.     
2.1.2  Emotion Regulation 
2.1.2.1 Definition and Emotion Regulation Strategies  
 Research in emotion regulation (ER) is maturing and has become an independent field 
of study from research on emotion (Tamir, 2011).  However, the field of emotion regulation is 
still relatively new and there is little consensus on a precise definition of ER.  An inclusive 
definition is provided by Thompson (1994): “emotion regulation consists of extrinsic and 
intrinsic processes responsible for monitoring, evaluating, and modifying emotional reactions, 
especially their intensive and temporal features, to accomplish one’s goals” (pp. 27-28).  In this 
definition, a functional view of ER is presented as emotions satisfy some kind of function based 
on individual-specific-goals and the context of the emotion-eliciting situation (Thompson & 
Goodman, 2010).  ER has also been defined according to what they target and their function.  
Koole (2009) identified three types of emotional responses that are targeted in ER; attention, 
knowledge, and embodiments.  The function that ER strategies serves are mainly hedonic needs, 
goal-orientated functions, and person-orientated functions (see Koole, 2009 for further details).  
Several more definitions have been used to describe ER concepts.  ER can also be referred to as 
a subjective experience or an emotionally-related response that includes concurrent changes in 
cognitions, behaviour, and physiology (Bridges, Denham, & Ganiban, 2004; Gross, 1998).  
Alternatively, ER can be conceptualized in terms of appraisal (e.g. perceptual) or bottom-up 
processes and cognitive or top-down processes such as volitional attention and working memory 
(Bell & Wolfe, 2004). In addition to conventional definitions of ER, research in mindfulness is 
increasingly showing that different facets of mindfulness facilitate emotion regulatory 
processes, including awareness of emotions, being nonjudgmental and nonreactive, and being 
more accepting of emotions (Boulanger et al., 2010; Gratz & Roemer, 2004; Hayes et al., 1999).   
 ER is also closely related to coping but first an understanding of coping in the stress 
literature is necessary before making any comparisons.  Coping came into focus many decades 
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ago when Lazarus (1966) argued that stress consisted of primary appraisal, secondary appraisal, 
and coping processes.  As mentioned in the appraisal section of emotions, primary and 
secondary appraisal potentially occurs prior to the elicitation of an emotion when an individual 
interacts with a particular situation (Gross, 1998).  If the situation is perceived as stressful, then 
negative emotions may be elicited.  Coping is the process of managing the perceived stress 
through cognitive and behavioural efforts (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984).  Although appraisals and 
coping overlap, they are also distinct processes in some ways.  Coping is more involved with 
the management of the perception that has been created or developed through appraisals and 
therefore certain coping strategies that include efforts to deal with the stressor are used in order 
to bring about changes to the situation.  Coping has been classified as problem-focused coping 
and emotion-focused coping (Folkman & Lazarus, 1980).  Problem-focused coping involves 
strategies used to alter the sources of stress while emotion-focused coping are attempts to 
manage or reduce emotional distress associated with the situation. Although the two types of 
coping are distinct, they tend to overlap the other.  When people feel that they can cope with the 
situation through constructive means, then problem-focused coping dominates and people often 
use strategies such as positive reappraisal and problem-solving.  In contrast, when emotion-
focused coping dominates, then people have the feeling that the distress is to be endured and 
they may tend to engage in strategies that impede adaptive coping such as cognitive 
suppression, avoidance, or escape (Folkman & Lazarus, 1980).   
Differences and similarities between coping and emotion regulation are mainly 
concerned with the object of regulation (i.e. emotions and emotion components).  These 
differences can be better understood from a problem-focused coping perspective.  Coping 
involves more than just the regulation of emotions as coping responses (e.g. problem-solving, 
reappraisal) are aimed at changing the situation which may or may not elicit emotions or 
involve emotions (John & Gross, 2009).  Further, coping can also be distinguished from ER 
based on whether the response was used to regulate emotional behaviours and/or physiological 
responses in managing emotional distress.  On the other hand, ER conceptually overlaps with 
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emotion-focused coping when both are concerned with efforts to manage or reduce the impact 
of negative emotions (Losoya, Eisenberg, & Fabes, 1998).  For example, Silk, Steinberg, and 
Morris (2003) used a coping questionnaire that also measures wide-ranging emotion-focused 
coping strategies to assess how children and adolescents regulated real-time emotional 
experiences.  The increased use of coping questionnaires with the intention to measure ER 
processes, particularly in the past few decades, has largely spurred the emergence of ER as an 
independent construct.  Moreover, the observation that cognitive strategies, particularly 
cognitive reappraisal, can be used for reducing stress responses and can result in benefits for 
psychological health led to further integration of coping and ER strategies.  The early studies of 
appraisal and coping were also adopted by appraisal emotion theorists and have subsequently 
been adapted into a process model of emotion by Gross (1998).   
The process model of emotion is based on the functional view of emotions that 
evaluations commence when internal or external emotional cues are detected in a situation 
(Gross, 1998).  An emotion starts unfolding when a stimulus is perceived (or appraised) within a 
context and the process of attending to its features commences.  Emotional components, such as 
behavioural, physiological, and experiential, are triggered due to certain evaluations and 
response tendencies that become activated according to perceived threats and opportunities 
(Gross, 1998).  The triggering of evaluation and modulation processes also triggers 
corresponding emotion regulatory strategies.  Emotions have been proposed to be regulated 
either before full-blown emotional responses arise (i.e. antecedent-focused) or after (i.e. 
response-focused).  Antecedent-focused strategies are likely to influence the generation of an 
emotion while response-focused strategies influence emotional response tendencies when an 
emotion has already been elicited.  ER processes employed before an emotion is elicited 
include;  situation selection, situation modification, attentional deployment, and cognitive 
change.  Correlational studies have shown how people select and avoid situations, including 
studies that have shown how caregivers alter the emotional experiences of infants.  Very few 
studies have used experimental designs to test situation selection and modification while more 
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studies have examined attentional deployment and cognitive change.  ER processes used after 
an emotion is elicited are called response modulation strategies.  The majority of correlational 
and experimental ER studies have examined response modulation strategies in connection with 
psychopathology and well-being variables.  Accumulated evidence shows that response 
modulation strategies predominantly contribute to psychopathological processes.  The process 
model of emotion is called the emotion generation process model (used interchangeably with 
the process model of emotion regulation; Gross, 1998).  The emotion generation process unfolds 
over time and the impact of ER strategies depends on the stage in which it unfolds in the 
emotion generation sequence.  
Regulatory and coping strategies that are used before an emotion is elicited are often 
called reappraisal strategies while strategies used after an emotion is elicited fall in the category 
of suppression.  Reappraisal strategies are often thought to be effective in regulating affect and 
physiological arousal as they target emotion-related knowledge.  In comparison, suppression 
strategies refers to either the suppression of experience or expression strategies and adversely 
affects cognition and physiology as they target bodily and behavioural responses.  There is a 
plethora of regulatory strategies that focus on cognitive, behavioural, and physiological aspects 
of regulation.  These strategies either occur as a part of the emotion generation process or can be 
classified as variations of reappraisal strategies or of suppression strategies.  Some examples of 
these strategies in the ER literature are presented here: emotional awareness, emotion 
identification, rumination, distraction, problem-solving, cognitive restructuring, social support, 
information seeking, engagement, helplessness, avoidance, escape, denial, inaction, wishful-
thinking, self-reliance, social isolation, negotiation, opposition, acceptance of emotions, 
mindfulness practice, perspective-taking, self-harm, catastrophizing, self-blame, other-blame, 
exercise, relaxation, alcohol use, cigarette smoking, drug use, eating, and restricting eating 
(Aldao & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2010; Chaplin & Aldao, 2013; Gross, 2007; Zimmer-Gembeck & 
Skinner, 2011).  Some strategies such as problem-solving, cognitive reappraisal, engagement, 
social support-seeking, relaxation, acceptance, and mindfulness are considered more adaptive.  
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In contrast, maladaptive strategies can either be categorized as forms of avoidance or as over-
engagement strategies (Hayes & Feldman, 2004).  Experiential avoidance is a type of an 
avoidant maladaptive strategy in which emotions, thoughts, images, memories, and physical 
sensations are avoided.  At times these strategies can be useful but its persistent use can 
outweigh its initial benefits and can become ineffective in the longer term.  Experiential 
avoidance underlies many forms of avoidant strategies that are often manifested as distraction, 
denial, cognitive distortion, suppression, repression, substance abuse, self-harm, disengagement, 
social isolation, and suicide (Hayes & Feldman, 2004).  Over-engagement strategies is 
regulation that involves being preoccupied and consumed by the emotional experience and 
results in the use of strategies such as rumination, worry, obsessions, compulsive behaviour, or 
impulsive behaviours (Hayes & Feldman, 2004).  In addition to the strategies mentioned, self-
regulation also plays a role in coping and ER. 
Emotional Self-Regulation 
The multifaceted aspect of processes in ER is also a reflection of self-regulatory 
attempts to manage emotions.  The ability for self-regulation begins early in life commencing 
from attempts to regulate distress during infancy and learning how to focus, shift, or inhibit 
attention during the toddler years.  At first, caregivers provide the needed regulation to calm 
distress or aggressive outbursts but as development occurs, children learn how to apply effortful 
control and start to become more proficient at self-regulating their distress.  Children learn how 
to self-regulate adaptively by actively distracting themselves and shifting their attentional focus 
on more pleasant stimuli in the environment (Denham, 1998).  However, some children are 
unable to master self-regulatory strategies during the preschool years and this has been shown to 
impair personality development and social competence (Kochanska, Murray, & Harlan, 2000), 
the development of theory of mind (Izard et al., 2011), and school success and cognitive growth 
(Macklem, 2008).  These self-regulatory strategies have also been called emotional self-
regulation.  To a certain extent, self-regulation can become automatic/unconscious processes as 
these regulatory processes have been learned and conditioned in childhood and eventually 
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influence regulatory processes in adolescence and adulthood.  In adults, failures in self-
regulation have often been observed as underregulation (lack of self-control) and/or 
misregulation (misguided/counterproductive self-control; Carver & Scheier, 1981).  Self-
regulation consists of three important aspects, namely standards/goals, monitoring, and the 
operation phase (Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996).  Impairments to self-regulation occur when 
standards or goals are lacking or are in conflict amongst each other, when the ability to monitor 
or track one’s actions and its effects are lacking or the inability to judge one’s situation is 
inaccurate, and when the inability to override impulses (default programming, habits, 
motivations) is hampered (Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996).  Emotional self-regulation is 
therefore the ability to engage with or disengage from one’s standards or goals by keeping track 
of one’s behaviour and directing it to achieve a desirable outcome even in the presence of 
emotional impulses.   
The purpose for the need to self-regulate plays an important part in the regulation of 
emotions.  People often regulate emotions in order to feel a certain way.  One of the most 
prominent reasons for regulating emotions is to maximize hedonic feelings or to maximize 
immediate pleasure and minimize or avoid unpleasant ones.  People also want to maximize 
useful emotions and minimize harmful ones.  Therefore, what people want to feel depends on 
both the maximization of pleasure and its utility/usefulness (Tamir, 2009).  When the 
maximization of or the preference for immediate pleasure is emphasized, then short-term 
benefits are obtained at the expense of long-term benefits.  On the other hand, when the 
usefulness of an emotion is preferred, then long term benefits are likely to outweigh short-term 
benefits.  Essentially, goals specify whether people will pursue feelings of pleasure or 
usefulness.  But pursuing a goal can be conscious or unconscious depending upon the ability to 
reason or on implicit learning.  Moreover, context determines goal preferences which in turn 
influence emotional preferences.  Research has shown that the self-regulation of emotions in 
pursuit of immediate pleasure (the goal) can contribute to dysfunctional ER that can be observed 
in for example, eating disorders and alcohol abuse.  In contrast, when people learn how a 
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particular emotion can be useful in a particular context, then they are more likely to override 
short term benefits in order to reap long term benefits (Tamir, 2009).  For example, people may 
be willing to experience unpleasant emotions such as anger when it has been demonstrated to be 
useful in certain contexts (Tamir, Mitchell, & Gross, 2008).  Research in ER is increasingly 
drawing from broader self –regulatory models that range from automatic/unconscious regulatory 
processes to more conscious, flexible, and open regulatory processes (an expanded discussion 
can be seen in section 2.1.2.3; Westphal & Bonnano, 2004).  Furthermore, self-regulation does 
not solely occur through the individual but is often influenced by others and the environment, or 
in other words the context in which it occurs.  
Such a wide array of strategies coupled with multidimensional aspects of ER included 
under one umbrella has rendered it almost impossible to define ER.  This broad approach 
considers any action or nonaction as ER.  But nevertheless, the majority of researchers agree 
that ER is concerned with the modulation of certain aspects of an emotional experience or 
response that can be adaptive or maladaptive, automatic or conscious/effortful processes 
(Campos, Campos, & Barrett, 1989; Eisenberg & Spinrad, 2004; Gross, 1998).  In sum, 
adaptive ER involves the ability to modify or reduce the intensity and/or frequency of aversive 
emotional states and the capacity to generate and sustain emotional states that contribute to 
psychological health.  Maladaptive ER can either be referred to as the absence of adaptive 
strategies to regulate responses to emotions that fosters goal attainment, or the use of a narrower 
range of strategies that may not be effective (Aldao & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2012).  Maladaptive 
ER tends to play a larger role in distress and psychopathology than adaptive ER (Aldao & 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 2010; Cairns et al., 2014).  
Emotion Dysregulation 
 Maladaptive ER can also be known as deficits in ER or emotion dysregulation. 
Generally, individuals who engage in a smaller subset of regulatory strategies are likely to 
experience emotion dysregulation and reduced socio-emotional well-being in the long term 
(Bonanno et al., 2004).  Emotion dysregulation has been implicated in a broad range of 
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psychopathological symptoms and behaviours (Aldao & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2010; Cisler et al., 
2010; Gross & Thompson, 2007) and have been identified in Axis I and Axis II disorders in the 
various versions of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Health (American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994).  Longitudinal and experimental studies suggest that ER deficits 
are not only correlates of psychopathological symptoms but are also significant antecedents of 
mental illness (Berking, Wirtz, Svaldi, & Hofmann, 2014; Liverant, Brown, Barlow, & Roemer, 
2008).  Emotion dysregulation is increasingly emerging as the underlying factor in the 
development and maintenance of psychopathology.   
Emotion dysregulation behaviours can be reported as under-regulation and over-
regulation of emotional content.  Emotion under-regulation can be referred to as deficits in 
regulating the experience of intense emotions.  It is common in post-traumatic stress disorder, 
borderline personality, and the various anxiety disorders.  On the other hand, emotion over-
regulation can be observed in obsessive-compulsive disorder and bipolar disorder, particularly 
the manic phase.  By far, problems of emotion dysregulation are a key factor in depression and 
anxiety disorders (Campbell-Sills & Barlow, 2007; Mennin, Heimberg, Turk, & Fresco, 2005).   
Additionally, emotion dysregulation can also be seen in clinically relevant behaviours including 
deliberate self-harm (Gratz & Chapman, 2007; Gratz & Roemer, 2008), substance abuse (Fox, 
Axelrod, Paliwal, Sleeper, & Sinha, 2007; Fox, Hong, & Sinha, 2008), and binge eating (Leahy, 
Crowther, & Irwin, 2008; Whiteside, Chen, Neighbors, Hunter, & Larimer, 2007).   
2.1.2.2 Summary of the Current Research of Prominent Emotion Regulation Strategies  
The large body of evidence in coping and emotion regulation strategies (as 
demonstrated in the previous section) has culminated into a greater understanding of how 
people respond to and adapt to ever changing situational contexts.  Theories and associated 
constructs that emerged from the accumulated research have increasingly emphasized the 
dynamic nature of person-situation interactions and have provided considerable insight on the 
role of coping and ER in adjustment, yet there is a lack of understanding in how a particular ER 
strategy can be adaptive or maladaptive in different contexts due to diversity of situations and 
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emotional triggers.  This lack of understanding can be attributed to the practice of categorizing 
coping and ER strategies as either adaptive or maladaptive (Bonanno & Burton, 2013).  
Adaptive ER strategies have been considered healthy and are associated with well-being while 
maladaptive ER strategies have been considered unhealthy and are associated with 
psychological difficulties (Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema, & Schweizer, 2010; John & Gross, 2004).  
More recently however, research on ER has been showing that emotions can be regulated in 
many different ways and that the different ER strategies have different consequences in 
different contexts, irrespective of being adaptive or maladaptive (Sheppes et al., 2014).  
Moreover, multiple different strategies can also be used in the same context in order to obtain 
optimum results and by the same token, the same strategies can be used in different situations 
with deleterious effects.  Research has indicated that a specific coping or ER strategy can 
influence mental health outcomes in various ways rather than in uniformity to the predictions of 
the categorized assumptions (Folkman & Moskowitz, 2004).  Examples of this new generation 
of ideas can be seen through novel findings in rumination and suppression.  But first, an 
introduction of where these strategies are located in the emotion generation process model is 
provided along with a brief description of the differences in strategies. 
Webb, Miles, and Sheeran (2012) developed a taxonomy of the relationships between 
ER processes and specific ER strategies by combining conceptual frameworks of Koole (2009) 
and the emotion generation process model (Gross, 1998) in an attempt to show how different 
definitions of ER and ER strategies are more similar than different.  According to the taxonomy, 
three ER processes, namely, attentional deployment, cognitive change, and response 
modulation, were identified in the ER experimental literature and these were linked to specific 
ER strategies that have been extensively investigated.   Furthermore, findings from the meta-
analysis also supported the conceptual distinctions between the three processes in the emotion 
generation process model described by Gross (1998).  Figure 2 below is a representation of the 
taxonomy.     
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Figure 2.2 ER processes and corresponding ER strategies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the attentional deployment category, various forms of distraction and concentration 
have been the focus of many studies.  Distraction can be effective when it is more active 
(intentionally thinking of unrelated thoughts to the emotion or emotion-related stimulus; 
Masuda et al., 2010) than passive (engaging in tasks unrelated to the emotion or emotional 
stimulus; Donaldson & Lam, 2004) and when more distinct emotionally positive material is 
presented in comparison to emotionally neutral material (Shepley, 2006).  Similarly, 
concentration can be effective when the focus is applied towards processing experiences, 
evaluating and analysing the situation, and arriving at a problem-solving mode (Kross, Adyuk, 
& Mischel, 2005; Watkins & Teasdale, 2004).  In contrast, concentration can be psychologically 
detrimental when attention is directed towards feelings and their consequences.  This is also 
called rumination (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000).  Rumination is the tendency to focus on the 
experience of negative emotions, its causes, and consequences in a repetitive manner (Nolen-
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Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008).  Although the purpose of rumination is to 
understand the source of distress, engagement in rumination paradoxically increases negative 
mood-congruent cognitions, restricts problem-solving, hinders instrumental behaviour, and 
prevents others from providing social support (Lyubomirsky, Kasri, & Zehm, 2003).  It has 
been suggested that when a re-immersion in the experience of emotions occurs, it heightens the 
feeling of the emotion and often results in maladaptation (Mor & Winquist, 2002; Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2000). 
In the category of cognitive change, ER strategies can take the form of a reinterpretation 
of the emotional experience.  According to Webb and colleagues, cognitive change includes 
acceptance and qualities of mindfulness such as being nonjudgmental by observing the ongoing 
stream of thoughts and feelings as they arise (Brown, Ryan, & Cresswell, 2007).  Mindfulness 
and acceptance eventually contributes towards reappraisal and a change in perspective (Holzel, 
et al., 2011).  Findings from the meta-analysis that compared the three broad processes in the 
figure above showed that strategies involving cognitive reappraisal were the most effective in 
comparison to attentional deployment and response modulation (Webb, Miles, & Sheeran, 
2012).   
Response modulation can be referred to as ER strategies that seek to alter the 
physiological, experiential or behaviour when response tendencies have been activated (Gross & 
Thompson, 2007).  Suppression occurs in many forms and is also considered a form of 
avoidance.  Suppression involves attempts to suppress expression, experience, and thoughts.  
Expressive suppression is the attempt to hide or inhibit the expression of ongoing emotional 
behaviour and/or emotional experience (Gross & John, 2003) while thought suppression is the 
attempt to stop thinking about unwanted thoughts (Wegner, 1994).  Attempts to control or 
suppress emotions often lead to a paradoxical increase in its frequency and intensity because 
people experience a rebound effect (Wegner, 1994).   
Suppression and rumination has been found to be the most widely used maladaptive 
strategies as reported in a meta-analytic study (Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema, & Schweizer, 2010).  
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Moreover, suppression and rumination strategies have been found to be strongly associated with 
symptoms of depression, anxiety, eating disorders, and substance use in comparison to the weak 
associations of adaptive strategies such as reappraisal and problem-solving (Aldao,Nolen-
Hoeksema, & Schweizer, 2010).  Suppression and rumination have consistently emerged as 
potent risk factors for the emergence and maintenance of psychopathology among other emotion 
regulation strategies (Aldao & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2010).  But from another perspective, the 
effects of suppression and rumination also depend upon the context or the situation in which 
these strategies are used.    
According to the emotion generation process model by Gross (1998), emotion 
dysregulation usually occurs after an emotion is elicited when an appraisal is made.  As 
proposed by Gross (1998), expressive suppression is used as an attempt to modulate the 
response to the appraisal of an emotion.  Accumulated evidence has shown that expressive 
suppression can be considered maladaptive but the goal of suppression is also an important 
consideration.  The first goal may entail the suppression of the expression of an elicited 
emotion.  This goal can be an effective strategy or an ineffective strategy depending upon the 
context.  The second goal may be an attempt to suppress the internal experience of the emotion 
and associated thoughts.  The suppression of emotions and associated thoughts in both clinical 
and nonclinical populations has generally been accepted as an ineffective strategy as suggested 
in self-regulatory models such as emotional inhibition and experiential avoidance (Boulanger, 
Hayes, & Pistorello, 2010; Lynch, Robins, Morse, & MorKrause, 2001).  But the expression of 
an emotion may also be considered appropriate for a specific situation.  For instance, 
suppressing feelings of disgust when confronted with the illness of a loved one is considered a 
better option than expressing it.  In other words, suppression, especially expressions of emotion, 
operate as important social and communicative functions (Parkinson, Fischer, & Manstead, 
2005).  In certain contexts, suppression may be beneficial especially in Eastern cultures when 
compared to Western cultures (Butler, Lee, & Gross, 2007) and in situations that involve excess 
adversity (Bonanno & Keltner, 1997).  In essence, neither expression nor suppression of 
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emotions is as crucial for adjustment as is flexibility in relation to the demands of the situation 
(Bonanno, Papa, Lalande, Westphal, & Coifman, 2004).    
Similarly, rumination has predominantly been cast as a maladaptive ER strategy as 
dwelling on negative aspects of the self has consistently been shown to function as a core 
diathesis for the emergence, maintenance, and recurrence of depressive episodes.  In contrast, 
moving attention away or distracting oneself from emotional processing can counter the effects 
of rumination.  From another perspective, rumination can also be advantageous in situations 
where a goal requires single-minded attention amid distractors (Altamirano, Miyake, & 
Whitmer, 2010) as distraction can be maladaptive when long-term adjustment is involved 
(Kross & Ayduk, 2008).   
It can be concluded that the existing understanding and knowledge of ER strategies can 
be viewed as incomplete based on findings from the various meta-analytic studies.  In the meta-
analytic study conducted by Webb et al. (2011), different ER processes (attentional deployment, 
cognitive change, and response modulation) have been shown to be conceptually distinct but 
significant differences between them were found to be modest.  However, an unexpected and 
important finding showed robust findings for the use of the same strategy in different contexts, 
which highlighted the need to examine ER strategies from a different perspective. These 
findings suggest that individuals are likely to use a particular strategy in many situations as 
deemed appropriate but this could also mean that the same strategy is used indiscriminately, 
thereby reducing effective regulatory behaviour.  For example, findings for expressive 
suppression revealed that when the expression of emotions was suppressed, it was generally 
effective but the suppression of emotional experiences and associated thoughts were generally 
ineffective.  This suggests that the suppression of expression may have been justified in certain 
contexts as the intention underlying the suppression may have been appropriate for the situation.  
On the other hand, suppression is generally ineffective as the suppression of emotional 
experience is more of an intrapersonal modulating strategy that can prevent awareness of the 
experience and thereby also prevent the processing of other accompanying information that 
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allows for clarity of the emotional experience.  Therefore, the indiscriminate use of suppression 
can result in ineffectiveness in the longer term.  Likewise, the widely acknowledged role of 
reappraisal as an adaptive ER strategy was also found to be less effective in comparison to using 
perspective taking or the reappraisal of the context in the elicitation of emotion or the cause of 
the emotion. 
Furthermore, the process model of emotion generation has been used widely but it 
seems like categorizing ER strategies as antecedent-focused and response-focused categories or 
as adaptive and maladaptive may not portray the whole picture of why people regulate emotions 
in different ways in different contexts.  For example, large distinctions among ER strategies 
have mainly been found to be between the use of cognitive strategies and behavioural strategies 
according to a meta-analysis of ER strategies (Augustine & Hemenover, 2009).  It was also 
found that behavioural (avoidance and engagement) strategies outweighed cognitive (avoidance 
and engagement) strategies in repairing affect effectively, possibly due to ease of 
implementation.  This could also be due to the proclivity of people to recall behavioural rather 
than cognitive responses.  For example, the use of avoidance strategies outweighed use of 
engagement strategies possibly due to the ease in avoiding rather than directly dealing with 
negative affect through journal writing or seeking constructive support from others (Augustine 
& Hemenover, 2009).  Moreover, wide variances between similar strategies were also observed.  
This meta-analysis has shown that categorizing ER strategies may not necessarily help in 
gaining a better understanding of how and when ER strategies are used which subsequently 
influences our incomplete understanding of the regulation of emotions.  As has been shown, 
people are likely to use certain strategies over others as they may consider those strategies 
suitable for the situation.   
An emerging aspect in understanding emotional experiences is shifting towards the 
interaction between the person and the context.  Although this idea is not new, research in 
coping and ER has predominantly focused on a few strategies rather than on this aspect.  Most 
importantly, researchers from both cognitive and behavioural traditions have begun to converge 
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in their conclusions regarding the choice of ER strategies.  People use different strategies in 
different situations based on what is deemed appropriate in the particular context rather than on 
adaptive or maladaptive features of the strategy.  Given our current understanding about the use 
of ER strategies, researchers have started addressing flexibility in the use of ER strategies.    
2.1.2.3  Flexibility in the use of Emotion Regulation Strategies 
Findings from an increasing number of studies are now showing that benefits of ER 
strategies depends upon the context (i.e. the person situation interaction) and this calls for  
flexibility in using the most appropriate strategy for the situation.  Moreover, research is also 
showing that the flexible use of ER strategies has long term consequences on mental health and 
well-being.  Accordingly, Bonannand Burton (2013) have advanced a model of self-regulation 
that emphasizes flexibility in coping and emotion regulation.  The broader construct in this 
model is referred to as Regulatory Flexibility and includes processes such as context sensitivity 
(perceived impinging demands and opportunities), the repertoire of regulatory strategies (wide-
ranging strategies accommodating contextual demands), and responsiveness to feedback 
(ongoing monitoring of efficacy of strategies for behavioural adjustment).  The premise for the 
emergence of this broader construct is based on individual differences in self-regulation and the 
use of the most effective regulatory strategies that fulfil its functional purpose.  However, a 
deeper understanding of the role of context in regulatory strategies is important to clarify for the 
purpose of this thesis. 
Context is a slippery construct but it can be referred to as interrelated circumstances that 
surround a situation, an event, or a process (Aldao, 2013).  Based on this concept, context is 
often relative and therefore its operationalization can also be relative to what context means in 
regulatory strategies.  Context can be organized into four broad categories that include (1) the 
personal characteristics of an individual , (2) the stimuli in the environment that triggers an 
emotion, (3) the strategy choice and implementation involved, and (4) the kinds of outcomes 
expected (for a more detailed discussion of the broader construct of context, please see Aldao, 
2013).  From a regulatory flexibility perspective, context consists of characteristics of the 
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organism which can be referred to as abilities to perceive changes in the environment in relation 
to the self and choosing to respond accordingly.  This is also what is meant by context 
sensitivity (the meaning of context sensitivity will be further elaborated in the mindfulness and 
PF sections).  In the wider literature, context has been lumped together to include a variety of 
contextual characteristics but a majority of the characteristics are more concerned with emotion-
eliciting stimuli in the environment or types of outcomes expected such as hedonic vs. 
instrumental or short vs long term.  Some of the contextual characteristics that have been the 
focus of empirical and theoretical papers are presented below.                  
Over time, past research has highlighted that the shifting nature of contextual demands 
play a crucial role in the choice of regulatory strategies.  Several contextual characteristics that 
have been deemed important in determining variability in the efficacious use of ER strategies 
have been attributed to controllability of the stressor (Carver & Connor-Smith, 2010; Folkman 
& Moskowitz, 2004), aspects of the person (demographics, personal psychological 
characteristics, cognitive factors, and psychopathology), external stimuli in the elicitation of 
emotion (environmental factors such as interpersonal processes or uncontrollable external 
factors), ER strategy selection and implementation (instructed vs. spontaneous selection of 
strategies or acceptance vs. reappraisal), kinds of outcomes assessed (different effects of 
emotional components, hedonic vs. instrumental expectations, short vs. long term effects)  
(Aldao, 2013), cultural and social influences that contribute to variability and their subsequent 
consequences, regulatory choice in the emotion generation process (Sheppes, Scheibe, Suri, & 
Gross, 2011), and cognitive and motivational factors (e.g. financial rewards and long term 
goals; Sheppes et al., 2012).  Although these contextual characteristics overlap with and 
influence regulatory strategy choice, Bonanno and Burton (2013) have emphasized that the 
interrelated combinations of the suite of regulatory processes are dynamic and vary according to 
the stressor rather than being stable and uniform in nature.  In this sense, the regulatory 
flexibility construct extends beyond the multiple contextual characteristics and can be viewed as 
a multidimensional construct that assesses varying underlying processes used for responding to 
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shifting contextual demands.  This idea of context-based coping and ER has contributed to a 
growing body of research and has opened up a new understanding of how intrapersonal 
flexibility can influence the optimal utilization of ER strategies.   
Furthermore, the recent understanding of flexibility in the use of ER strategies has also 
led to other different conceptualizations and names for ER.  Flexibility has been referred to as 
Emotion Regulation Choice (Sheppes, Scheibe, Suri, & Gross,2011).  The underlying idea 
introduced by the researchers encompasses similar context-related ideas about flexibility in 
using ER strategies.  People generally adapt their emotions to suit the needs of the situation 
(Gross, 2007; Koole, 2009).  Based on this notion, people make choices on how to regulate 
emotions according to situational demands as ER strategies have different consequences in 
different contexts (Sheppes et al., 2014).  ER choice considers the stage at which ER strategies 
are used in the emotion generation sequence.  For example, early engagement in reappraisal 
allows for a more elaborated capturing of important information and cognitive processing in 
preparation for an adaptive response in low intensity emotional situations and disengagement in 
the form of distraction at an early stage for emotional processing in high emotional intensity 
situations (Sheppes et al., 2011; Sheppes et al., 2014).  These ideas have more recently been 
regarded as demonstrating good ER flexibility.  In the framework of ER choice, disengagement 
in the form of distraction occurs earlier than reappraisal in the emotion generation process and is 
more often used for high intensity emotional situations (Sheppes et al., 2014).  Moreover, long 
term costs and benefits need to be considered when using disengagement.  Although benefits 
may result in less expenditure of cognitive resources, this comes at the expense of a loss in the 
ability to store and retrieve emotional information in working memory in the service of long 
term goals and functioning due to a lack of initial emotional processing (Sheppes & Meiran, 
2007; Sheppes et al., 2009; Sheppes & Meiran, 2008).  In the series of studies conducted by 
Sheppes and colleagues, regulatory choice has been demonstrated to be linked with well-being 
and psychopathology.  A healthy regulatory choice in the form of reappraisal often leads to 
healthy adaptation while the repeated use of disengagement distraction can often result in 
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overgeneralization of the strategy and subsequently lead to maladaptation.  Essentially, the 
choice in implementing whichever ER strategy is likely to have long term implications for the 
individual.              
In addition to the reappraisal framework in ER choice, costs and benefits of reappraisal 
has also been shown to be dependent on the controllability of stressor context (Troy, Shallcross, 
& Mauss, 2013).  The context of controllable (when changes can be made to a situation) and 
uncontrollable (when only the self can be regulated) situations seems to dictate whether 
reappraisal is an adaptive regulatory strategy.  In Troy et al’s (2013) study, reappraisal was 
unrelated and negatively correlated to psychological health in a controllable situation.  In 
controllable situations, reappraisals for negative emotions may not be suitable as according to 
the functional view, emotions serve an adaptive purpose and so negative emotions serve the 
purpose of motivating people to take action.  Reappraisal may influence inaction or the 
inflexible use of regulation and may therefore be maladaptive.  On the other hand, reappraisal is 
effective when the stress is uncontrollable and where reappraisal can contribute to adaptive 
outcomes.  This study provides further support for flexibility models that involve the flexible 
deployment of regulatory strategies according to demands of the situation.   
The ability for flexibility or choosing an appropriate ER strategy requires a certain 
insight into the emotional functioning of the self in relation to the environment otherwise 
feedback processes can become haphazard and can be based on short-term consequences, 
thereby, unsuccessful in the long term.  To a large degree, the ability for being contextually 
sensitive depends on an awareness or a presence of mind that alerts the individual to internal 
feelings when changes in the environment occurs. This then provides a platform from which to 
react or act.  Additionally, the two stage model of affect regulation states that the inability to 
correctly identify emotional states often contributes to ineffective coping (Larsen, 2000).  
Research in children, adolescents, and adults have shown that emotional awareness is a 
prerequisite for competency in emotional functioning, particularly in balancing internal 
emotional states (see review by Kashdan, Barrett, & McKnight, 2015).  The ability to identify, 
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label, distinguish, and express emotional states have been investigated under a variety of names 
and constructs.  In the following section, a brief summary of emotional awareness and 
mindfulness is presented.   
2.1.2.3.1 Emotional Awareness 
Regulatory flexibility largely depends upon attentional awareness as conceptualized in 
emotional awareness (Lambie & Marcel, 2002) and the ability to focus on the present moment 
(also known as mindfulness; Brown & Ryan, 2003).  In this section, emotional awareness will 
be discussed first, followed by mindfulness in the following section.   
Emotional awareness has been defined as attentional processes that allow for 
interpretations and evaluations of emotions (Rieffe et al., 2008).  Awareness of the evaluative, 
behavioural, and bodily aspects of an emotional state depends upon directional focus and mode 
of focal attention (Lambie & Marcel, 2002).  Directional focus is attention that can either be 
directed to the self or to the world.  Mode of attention can occur in to two stages of awareness: 
(1) the immediate experience of an emotion that involves the degree of immersion or 
detachment with the object of attention and the degree of analytical or synthetic attention 
towards components or to a whole, to lower or higher description or category, and (2) an 
awareness that involves varying degrees of reflection, reporting, purposive recall, i.e. attention 
which is more characteristic of diffused attention such as relaxation and hypnagogic states 
(Lambie & Marcel, 2002).   
In comparison to ER, emotional awareness assesses whether an individual can 
consciously experience emotional arousal as feeling states in the form of bodily sensations, a 
tendency to act, or to verbally express one’s emotions.  The conscious awareness of emotional 
components may differ in individuals and this most likely contributes to the experience of 
emotions and its regulation (Subic-Wrana et al., 2014).  Differences in emotional awareness can 
be gauged in anxiety and depression.  For example, a state of arousal may be experienced as 
restlessness but the conscious feeling of anxiety may be lacking, while another person may 
experience bodily sensations as anxious arousal and be able to consciously connect it with 
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anxiety.  Similarly, a depressed individual may attribute social avoidance to feelings of 
exhaustion while another person may attribute the same to feelings of sadness or shame.  An 
awareness of emotional components is crucial for connecting the links between emotional 
arousal and ER.  If emotional awareness is appraised accurately, then there is greater possibility 
for successful ER.  In contrast, if emotional awareness is lacking, then there is a greater 
possibility for ER to be unsuccessful, resulting in maladjustment.  The importance of emotional 
awareness has been demonstrated in a study below.        
A longitudinal study examined emotional awareness in early adolescents by using the 
TAS-12 (i.e. alexithymia) to predict specific positive (joy) and negative (fear, hostility, and 
sadness) emotions and PSS (Ciarrochi, Heaven, & Supavadeeprasit, 2008).  The results 
indicated that the inability to identify emotions significantly predicted increases in fear and 
sadness (particularly in boys, not girls) and decreases in joy in the following year.  Similar 
effects were found for perceived social supportwhere the inability to identify emotions 
contributed to decreased perceptions of the number of social supports and satisfaction with 
them.  This study provides some preliminary evidence for the importance of emotional 
awareness and also its importance in identifying specific emotions.      
In the broader literature, “alexithymia,” defined as impairment in describing and 
experiencing emotions, has been observed as a deficit-based phenomenon of emotional 
awareness (Nemiah & Sifneos, 1970).  In this regard, several measures for assessing the various 
aspects of emotional awareness have been developed such as the emotion expression scale for 
children (EESC; Penza & Zeman, 2002), the emotion awareness scale (EAQ-30; Rieffe et al., 
2007), the Toronto alexithymia scale (TAS-20; Bagby, Parker, & Taylor, 1994), the alexithymia 
questionnaire for children (AQ-C; Rieffe, Oosterveld, & Terwogt, 2006), and the levels of 
emotional awareness scale for children and adults (LEAS; Lane, Quinlan, Schwartz, Walker, & 
Zeitlen, 1990; LEAS-C; Bajgar, Ciarrochi, Lane, & Deane, 2005).  These measures have been 
developed independently and measure unique aspects of awareness but they also measure 
overlapping themes and concepts of emotional awareness.  Some examples of overlapping 
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concepts include emotional expressions that portray awareness, bodily/physical awareness of 
emotions, awareness of other’s feelings, and differentiating emotions.  Despite the overlapping 
themes, research findings have shown that the various emotional awareness measurements do 
not measure the same underlying construct as demonstrated below.   
Several studies in children, adolescents, and adults have examined the effects of poor 
emotional awareness in the emergence and maintenance of psychological disorders.  Findings 
from most studies in children and adolescents have shown that poorer emotional awareness 
influences internalizing disorders (Rieffe, Oosterveld, Miers, Terwogt, & Ly, 2008; Zeman, 
Shipman, & Suveg, 2002) while only some studies have shown poorer emotional awareness 
influencing externalizing disorders (Casey & Schlosser, 1994).  In a recent study with 
adolescents, the LEAS-C was found to be negatively correlated with the AQ-C, demonstrating 
that the underlying construct in the two measures were distinct (Vermain, Fontaine, & Van 
Ryckeghem, 2015).  Among adults, emotional awareness as measured by the TAS-20, a self-
report scale, has mainly been shown to be impaired in mental disorders such as depression, 
anxiety, adjustment disorders, and eating disorders.  Whereas emotional awareness measured by 
the LEAS, differentiates between diagnostic groups in patients with body-related symptoms and 
those with other psychological symptoms.  Low scores on the LEAS have primarily been 
associated with the tendency to experience emotional distress as bodily symptoms.  Moreover, 
findings from a study comparing the TAS-20 and LEAS in inpatients showed that the TAS-20 
specifically captured changes in negative affect while the LEAS captured changes in emotional 
awareness during the course of treatment (Subic-Wrana et al., 2005).   
Findings from the small number of studies reviewed above suggest that the various 
emotional awareness measurements are assessing different aspects of emotional awareness.  It 
appears that emotional awareness is an important construct for understanding individual 
differences in emotional experience but the varied research outcomes demonstrate that the 
emotional awareness construct is broader than what is assessed by each measurement.  Even 
though the measurements have common underlying themes, they seem to be tapping into 
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distinct static characteristics of a disposition or trait of emotional awareness.  Emotional 
awareness may consist of broader emotion identification skills than just the simple labelling of 
emotional states, such as the identification of different conflicting emotions, the identification of 
emotions in self and others, and identification of similarities between emotions (Lane & 
Schwartz, 1987; Saarni, 2000).  Additionally, while dispositional assessments of emotional 
awareness provide valuable information about emotional processing, they may have limited 
value from a therapeutic point of view.  For instance, it is widely accepted that alexithymia is 
difficult to treat as these individuals tend to have a historical pattern of emotional avoidance and 
ingrained maladaptive behavioural responding patterns used for emotion self-regulation.  In this 
regard, mindfulness provides an alternative and broader view of attention and awareness that is 
more in line with emotional awareness as suggested by Lambie and Marcel (2002).  Further, an 
increasing body of research is showing that the capacity for awareness can be enhanced through 
the training of attention in therapeutic settings.     
2.1.2.3.2  Mindfulness 
Mindfulness has been referred to as qualities of awareness but mindfulness is also 
considered a disposition.  The original definition of mindfulness emerged from Buddhist 
psychology and emphasizes qualities of consciousness, such as moment-to-moment awareness 
and nonjudgment/nonreactivity (Kabat-Zinn, 1994). Awareness in mindfulness can be defined 
as “the conscious registration of stimuli, including the five physical senses, the kinesthetic 
senses, and the activities of the mind” (Brown, Ryan, & Cresswell, 2007, p. 212).  A more 
contemporary understanding of mindfulness integrates Buddhist contemplative theory with 
Western psychological theories.  Mindfulness can be defined as “the awareness that emerges 
through paying attention on purpose, in the present moment and nonjudgmentally to things as 
they are” (Williams, 2007, p. 47).  Accordingly, mindfulness has been proposed as a two 
component process.  The first component involves the self-regulation of attention for the 
purpose of focusing on the immediate experience of the present context rather than using past 
experiences to focus on the present context.  These skills involve the ability to sustain attention, 
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recognize and switch back to the present moment when the mind wanders, and using a 
nonjudgmental awareness approach towards thoughts, feelings, and sensations.  The ability to 
observe and become aware of one’s thinking and cognitive processes is called metacognitive 
awareness.  The second component involves approaching one’s experience with acceptance and 
curiosity, irrespective of the valence and desired expectations of the experience.  This allows 
one to observe the self and ever-changing flow of private experience.  Mindfulness has also 
been proposed as a dispositional trait that is reflected in a multifaceted construct in which 
mindful attributes consist of acting with awareness, nonjudging, nonreacting, being able to 
describe experiences, and observing (Baer, Smith, Hopkins, Krietemeyer, & Toney, 2006).  
Items in the multifaceted construct are usually referred to as mindful behaviours.  Some 
individuals may naturally be mindful while for some individuals, mindfulness can become trait-
like tendencies when appropriately trained.   
Certain aspects of mindfulness have also been viewed to be similar and dissimilar to the 
theory of self-awareness with respect to attention and awareness.  Conscious attention by nature 
can either be directed towards the self or towards the external environment at one moment in 
time.  Self-awareness is concerned with conscious attention directed upon the self (Davis & 
Brock, 1975).  Other names used for self-awareness are “objective self-awareness” or “self-
focused attention.”  The theory underlying self-awareness postulates that when attention is 
focused on the self, then a series of self-evaluations also crop up when discrepancies are 
perceived to exist between the ideal self and one’s achievements, thus contributing to lowered 
self-esteem and negative affect (Duval, Wicklund, & Fine, 1972).  In contrast, when people are 
given positive feedback to avoid negative stimuli, then self-awareness can enhance positive 
affect (Duval, Wicklund, & Fine, 1972; Gibbons & Wicklund, 1974).   
Similarities and differences between mindfulness and self-awareness often vary 
according to strength, direction, and kind of attention deployed (Brown, Ryan, & Creswell, 
2007).  Strength and direction of attention refers to the sufficient ability to bring attention 
towards both the inner and outer realms so that reflective consideration can be given to one’s 
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goals.  The strength in directing attention towards mental, emotional, and physical experience 
contributes to healthy self-regulation while a lack of sufficient attention contributes to habitual, 
automated, or overlearned responses that may not be situationally or contextually appropriate. 
Differences between mindful and reflexive attention lie in the quality of attention 
deployed.  Specifically, the purpose of consciousness plays a role in explaining these 
differences.  The function of consciousness is both to monitor and control.  The monitoring 
function is that of an observer while the control function is that of maintaining and/or changing 
responses in the direction of one’s selected goals (Brown, Ryan, & Creswell, 2007).  The 
control function is mainly concerned with the self-regulation of attention to stimuli in relation to 
self-relevant concerns and enhancement of identity and self-concept.  Essentially, this kind of 
self-awareness can also be said to be a direct response to stimuli without “awareness” (Zuriff, 
1986, p. 237-238).  According to Zuriff (1986), there could be two levels of awareness of the 
self.  The difference in the two levels can be gauged from the example wherein one might say “I 
see a tree” and “I’m aware that I see a tree.”  This example could potentially provide an 
explanation for the quality of attention deployed in mindfulness.  The monitoring function in 
mindfulness serves as an observer of awareness rather than self-regulator of self-relevant 
cognitions.  Becoming aware of awareness itself is in direct contrast to generating forms of 
cognition in pursuit of enhancing self-concept.  This kind of conscious processing involves 
being in contact with the present moment so that inner and outer stimuli is captured accurately.  
It also introduces a mental gap between attention and its object for the purpose of creating space 
between consciousness and mental content (Martin, 1997).       
Although mindfulness engenders qualities of consciousness, it is not necessarily 
equivalent to activities that enhance mindfulness.  Mindfulness can be enhanced through 
practice and through mindfulness-based interventions in therapy.  The most common means of 
cultivating mindfulness is through the practice of mindfulness meditation.  Meditation is 
generally known as the training of attention and awareness for bringing mental processes into 
regulated control thereby fostering mental well-being and developing calm, clarity, and 
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concentration (Walsh & Shapiro, 2006).  Many styles of meditation are currently being 
practiced and while it is assumed that all practices benefit practitioners equally, research has 
shown otherwise.  Neurological studies have shown that different styles of meditation have 
different effects on brain activity (Cahn & Polich, 2006; Lutz, Dunn, & Davidson, 2007).  For 
example, in comparison to concentrative forms of meditation (e.g., chanting of a mantra), 
mindfulness meditation has shown stimulation in the mid-prefrontal brain which is associated 
with self-observation and metacognition (Cahn & Polich, 2006; Siegal, 2007).   
Qualities of mindfulness have been explored through the use of psychometric 
assessments.  Various psychometric self-report measures assessing dispositional mindfulness 
have been developed, including the Freiburg Mindfulness Inventory (FMI; Wlach et al., 2006), 
the Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Skills (KIMS; Baer et al., 2004), the Five Facets 
Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ; Baer et al., 2006), and the Mindful Attention Awareness 
Scale (MAAS; Brown & Ryan, 2003).  Considerable similarities between the mindfulness 
measures have been observed, especially in aspects of awareness in mindfulness and attitude in 
acceptance, but there are also differences among them (Rau & Williams, 2016).  For example, 
MAAS focuses on subjective experience of awareness while the KIMS and the FFMQ focus on 
dispositional mindfulness traits.  Dispositional mindfulness measures have been shown to be 
positively related to meditation experience (Baer et al., 2008) and trait mindfulness is likely to 
increase with increased exposure to mindfulness training (Bowen et al., 2009; Carmody & Baer, 
2008).  Similar to dispositional mindfulness measures, behavioural-based measures of 
mindfulness attempt to capture interdependent overlapping processes in a multidimensional 
format. 
Behavioural-based measures of mindfulness have been developed to capture 
intercorrelated processes such as acceptance, present moment awareness, cognitive defusion, 
self-as-context, clarity in values, and committed action on one end of the continuum and 
experiential avoidance and cognitive fusion on the other end of the continuum.  The processes 
are behaviourally operationalized according to the function of the process rather than in terms of 
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disruptive cognitive patterns (Gillander et al., 2014).  These measures are the Acceptance and 
Action Questionnaire (AAQ; Bond et al., 2009), and the Action and Fusion Questionnaire for 
Youth (AFQ-Y; Greco, Lambert, & Baer, 2008).  The AAQ and AFQ-Y measure the 
Psychological Flexibility construct and is the emphasis in the ACT modality of mindfulness 
interventions.  Researchers have used these mindfulness questionnaires as state and trait 
measures in both research and applied contexts for assessing the association of mindfulness with 
mental health and psychological well-being, quality of life, behavioural regulation, physical 
health, affect, cognitive performance, and quality of relationships.  The AAQ has been shown to 
overlap considerably with other mindfulness (i.e. MAAS and FFMQ) and self-compassion 
measures and the AAQ has also been shown to predict larger variance in negative indicators of 
psychological health than the MAAS and FFMQ (Woodruff et al., 2013).  For the purpose of 
this thesis, the behavioural-based measure of mindfulness (i.e. the AFQ-Y) has been used.  
With the increasing use of mindfulness treatments for an array of psychological 
disorders and with disordered ER at the core of psychological disorders, researchers have 
proposed the integration between mindfulness and ER (Chambers, Gullone, & Allen, 2009).  
Evidence is accumulating for the significant overlap between mindfulness and ER.  Attentional 
deployment in ER is not a new concept in Western psychology and is considered as one of the 
multiple strategies in the emotion generation process model (Taylor & Amir, 2010).  Moreover, 
benefits of mindfulness practice have been observed in psychotherapy particularly in relation to 
affective, interpersonal, and intrapersonal improvements (Davis & Hayes, 2011).  Based on 
these insights, links between mindfulness and ER are discussed further in the following section. 
Mindfulness and Emotion Regulation  
From an emotion regulation perspective, the practice of mindfulness helps develop a 
distance between internal and external experiences while allowing for more flexibility in 
choosing how to react to a particular situation.  Mindfulness promotes self-regulation by 
enhancing the ability to selectively attend to positive stimuli and refrain from reacting to 
negative stimuli and allows for flexible responding to emotions and other internal states through 
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emotional acceptance.  Mindfulness contributes to the effective regulation of emotions through 
decreased reactivity and increases flexible responding.  The reduction in dysphoric reactivity is 
usually achieved through the development of metacognitive skills where tolerance for negative 
affect is fostered through a wider attentional frame (Teasedale, 1999).  
Overlaps between mindfulness and effective self-regulation processes have also been 
observed.  A mindful approach promotes regulatory flexibility (as mentioned in section 2.1.2.3 
above) as being mindful allows one to consider the impinging demands and opportunities of the 
context-at-hand, use regulatory strategies that are most appropriate for the situation, and monitor 
and adjust ongoing internal cognitions, emotions, and behaviours (Brown, Ryan, & Creswell, 
2007).  Attributes of regulatory flexibility can be achieved when attentional deployment 
strategies are aimed at meeting the demands of the context.  In this respect, mindfulness uses the 
same processes as regulatory flexibility whereby the decision to choose to respond depends 
upon its appropriateness to the situation and adjustments to behavioural responses are monitored 
through ongoing observation.  On the other hand, being mindful is the opposite of self-
controlled regulation (e.g. Baumeister, Bratlavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998).  A mindful state is 
not a state of self-control where mental content is manipulated (e.g. suppression) but is rather a 
state of awareness of the internal thoughts and emotions occurring at each moment. 
The above benefits of mindfulness contrast with avoidance and overengagement 
strategies when used for regulating emotions.  Avoidance and overengagement strategies are 
likely to hinder the functional and adaptive nature of emotions through effortful control or the 
attempt to modify the intensity, frequency, and/or duration of emotions.  Attempts to modulate 
emotions also involve an attachment to these efforts and therefore further efforts are required to 
dampen emotional arousal.  This repeated cycle where more and more efforts are required are 
due to the rebounding effects of suppression.  This is a reflection of the emotional control 
agenda which is indicative of experiential avoidance (this is further explained in the next 
section).  On the other hand, mindfulness contributes to the functional and adaptive nature of 
emotions.  The multidimensional benefits of mindfulness support behavioural control instead of 
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emotional control (Gratz & Tull, 2010).  Behavioural control is concerned with the ability to 
inhibit impulsive behaviours or alternatively, acting according to one’s goals or values in the 
presence of negative emotions (Linehan, 1993; Melnick & Hinshaw, 2000).  This 
conceptualization of mindfulness overlaps with ER and is consistent with behavioural-based 
mindfulness and acceptance approaches of psychological treatment.       
In comparison to the practice of cognitive-behavioural interventions working at the 
levels of reappraisal and response modulation, mindfulness is not a direct intervention for 
regulating moods and changing them.  Instead, an observation of the ebb and flow of emotions 
and its associated thinking, behavioural, and physiological tendencies is encouraged.  
Observation allows one to become familiar with one’s emotional repertoire and fosters tolerance 
for negative emotions, thereby reducing the influence of the intensity of emotions and its 
duration (Corcoran, Farb, Anderson, & Segal, 2010).  With the cultivation of an open, 
accepting, unbiased awareness, and a wider attentional focus towards inner experience, the 
efficacy of one’s behaviour and manifest action is also monitored.  Neurologically, 
disengagement with previously learned automatic pathways is achieved through self- 
observation which results in the promotion of flexibility in the use of emotion regulatory 
strategies (Siegal, 2007).  Input from the present moment allows for the integration of current 
information and results in the tailoring of responses to idiosyncratic features of the concurrent 
situation rather than the use of habitual reactions. 
In conclusion, neuroscientific studies have shown that mindfulness allows for the 
engagement with or disengagement from the selected target while responding to the situation, 
thereby enabling emotional flexibility.  These studies have also shown that rather than the top-
down approach in ER, as in reappraisal, mindfulness produces dynamic equilibrium states in the 
brain, which in turn influences  capability in the processing of moment to moment situations 
while reducing habitual elaborative processing.  Furthermore, the neuroscientific evidence 
suggests that mindfulness enhances ER by expanding attentional capacity and metacognitive 
awareness and as a result, contributes to decreases in avoidance of thoughts and feelings, greater 
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ability for tolerating negative emotions, and reduces the overreliance on under-engagement or 
over-engagement ER strategies.    
Although benefits of responding with a mindful approach as an alternative to 
conventional ER responding approaches is widely accepted, research is still lacking in how 
mindfulness and acceptance works as an ER construct.  In the following section, psychological 
flexibility is proposed as a mindful emotion regulation construct. 
2.1.2.4  Psychological Flexibility as Mindful Emotion Regulation  
The enhancement of mindfulness and acceptance skills in therapy became more 
widespread with the advent of the “third wave” of cognitive-behavioural therapies (CBT) such 
as Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT; Segal, Williams, & Teasdale, 2001), 
Dialectical Behaviour Therapy (DBT; Linehan, 1993), Acceptance and Commitment Therapy 
(ACT; Hayes, Strohsal, & Wilson, 1999), Functional Analytic Psychotherapy (FAP; 
Kohlenberg & Tsai, 1995).  The newer approaches of CBT differ from the traditional and 2
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wave of cognitive therapies on philosophical, scientific, and clinical grounds (Hayes, 2004, 
more details are discussed in chapter 3).  One major difference worthy of mention here is that 
symptom alleviation is not specifically sought but instead the goal is to promote mindfulness 
and acceptance through behaviour change methods.  In particular, ACT aims to enhance 
psychological flexibility (PF).  In fact, the PF construct can be viewed as core processes of 
mindfulness which is defined as “the ability to contact the present moment more fully as a 
conscious human being, and to either change or persist when doing so serves valued ends” 
(Hayes et al., 2004, p. 5).  The PF construct can be used to represent the extent to which 
individuals are dispositionally mindful or those who have achieved a certain level of 
mindfulness through mindfulness practice or through mindfulness promoting interventions as in 
ACT.   
Processes inherent in PF stem from the ACT model and are based on behavioural 
principles that focus on verbal behaviour called Relational Frame Theory (RFT).  Psychological 
flexibility is the ability for directing flexible attention to the present moment, being accepting of 
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psychological distress in the context of valued action, defusing from the content of speech and 
thinking, engaging in discriminating the “self” from aversive thoughts and feelings, committing 
to action that is in the direction of chosen values even in the presence of distressing thoughts 
and emotions, and focusing on values that improve vitality and meaning in life (Blackledge & 
Barnes-Holmes, 2009; Hayes, Strohsal, & Wilson, 2012).  This is considered the ACT model of 
psychological well-being.  On the other hand, psychological inflexiblity occurs when attention 
is dominated by certain kinds of rule-governed behaviour that leads to avoidance, loss of present 
moment awareness, fusion, lack of clarity in values, and a lack of committed action.  This can 
be called the ACT model of psychopathology (Levin & Hayes, 2009).  Many of these processes 
overlap considerably and therefore exclusive measures that assess a single process can lose its 
meaning (Levin & Hayes, 2009).  Therefore, the PF construct was developed to measure the 
continuum of mindfulness and acceptance on one end and experiential avoidance and cognitive 
fusion on the other end (this is further expanded in Chapter 3).  Additionally, the clinical utility 
of these processes have been supported in component studies that examined the function of 
these intervention processes in a recent meta-analysis (Levin, Hildebrandt, Lillis, & Hayes, 
2012).  
ACT is more commonly known as a treatment program that uses mindfulness and 
acceptance strategies along with behavioural change techniques for the treatment of underlying 
behavioural problems.  Essentially, the aim is to increase PF by focusing on the context and the 
function of psychological events instead of the form, content, and frequency with which the 
private events occur (Hayes et al., 2011).  The kinds of strategies used encourage the processing 
of private events that target particular clinical behaviours and contextual factors in order to 
enhance psychological flexibility.  The core processes in the ACT model are linked with basic 
behavioural principles and through mid-level concepts such as PF, the relationship between 
behaviours, contextual factors and learning principles are organized and described (Levin & 
Hayes, 2009).  PF can be viewed as the interface for the purpose of organizing theories of 
psychopathology and well-being and also acts as an assessment tool for organizing and adapting 
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interventions to match with client characteristics (Waltz & Hayes, 2010).  From an ACT 
perspective, human suffering is derived from normal psychological processes that involve 
human language and cognition.  Many difficult thoughts are believed to be rooted in language 
where verbally-learned behavioural repertoires and rule-governed behaviour become 
generalized to many aspects of an individual’s life.  In other words, the impact of language on 
thinking and cognition can become problematic through the overuse of generalization in the 
form of evaluative thinking and problem-solving for example, and this can result in the 
manifestation of different problems but functionally similar underlying behaviours.   According 
to RFT, verbal behaviour and associated rules are a learned ability that commences in infancy 
and appears to be a path in which all normal human beings learn how to construct relations 
among events in their psychological world.  However, these normal learning processes also 
have a dark side in that certain learned rules may have been applicable in certain contexts but 
not in other contexts, rendering the learned rule inflexible.  This phenomenon can easily be seen 
in overt behaviour but people often use the same rules in the way they process their thoughts 
too.  For example, people are often bound to the rule that unpleasant things should be forgotten 
but yet they struggle to forget.  These processes are further elaborated in Chapter 3 but suffice to 
know that ACT and RFT are closely intertwined through PF.  
The philosophical and theoretical underpinnings of the PF construct are also consistent 
with attributes of self –regulation and regulatory flexibility.  As a self-regulatory construct, PF 
has been argued to be an important ingredient for psychological health (Kashdan & Rottenberg, 
2010).  Psychological flexibility benefits health in several different ways and consequently 
provides meaning and balance to life.  Individuals who are more psychologically flexible have 
been shown to experience more well-being such as quality of life and life satisfaction while 
those who are psychologically inflexible tend to experience a variety of negative mental health 
outcomes such as depression and anxiety (Hayes et al., 2006).  As a regulatory flexibility 
construct, an individual with high levels of PF is more likely to respond to the demands of the 
situation by using the most appropriate strategy while also engaging in the tracking of their 
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behaviour in order to adjust to the demands of the situation.  In other words, higher levels of PF 
indicate sensitivity towards contextual features which allows for successful behavioural 
adjustment in the long term.  Psychological flexibility is often the result of the use of the most 
appropriate strategy or response that matches with the situation- based on the goals and values 
subscribed to by an individual.  In contrast, lower levels of PF indicate insensitivity towards 
contextual features which subsequently results in the use of inappropriate strategies that may 
only be effective in the short term and is eventually ineffective in the longer term.   
The Role of Psychological Flexibility in the Emotion Generation Process 
Model  
As a mindfulness and acceptance construct, PF can be viewed as an attentional 
deployment regulation strategy that is approach-oriented on one end and avoidance-oriented on 
the other end of the continuum.  Farb and colleagues (2014) have proposed that as an approach-
oriented attentional deployment strategy, mindfulness is likely to work differently in the 
emotion generation process model (Farb, Anderson, Irving, & Segal, 2014).  According to the 
top-down and bottom-up processes, mindfulness can possibly supersede the situation 
modification stage.  A figure of where mindfulness can be situated in the emotion generation 
process model is presented in Figure 3 adapted from the emotion generation process model in 
Gross (2002) and Farb and colleagues (2007). 
Figure 2.3 Possible locations of mindfulness in the emotion generation process model 
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Farb and colleagues (2014) proposed that from a mindful response perspective, when 
stress and emotion occurs, the intention or motivation involved in the experience, is often used  
as an exploration of the nature of the emotion rather than for solving a problematic emotion.  
Further along in the emotion generation process, the wider attentional frame serves to create an 
awareness of bodily sensations as momentary, draws a psychological distance between the 
broader self and dysphoric feelings, and disrupts the habitual modes of interpretations and 
reactions, thereby allowing context-centered appraisals.  At the appraisal stage, emotions and 
associated thoughts are experienced as a transitory challenge and an opportunity for insight as 
opposed to threats or compromises in quality of life.  The resulting response then is more of an 
attitude of curiosity and acceptance rather than increases in sadness or anger or frustration. 
In the model proposed by Farb et al. (2014), mindfulness or its antithesis may occur 
anywhere in the emotion generation process model depending upon the unfolding of emotional 
processes.  Likewise, PF or psychological inflexibility is likely to occur anywhere in the 
emotion generation process.  At present, mediational studies that have examined the role of PF 
in psychological disorders have shown that PF partially or fully mediates the impact of various 
coping and ER variables in producing psychological distress or symptoms, suggesting that low 
levels of PF partly contributes to negative outcomes.  These studies have demonstrated that as 
an ER variable, PF is a part of emotional processes but whether PF precedes or is a consequence 
of the unfolding of emotions is still unknown.  A definite conclusion of the role of PF in 
emotional processing is currently unclear because most of the mediational studies have mainly 
used a cross-sectional design and therefore a more precise understanding of where PF may be 
located in the emotion generation process model cannot be determined.        
According to prior research on the emotion generation process model, ER 
predominantly depends on primary and secondary appraisal processes (Lazarus, 1991).  Coping 
and ER responses generally unfold after a situation has been selected.  Cognitive reappraisal, an 
antecedent-focused strategy, has generally been considered a healthier regulatory strategy than 
expressive suppression, which has been considered a response-focused strategy.  But more 
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recent research suggests that cognitive reappraisal occurs at a later stage in the emotion 
generation process model while other forms of regulation, such as attentional deployment, 
potentially occurs before cognitive change (Sheppes et al., 2014).  This finding indicates that the 
use of ER strategies do not seem to depend on them being antecedent-focused or response-
focused but rather on the features of the context and on individual predispositions.  From the 
context of the role of PF in the emotion generation process model, PF processes are likely to be 
employed at any stage in the process model given.    
As an approach-oriented attentional deployment strategy, it is likely that PF processes 
are employed earlier on in the process model.  It is often helpful to draw parallels with previous 
research but very little research has been devoted to attentional deployment strategies.  Apart 
from experimental studies, attentional deployment has been far less examined in comparison to 
cognitive reappraisal.  Few studies that have examined attentional deployment focused on 
distraction, a strategy that involves avoidant approach when confronted with intense emotional 
content (Sheppes, 2007).  Similarly, depending upon the situation, there is a possibility that PF 
could occur at an earlier stage in the emotion generation process and psychological inflexibility 
could occur later as a response-focused strategy.      
The role of PF processes can further be gauged from neuroscientific research that 
suggests that responses to emotions can be top-down (activation in prefrontal cortices 
suggesting cognitive appraisal of stimuli) or bottom-up (activation of limbic cortices suggesting 
emotional appraisal of stimuli), suggesting that these can be mapped on to the emotion 
generation process model.  For example, antecedent-focused strategies (i.e. reappraisal) are 
suggested as top-down strategies (i.e goal-directed) while response-focused strategies are 
suggested as bottom-up strategies (i.e. stimulus-driven or suppression).  But the direct mapping 
of top-down and bottom-up regulation to reappraisal and suppression strategies is not always 
straightforward.  For example, although high correlations between high levels of trait 
rumination and activation of amygdala have been observed, the very tendency to ruminate by 
turning events over and over again in the mind also involves the same cognitive control systems 
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that is used in reappraisal (Ray et al., 2005).  This suggests that ruminators and reappraisers are 
using the same underlying systems and therefore both may be capable of either strategy.   
Perhaps the difference in these two strategies is that ruminators may not know when to up-
regulate or down-regulate the amygdala.   
Similarly, because the PF construct measures two sides of a continuum, it is capable of 
both generating and regulating emotions.  The deployment of attention can either be a top-down 
process where the focus is placed on a particular stimulus for goal-directed reasons or as a 
bottom-up process where the focus is stimulus-driven (Taylor & Amir, 2010).  Alternatively, 
just like ruminators and reappraisers above, those who are less psychologically flexible may 
become stuck in the same cognitive control system and may not know when to up-regulate or 
down-regulate.  And likewise, avoidance in the form of thought suppression can be viewed as a 
bottom-up process where it is likely that the same habitual/automatic processing is also at play 
here because the tendency to suppress usually results in the re-emergence of unwanted feelings 
or thoughts (Wegner & Erber, 1992).  Not only does the intended thought re-emerge but all 
other thoughts that became directly or indirectly related also re-emerge, rendering the attempt to 
suppress even more impossible (Hooper, Saunders, & McHugh, 2010).  Similarly, not only is 
the target of suppression avoided but any related stimuli is also avoided, rendering suppression 
attempts more difficult thereby increasing feelings of distress.  Moreover, a loss in the ability to 
discriminate between the to-be-suppressed target and related stimuli can also promote the 
avoidance of behaviours.  The ability for discrimination may actually be beneficial for the 
individual to become unstuck in this cycle (Hooper, Saunders, & McHugh, 2010).  Essentially, 
the attempt to suppress becomes generalized especially in the context of related thoughts and 
this can interfere with up-regulation and down-regulation. 
The opposite ends of the PF construct continuum can also be viewed as adaptive and 
maladaptive ER.  People who are low in PF use ER strategies such as avoidance, distraction, 
suppression, and rumination to cope with emotionally-related issues and that eventually leads to 
maladaptation.  Low PF scores also provide an indication of low tolerance for distress, which is 
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the degree to which an individual is able to endure negative psychological states (Simmons & 
Gaher, 2005).  People who are high in PF are generally more aware and conscious of what they 
are feeling and thinking and can therefore choose to respond to situations or their internal 
private experiences with ER strategies that foster adaptation.  Moreover, high PF scores indicate 
a willingness to tolerate difficult psychological states whilst being engaged in value-driven 
behaviours.  Although certain aspects of PF can be said to represent ER strategies, PF also 
seems to represent a broader construct than adaptive or maladaptive ER.  Emotion regulation 
focuses mainly on the regulation of emotions but PF includes the regulation of other private 
events that may be linked to emotions such as memories, images, and physical sensations.  By 
definition, ER is concerned with some alteration or modification of the form of emotional 
experiences (e.g. behaviour, expression, cognitions etc.) or the emotion-eliciting situation and 
these are also considered as central to PF.  But nevertheless, the key difference between PF and 
other emotion regulation strategies is that PF is a construct that comprises of ER processes 
rather than specific strategies.  An individual with high PF has the ability to assess the situation 
and behave according to the needs of the context by applying mindful processes.  In other 
words, the PF construct assesses the function of the behaviour in the context in which it occurs.  
When the purpose of an ER strategy is to avoid, escape from, or reduce the frequency or 
intensity of emotional experiences, then it can be said that the function of the ER strategy is that 
which consists of processes in psychological inflexibility (Boulanger, Hayes, & Pistorello, 
2010).  When this method of regulating emotions (i.e. avoidance) becomes overlearned and 
generalizes across contexts, it can result in disruptions in emotional processing and this in turn 
can undermine well-being and life satisfaction over the long term. 
As demonstrated in the numerous examples above, the PF construct can assume many 
roles in the emotion generation process model.  A clearer picture of the role of PF as a mindful 
ER variable is required.  Moreover, there is a need to explore the association between 
mindfulness and acceptance and emotions so that a better understanding of their contribution 
and relevance in mental health problems can be developed and more precise mechanisms of 
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change can be ascertained for prevention and intervention purposes.  Past research has 
predominantly examined mindfulness and positive and negative affect while examinations of 
specific relationships between mindfulness and discrete emotions have been neglected.  
Research in this area is necessary to advance our knowledge of how responding with a mindful 
approach can contribute to the adaptive nature of specific emotions.   
2.1.2.5  Summary and Conclusion: Emotions and Emotion Regulation 
The role of emotions in the life of humans is an adaptive one as it allows for 
readjustments or reorganizations to be made internally with respect to changes taking place in 
the environment (Gross, 1998; Kopp, 1989).  Specific emotions are known to have multi-
componential characteristics that differentiate them from one another.  These multi-
componential characteristics include affect, action tendencies, appraisals, physiology, and 
neuropsychology.  Although emotion components can be identified separately, these 
components often occur in a synchronized manner when an emotion is experienced.  Various 
theories of discrete emotions support different emotion components (Tomkins, 1954; Ekman, 
1994; Izard, 1971; Levenson et al., 1992; ) and experimental research is increasingly showing 
that discrete emotion theories (for e.g. the differential emotions theory proposed by Izard, 1971) 
either support the patterning of neuropsychological circuits emphasizing physiological and 
behavioural reactions while appraisal theories of discrete emotions (for e.g. Lazarus, 1968) 
emphasize cognition and judgment (Lench, Flores, & Bench, 2011).  Moreover, each discrete 
emotion was also found to have unique effects on cognition, behaviour, physiology, and 
experience, in support of the discrete emotion theories (Lench, Flores, & Bench, 2011). 
Discrete emotions can also be distinguished from moods and affect.  The distinction 
between emotions and mood is mainly based on the continuity of action readiness and therefore 
rigid distinctions between them are not possible.  Categorical differences can be observed more 
clearly between emotions and affect as they have distinct effects on mental health and well-
being (Baumeister et al., 2007).  Research evidence shows that emotions can be organized as a 
hierarchical taxonomic scheme where the upper most and middle levels represent two broad 
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dimensions and the lower or base level represents distinguishable emotional states (Tellegen et 
al., 1999).  Research has also shown that each level in the hierarchical structure has heuristic 
value wherein more differentiated perspectives with respect to other psychological constructs 
can be determined.  Essentially, differences between the dimensional approaches models and 
discrete emotion models have largely been ignored.  Past research has mainly focused on 
examining negative and positive affect as two broad constructs while neglecting differences 
among specific emotions of the same valence.  Given that specific emotions of the same valence 
have different functions, it is likely that the regulation of each specific emotion, irrespective of 
valence, occurs differently.  More recent research is beginning to suggest that specific emotions 
are important to consider when examining ER as functionality of ER strategies can lead to 
emotion-specific activation (Zimmerman & Iwanski, 2014).  Additionally, the emotion feedback 
system also suggests that emotional states tend to influence behaviour through ER (Baumeister, 
2007).         
The emotion feedback system proposed by Baumeister et al. (2007) suggests that when 
behaviour is aimed at promoting changes in emotional states, then the behavioural consequences 
are derived from ER instead of from the emotion itself.  Therefore, emotions influence 
behaviour indirectly through the regulation of an elicited emotion or an anticipated emotion.  
From a linear perspective, emotions trigger its regulation and this in turn triggers behaviours.  
But since behaviour is aimed at changing emotional states in the emotion feedback loop 
(Baumeister et al., 2007), it is unclear whether behaviour influences emotions to promote 
changes in ER or whether the behavioural consequences desired in ER influences emotion.  Due 
to functional differences in specific emotions, the influence of behavioural consequences 
derived from ER may be different for each emotion.  ER strategies are varied but there are some 
common underlying processes that determine their behavioural consequences. 
Many definitions have been proposed for ER as research has shown that people use 
many kinds of strategies to regulate their emotions.  Most ER theorists agree that ER strategies 
can either contribute to adaptation or maladaptation and can be considered conscious/voluntary 
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processes or automated processes.  Empirical research in ER is increasingly showing that ER 
processes are transdiagnostic factors underlying many forms of psychological disorders (Aldao 
& Nolen-Hoeksema, 2010).  The effects of maladaptive ER strategies have been found to be 
more highly associated with psychopathology than adaptive ER strategies (Aldao & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2010).  Moreover, deficits in ER skills have predominantly been found to be 
associated with the emergence and maintenance of psychopathology (Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema, 
& Schweizer, 2010; Berking & Wupperman, 2012; Cisler et al., 2010; Gross, 2007).   
Presently, our understanding of ER strategies is inconclusive due to the identified gaps 
in the literature.  First, studies examining ER have not focused on the object of regulation, i.e. 
specific emotions.  The majority of ER studies have mainly focused on the dimensional aspect 
of emotions, i.e. positive and negative affect, or have used measures of distress such as anxiety 
and depression to represent affect and outcomes.  Moreover, the focus of investigation in the 
majority of studies have been devoted to understanding the role of ER in psychopathology at the 
expense of attempting to understand the role of specific emotions.  Second, the bulk of studies 
that examined ER strategies have focused on very few strategies (e.g. suppression and 
rumination) even though a large number of strategies have been identified.  This has led to some 
bias in our understanding of the whole range of strategies that people actually use when an 
emotion(s) unfolds (Aldao & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2010).   
More recently, ER strategies have been organized into ER processes using the emotion 
generation process model (Webb, Miles, & Sheeran, 2012).  The most prominent ER strategies 
were categorized into three processes, namely, attentional deployment, cognitive change, and 
response modulation with corresponding ER strategies.  Although these processes were found to 
be conceptually different, the differences among them were modest.  Furthermore, it was found 
that people often use the same strategy in different contexts, thereby suggesting the importance 
of considering context.  Similar findings have been reported in two other meta-analytic studies 
where people reported using more behavioural avoidant strategies than cognitive strategies 
(Augustine & Hemenover, 2009) and suppression and rumination strategies (Aldao & Nolen-
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Hoeksema, 2010) for regulating emotions.  It was also found that people used more maladaptive 
strategies than adaptive strategies for regulating emotions (Aldao & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2010).      
Based on the findings from the various meta-analytic findings, it can be concluded that more 
focus should be given to investigating the person and context as individuals are likely to use a 
particular strategy in many situations as deemed appropriate or use the same strategy 
indiscriminately, thereby reducing effective regulatory behaviour. 
Regulatory flexibility has been proposed as an emotional self-regulatory construct that 
includes processes such as context sensitivity, repertoire of wide-ranging strategies that meet 
contextual demands, and ongoing monitoring of ER behaviours.  These processes are thought to 
underlie a range of adaptive strategies while deficiencies in these processes underlie a range of 
maladaptive ER strategies.  The interrelated combination of processes in the regulatory 
flexibility construct varies according to the stressor and is a dynamic multidimensional 
construct that responds to shifting contextual demands.  The ability to use the most appropriate 
strategy in a given situation also depends upon attentional awareness.  Attentional awareness is 
instrumental in emotional processing and has been studied extensively in emotional awareness 
and mindfulness.  While emotional awareness has greatly contributed to our understanding of 
the importance of describing and experiencing emotions in ER, some shortcomings lie in the 
myriad of measurements available that essentially tap into distinct static characteristics of 
emotional awareness.  In this respect, mindfulness measurements appear to be more uniform as 
they measure similar mindfulness processes and behaviours.  Additionally, the training of 
attention in mindfulness has demonstrated that it is an effective therapeutic modality for 
psychological problems.       
Mindfulness and acceptance has been demonstrated as processes underlying ER 
strategies that utilize attentional awareness at its core.  Cognitive neuroscientific research 
suggests that neural correlates of mindfulness and cognitive ER strategies are similar with the 
only difference being in the way neural activation is managed.  Mindfulness and acceptance 
promotes effective self-regulation through increased regulatory flexibility.  The 
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multidimensional benefits of mindfulness generally support behavioural control (i.e. the ability 
to inhibit impulsive behaviours) instead of emotional control (i.e. avoidance and/or suppression 
of the intensity, frequency, and duration of unwanted emotions; Gratz & Tull, 2010).  When 
emotional control dominates, then avoidance and overengagement strategies are used for 
regulating emotions and an individual can become stuck in the cycle of the emotional control 
agenda.  Regulation through emotional control contrasts with being in a mindful and accepting 
state as intolerance for negative affect and the use of habitual reactions incrementally increases.  
Aspects of both mindfulness and acceptance and emotion dysregulation are captured by the PF 
construct.  PF has been described as a mindful ER construct that represents mindfulness and 
acceptance processes on one end of the continuum and on the other end, psychological 
inflexibility represents rigidity in managing emotions.   
Based on the proposition of Farb and Irving (2007), mindfulness is likely to occur 
earlier in the emotion generation process model where it is expected to influence appraisal 
processes and act as an attentional deployment process.  Similarly, PF or psychological 
inflexibility is likely to occur earlier in the emotion generation process model.  One way to test 
these assumptions is to understand the temporal relationship between PF and specific emotions.  
Recent research suggests that ER can develop in an emotion-specific manner (Zimmermann & 
Iwanski, 2014). This is also in line with the developmental perspective that as a specific 
emotion and corresponding behaviours develop over time, additional behaviours that add on to 
the repertoire support the existing function of the emotion (Izard & Ackerman, 2000).  
Therefore it is more prudent to test this relationship by using specific emotions.  The aim of the 
proposed study is to address some of the gaps in the literature in relation to specific emotions 
and PF in order to advance our knowledge of the role of mindfulness and acceptance in the 
emotion generation process model by using a longitudinal research design.  Because specific 
emotions are appraisals of the encountered situation, the cross-lagged longitudinal design can 
provide information as to whether PF processes influence appraisal processes earlier in the 
process model or after appraisals are made.  Knowledge about the temporal relationship 
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between PF and each specific emotion is likely to provide some clarity about the role of 
mindfulness and acceptance processes in the emotion generation process model.        
2.2  Emotion Regulation and Perceived Social Support 
2.2.1 Definition and the Interpersonal Model of Emotion Regulation  
The notion that ER is an intrapersonal and interpersonal concept is gaining attention 
among researchers (Campos, Walle, Dahl, & Main, 2011; Hofmann, 2014; Marroquin, 2011).  
As an intrapersonal concept, the focus is on ER processes that occur inside the individual.  In 
other words, individuals cope with or regulate emotions by processing them internally by 
avoiding thoughts, images, memories, physiological sensations etc. associated with the 
experience of emotions.  According to the interpersonal view, human beings are embedded in a 
social context and therefore the goal of ER is also social in nature.  An interpersonal view of ER 
involves people, situations, and external triggers.  Interpersonal interactions can provoke 
powerful emotions, such as joy, anger, shame, jealousy etc., and the regulation of these 
emotions cannot be readily explained only from an intrapersonal perspective.  Emotions are 
partly regulated and expressed within a social context in which others play a role (Hofmann, 
2014).  Also, negative emotions are not just down-regulated in the service of up-regulating 
positive ones but they are also regulated in the service of attaining socially-related goals.  
Campos and colleagues provide a definition for the social embeddedness of ER as follows:   
Emotion regulation is typically a process of negotiating or coordinating the various goals 
and strivings of an individual who is in a relational encounter with another individual or 
groups of individuals with sometimes similar but often quite different goals and strivings 
to that of the individual (Campos et al., 2011, p. 27).   
It has also been suggested that the development of ER occurs within a social context.  
For example, in the context of parent-child interactions, adaptive and maladaptive emotion 
development occurs via ongoing interactions and corresponding attentional deployment 
(Crockenberg & Leerkes, 2004; Ruff & Rothbart, 1996).  The external environment in the form 
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of caregiver’s reactions or non-reactions and expressions/discussions about emotions provide 
key input and feedback for emotional development in children and adolescents (Eisenberg, 
Spinrad, & Eggum, 2010; Posner & Rothbart, 2000).  With the development of executive 
functioning and the advent of higher cognitive abilities, ER becomes more conscious and 
intentional (Derryberry & Rothbart, 1997; Eisenberg & Morris, 2002).  
Marroquin (2011) has provided an account of interpersonal influences on ER in 
depression based on interpersonal dysfunction as a core phenomenon.  In light of interpersonal 
influences on ER, Marroquin (2011) proposed that social support potentially plays a role in 
intrapersonal ER.  Social support is viewed as an interpersonal coping style that involves the 
recruitment of social resources in times of need through existing social support networks.  
Building on this understanding of social support, intrapersonal ER processes can be modulated 
in interpersonal interactions.  For example, attentional bias towards negative content when an 
individual is depressed can be redirected by supportive others.  Supportive others also have the 
potential to provide alternative interpretations and perspectives on situations that may lead to 
more flexibility in thinking.  The effects of social support are also largely dependent upon 
relationship-interaction specific factors such as the credibility of the support provider (Lakey & 
Orehek, 2011).  Relationship-interaction specific factors potentially influence attempts by 
support providers to broaden the range of information and increase cognitive flexibility of the 
support recipient.  Support providers often use attentional deployment and cognitive re-
evaluation processes broaden interpretations and perspectives of the support recipient.  
Although researchers (Hammen, 1991; Joiner, Metalsky, Katz, & Beach, 1999) acknowledge 
that ER in depression and other mental health disorders occurs within a social context, processes 
that influence social interactions are still unclear.  This is possibly due to the involvement of 
many actors in the social network.  For example, the perception that social support will be 
available when needed depends on past experiences of social interactions along with 
characteristics of the support recipient, the support provider, and the relationship between them 
(B. Sarason, Pierce, Bannerman, & Sarason, 1993).  Over the years, the effects of social support 
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on mental health have produced conflicting findings.  Past research has shown that social 
support has enhanced coping capabilities while also contributing to negative coping (Folkman 
& Moskowitz, 2004).  This is possibly due to the many ways in which the social support 
construct has been defined and also due to an unclear understanding of how social support 
processes interact with intrapersonal processes.   
The social support construct has been examined and operationalized from several 
perspectives by different researchers.  This has led to different ways of understanding different 
aspects of social support.  An important aspect of social support is that it consists of two main 
features namely, social support network size and social support functions.  Cohen (2004) 
defines social support as “a social network’s provision of psychological and material resources 
intended to benefit an individual’s ability to cope with stress” (p. 676).  Social support network 
size provides an indication of social integration (i.e., participation in social relationships; 
Brissette, Cohen, & Seeman, 2000).  Social support functions are reflected in the social 
resources provided by those in the social support network which include emotional support (e.g. 
concern, empathy, affection), informational support (e.g. guidance for problem-solving), 
financial support, and instrumental support (e.g. assistance in tasks) (Reevy & Maslach, 2001).  
Measures of social support are either subjective (i.e. perceived social support, PSS) or objective 
(i.e. received social support, RSS) and include both social support network size and satisfaction 
with social support.  PSS is the perception that social support will be available when it is needed 
(Lakey et al., 2002) whereas RSS is the actual support received (Uchino, 2009).  Research 
evidence suggests that PSS and RSS are associated but they are different components of the 
broad social support construct.  Correlations between PSS and RSS are modest and they are also 
differentially related to depression.   
Although social support can be viewed as a multidimensional concept, the Social 
Support Questionnaire (SSQ; Sarason, Sarason, 1983) measures some important aspects of 
social support.  Perceived social support is a reflection of a stable psychosocial environmental 
factor in comparison to enacted support which represents actual provisions of social support and 
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is closely linked with social and contextual factors.  Investigations of enacted support and 
mental health have either yielded no effects or harmful effects on mental health (Barrera, 1986; 
Bisschop, Kriegsman, Beekman, & Deeg, 2004; Gleason, Iida, Shrout, & Bolger. 2008; 
Helgeson, 1993).  In this respect, PSS has been shown to be a better predictor of recovery and 
recurrence of depressive episodes than enacted support in adolescents with underlying 
neurobiological vulnerability (Rao, Hammen, & Poland, 2010).  According to Marroquin 
(2011), intrapersonal ER is influenced hierarchically by PSS and RSS. The level of social 
integration and perceived satisfaction with social support at the PSS level influences RSS.  At 
the RSS level, interpersonal influences on attentional deployment and cognitive re-evaluation 
processes are thought to influence intrapersonal attentional deployment and cognitive re-
evaluation processes or intrapersonal ER.  This hierarchical view of the influence of social 
support on intrapersonal ER is based on the notion that the cumulative effects of social 
interactions and social relationships may be plausible antecedents of intrapersonal ER.  For 
example, the finding that adolescents, in particular, regulated the expression of sadness and 
anger according to intended social norms (i.e. suppression of sadness and display of anger), can 
also have an alternative interpretation (Zeman & Shipman, 1998).  The intrapersonal regulation 
of emotions- that is, the decision to suppress or express either emotion in this study, can be 
interpreted as a consequence (emphasis added) of past social interactions and relationship-
specific factors rather than an intention to achieve a social goal that can have an effect on future 
social interactions and relationships.  Based on the two possible interpretations, PSS and RSS 
can either be an antecedent or a consequence of intrapersonal ER.  The directional relationship 
between social support and intrapersonal ER is still unknown but previous research provides 
some clues as to the possible directional relationship of interpersonal ER and intrapersonal ER.   
Although it is acknowledged that RSS is important, the focus of this research is on PSS. 
2.2.2  Research in Perceived Social Support  
 Past research has shown that PSS is important in maintaining both physical and mental 
health (Cohen, Gottlieb, & Underwood, 2000).  Low PSS is particularly implicated in 
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depression (Cornwell, 2003).  PSS is also considered an important means of coping with daily 
hassles and major life events as it facilitates adaptive coping (DeLongis & Holtzman, 2005; 
Thoits, 1986).  Deficits in social functioning have been well documented as a correlate of 
depressive rumination in a large body of research (Grassia & Gibb, 2008; Nolen-Hoeksema et 
al., 2008; Watkins, 2008) and research evidence has shown that social support acts a buffer 
against depressive rumination (Nolen-Hoeksema & Davis, 1999; Puterman, DeLongis, & 
Pomaki, 2010).  Moreover, the beneficial influence of PSS is experienced more when 
supportive others perceive coping behaviour of the support recipient to be appropriate in 
comparison to those who display less appropriate behaviour (Siewert, Kubiak, Jonas, & Weber, 
2013; Silver, Wortman, & Crofton, 1990; Vollmann, Renner, & Weber, 2007).  Although the 
association between PSS and emotional well-being is well established, most of these studies are 
cross-sectional and correlational in nature.  It is still unclear as to how PSS and intrapersonal ER 
influence each other.  In an attempt to clarify the relationship between PSS and intrapersonal 
ER, other researchers have investigated PSS as a moderator and mediator.  
 In the broader social support literature, it has been found that PSS can have a protective 
effect (moderating effect) during stressful situations (Cobb, 1976; Cohen & Wills, 1985) or PSS 
can independently have a direct effect on coping regardless of stress levels (Compas, Wagner, 
Slavin, & Vannatta, 1986).  In addition, social support has also been proposed to play a 
mediating role between stressors and ill-health in which the interaction between PSS and stress 
levels influence the level of symptoms experienced (Yarcheski & Mahon, 1999).  All three 
models (i.e. PSS as a moderator, an independent influence, and as a mediator) were tested in 
early adolescents.  The findings indicated that among early adolescents, PSS was a mediator of 
the stress-outcome relationship rather than a moderator.  Additionally, PSS was strongly 
inversely associated with the pattern of negative symptoms suggesting that PSS potentially has a 
direct effect on symptoms (Yarcheski & Mahon, 1999).   
Other researchers attempted to explore the mediating role of PSS in the relationship 
between emotional competencies and help seeking behaviours in adolescents (Ciarrochi, Deane, 
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Wilson, & Rickwood, 2002; Ciarrochi, Wilson, Deane, & Rickwood, 2003).  Emotional 
competencies consisted of three separate measures.  The self –report emotional competence 
inventory (Schutte et al., 1998) measures the ability to perceive emotional cues, the 
management of self-relevant emotions, and the management of others’ emotions.  The levels of 
awareness scale (LEAS; Lane, Quinlan, Schwartz, Walker, & et al., 1990) measures levels of 
emotional awareness and the Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20; Bagby, Parker, & Taylor, 
1994) measures the ability to identify and describe emotions.  The three measures were used in 
the first study but only the self-report emotional competence inventory and the TAS were used 
in the second study.  Measures of emotional competencies used in these studies were considered 
aspects of intrapersonal ER.  In the first study, adolescents with low emotional competence 
were least likely to seek nonprofessional help but were more likely to seek professional help 
(Ciarrochi et al., 2002).  Moreover, the link between emotional competence and help-seeking 
behaviour was partially explained by PSS.  In the second study, the same results were 
replicated.  Adolescents with low emotional competence were also unlikely to seek help from 
nonprofessional sources (Ciarrochi et al., 2003).  Developmental differences between younger 
and older adolescents were analysed in the second study. Younger adolescents (aged 13) with 
difficulties in identifying and describing emotions tended to have higher intentions of seeking 
help from nonprofessional and professional sources while the reverse pattern was observed in 
older adolescents (aged 14-15).  Similar to the first study, PSS partially mediated the 
relationship between emotional competence and help-seeking intentions (Ciarrochi et al., 2003).  
The results suggested that when adolescents reported feeling distressed even with reported high 
levels of PSS, the intention to solicit help was low and that emotional competencies were still 
important in explaining help seeking behaviour.  These studies provided some preliminary 
clarification for the relationship between intrapersonal ER and interpersonal ER and raised the 
possibility that intrapersonal ER may also influence social support in older adolescents.   
The literature reviewed above indicates that the relationship between interpersonal ER 
and intrapersonal ER could operate in either direction.  It remains unclear whether interpersonal 
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ER is an antecedent of intrapersonal ER as proposed by Marroquin (2011) or vice versa.  The 
central argument presented by Campos and colleagues is that there is a need to differentiate 
between intrapersonal and interpersonal ER.  They believe that the purpose of selecting, 
modifying, or expressing a particular response is often neglected in research studies (Campos et 
al., 2011).  In other words, the social context is deemed as primary for processing intrapersonal 
ER.  The studies conducted by Ciarrochi and colleagues seem to suggest that intrapersonal ER 
in mid- adolescence may be a precursor of interpersonal ER.  The purpose of the current study 
was to address this gap in the literature.   
According to the definition of intrapersonal ER, individuals regulate or process 
information internally.  Borrowing from the description of PF processes in the ER section 
above, PF can be viewed as an intrapersonal ER variable as these processes are intrinsic in 
nature.  Additionally, PF processes are involved attentional deployment and which occurs 
within an individual.  High levels of PF represent mindfulness and acceptance processes and are 
concerned with awareness and observation while low levels of PF can be said to measure 
aspects of intrapersonal ER that is broadly concerned with avoidance of internal experiences.  It 
has been suggested that those who are low in PF will most likely avoid social interactions 
because negative evaluations are likely to dominate attentional processes (Boulanger et al., 
2010).  On the other hand, high PSS is associated with higher levels of mental and physical 
health.  In theory, those who are high in PF will tend to be high in PSS as well but whether 
being high in PF is a prerequisite for being high in PSS or whether high PSS is a prerequisite for 
high PF is still unclear.  In other words, it is unclear whether people who are generally more 
mindful and accepting will perceive themselves as more satisfied with their social network or 
report having larger social support networks or vice versa.  The directional relationship between 
PF and PSS is considered important for informing prevention and intervention efforts.  The 
determining of antecedents is of primary importance as this allows problems to be addressed at 
their roots.  If PF is an antecedent of PSS, then prevention programs can address the willingness 
to experience internal distress which can potentially have an effect on the willingness to seek 
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support when it is needed.  If PSS is an antecedent of PF, then adolescents may be given some 
training in social skills so that they may be encouraged to engage with their social supports.  
Regular interactions with their social supports may help adolescents understand and become 
more engaged in intrapersonal regulation of emotions.             
2.2.3  Summary and Conclusion: Emotion Regulation and Perceived Social Support  
 The distinction between intrapersonal and interpersonal ER and the relationship 
between the two variables is gaining attention among researchers.  Researchers are suggesting 
that the role of others is an important aspect of intrapersonal regulation (Campos et al., 2011; 
Hofmann, 2014; Marroquin, 2011).  Social support has been suggested as a representative 
variable for interpersonal ER (Marroquin, 2011).  PSS and RSS have been proposed to have a 
hierarchical influence on intrapersonal ER.  Both PSS and RSS have been found to be important 
indicators of well-being but PSS is the focus of this research.  The relationship between 
intrapersonal ER and PSS has mainly been explored in cross-sectional studies.  Evidence from 
previous studies has shown that intrapersonal ER may be more important than PSS in predicting 
help seeking behaviour (Ciarrochi et al., 2002; Ciarrochi et al., 2003).   
The intention of the proposed study is to address some gaps in the literature in relation 
to intrapersonal ER and interpersonal ER by using a longitudinal research design.  
Psychological flexibility has been proposed to be an emotion regulation strategy that represents 
intrapersonal ER.  The relationship between PF and PSS is explored to gain a clearer directional 
picture of the relationship between intrapersonal (via PF) and interpersonal emotion regulation 
(via PSS) as this knowledge has the potential to support efforts in therapeutic settings.   
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Chapter 3:  Psychological Flexibility  
 The foundations of the early years are thought to account for individual differences in 
the experience and regulation of emotions later in life.  Various experimental observations 
suggest that emotional awareness and understanding, knowledge of emotional causes and 
consequences, and the regulation of emotional expression are all learned in the early years and 
continue to become more distinct as language and cognition develop in the later years (Meerum 
Terwogt & Stegge, 2001).  Likewise, experimental studies have shown that PF develops in the 
early years (Lipkens, Hayes, & Hayes, 1993; Roche, Barnes-Holmes, Smeets, Barnes-Holmes, 
& McGeady, 2000).  PF is likely to be learned through emotion socialization in the family 
(Eisenberg, Cumberland, & Spinrad, 1998).  For example, negative parental responses to 
emotional experiences in childhood have been shown to result in avoidant coping responses and 
psychological symptoms in those children (Eisenberg, Fabes, & Murphy, 1996).  In the same 
way, parental/caregiver PF levels and their interpersonal interactions with their children 
contribute to high or low PF in children (Coyne & Thompson, 2011; Coyne & Wilson, 2004; 
Williams, Ciarrochi, & Heaven, 2012).  The evidence above suggests that the formation and 
shaping of PF tendencies, emotional experiences, and interpersonal processes commences in 
childhood. 
3.1  Defining Psychological Flexibility  
3.1.1 Definition  
 PF refers to the willingness and openness to experience difficult and unwanted internal 
events including thoughts, feelings, emotions, physical sensations, and memories without being 
overly entangled with them (Hayes et al., 2006).  The main tenet of PF is that when people are 
low in PF, they are overly entangled with their thoughts and are unable to notice the transitory 
thinking process itself and therefore rely excessively on avoiding/escaping negatively evaluated 
private events.  Those high in PF manage their responses and behaviour with an active 
awareness of their thoughts and emotions in the present moment and conduct themselves 
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according to the demands of the situation.  People who are open and flexible are able to 
rearrange their mental resources, make shifts in their perspectives, and develop a balance 
between wants and needs in order to move towards identified goals and values (Kashdan & 
Rottenberg, 2010).  On the other end of the continuum, people who are low in PF have been 
found to have various psychopathological symptoms (Boulanger et al., 2010).  People who are 
inflexible have rigid thought patterns and this can be observed in those who ruminate and worry 
and in behavioural patterns that produce ineffectiveness.  Additionally, they are unable to 
rebound after a stressful event and are incapable of planning and working towards distant goals 
(Kashdan & Rottenberg, 2010). 
Although the PF model ACT is represented by the six core processes, the PF 
measurement predominantly highlights experiential avoidance and cognitive fusion which 
represents a state of psychological inflexibility (emphasis added).  Experiential avoidance and 
cognitive fusion are viewed as processes that undermine the use of flexible attentional 
processes, a workable view of self that contains self-knowledge for the regulation of 
psychological difficulties, and actions/behaviours that moves one towards chosen values.  A 
more detailed explanation of experiential avoidance and cognitive fusion are provided below. 
Cognitive fusion and experiential avoidance are unhealthy processes that interfere with 
more adaptive self-regulatory behaviour and are relevant in the development and maintenance 
of psychological disorders (Boulanger et al., 2010; Hayes et al., 2006; Ruiz, 2010).  Cognitive 
fusion is the belief and treatment of verbal and cognitive events as literal truths; thus altering 
their functions (Levin & Hayes, 2009).  Verbal processes eventually dominate behavioural 
repertoires of the individual to the extent that they become rules that narrow an individual’s 
responses and make them insensitive to the immediate context.  Ultimately, the individual loses 
contact with the results of direct experiences (Y. Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, McHugh, & 
Hayes, 2004).  As a result, the individual gets entangled with the content of these private events 
and perceives them as reality instead of as transitory events (Luoma & Hayes, 2009).  
Consequently, an attempt to avoid the content of private events becomes a relentless effort in 
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trying to alter or control the intensity, frequency, or form of private events that result in 
experiential avoidance (Greco, Baer, & Lambert, 2008).  The avoidance of negative emotions or 
other private events may not necessarily be maladaptive when there is a willingness to 
experience them internally or when there is an acknowledgement of their presence (Boulanger 
et al., 2010).  But when there is an unwillingness to experience private events, they come under 
aversive control because repeated attempts are made to avoid or suppress them.  Essentially, 
private events are there whether one is willing or not willing to have them.  Instead of just 
allowing or accepting their presence, individuals who attempt to control or suppress emotions 
and associated private events are considered to be high in experiential avoidance.  Moreover, the 
paradoxical effects of suppression show up in the form of rebounding effects and the object of 
suppression become ever more present in the periphery of attention (Wegner, 1994).  As a 
result, the frequency and intensity of private events increases as attempts to avoid or supress 
them increases.   
On one end of the PF continuum, these processes consist of psychological inflexibility, 
characterised by experiential avoidance and cognitive fusion and that forms the cognitive 
behavioural aspect of the model.  At the other end, psychological flexibility is characterised by 
mindfulness and acceptance processes.  For the purpose of this thesis, the endpoints of the 
psychological flexibility continuum will be referred to as high PF and low PF. 
3.1.2  Underlying Philosophy and Theory 
3.1.2.1  Functional Contextualism  
The underlying philosophy of the PF construct is based on the worldview of science 
called functional contextualism (Hayes, Blackledge, & Barnes-Holmes, 2001).  The 
philosophical assumptions of functional contextualism are based on “the whole organism 
interacting in and with a historical and situational context” (Hayes, 1993, p. 24).  Functional 
contextualism provides an approach for observing all behaviours so that principles, theories, and 
methodologies can be derived for the successful prediction and influence of behaviour (Biglan 
& Hayes, 1996).  In addition, a holistic account of behaviour can only be complete when the 
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historical and situational context is also considered.  Context refers to both the current and 
immediate situation/environment in which the event occurs and an individual’s learning history.  
Features in the context include the physical, social, biological, and/or cultural aspects.  The 
focus on behaviour in context is paramount in understanding the function of the behaviour 
because individual context provides a basis for exploring the learning history and the current 
contingencies that govern behaviour for the purpose of manipulating/influencing the same 
behaviour.  It has been argued that models of therapy remain incomplete when the context is not 
considered.  They may be useful in predicting thought-action, emotion-action, or behaviour-
behaviour relationships, but they lack a means to explain the influence variables outside the 
psychological event (Biglan & Hayes, 1996; Hayes & Brownstein, 1986).  Philosophical 
assumptions of functional contextualism provide the foundation in the scientific and of what is 
now called Contextual Behavioural Science (CBS).  Contextual Behavioural Science has 
Relational Frame Theory (RFT) as its primary theoretical foundation.  
3.1.2.2  Relational Frame Theory  
Behavioural principles underlying the PF construct are derived from the theoretical 
foundations of Relational Frame Theory (RFT; Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001).  RFT 
is an advanced behavioural theory of language and cognition that provides a refined approach to 
account for how people use language and cognition, consciously or unconsciously, to produce 
relationships between thinking, emotions, behaviours, physical sensations, and other private 
events.  The derived relations abstracted from these relationships between private events can be 
arbitrarily derived and have the ability to transform the function of those relationships by virtue 
of stimulus equivalence (Hayes, Fox, et al., 2001).  Over time, the abstracted relationships 
between private events become more firmly learned (i.e. the type of relating and transformation 
of functions) as they are reinforced by the social verbal community (Barnes-Holmes, Hayes, 
Dymond, & O'Hora, 2001).  The social verbal community can be referred to as a type of  
psychological influence through terms or expressions that are commonly used in everyday 
language and that represent the norms and values of a wider social system (Burton & Kagan, 
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1994).  Basic experimental research studies indicate that each derived relation is a generalized 
operant and the ability for relational responding commences approximately at the age of two, 
develops over time from training in deriving relations and through repetitive contact, and can 
come under the control of antecedents or consequences (Healy, Barnes-Holmes, & Smeets, 
2000; Lipkens et al., 1993; Roche et al., 2000)  
 RFT posits that verbal behaviour is a kind of action that occurs at the cognitive level, 
and events are framed relationally through a history of operant conditioning in multiple 
exemplars.  As consequences (through the property of a stimulus or stimuli) start to control 
responses or behaviours (results of the way we think and act), they start generalizing across 
situations and contexts without due regard to differences between each situational context 
(Berens & Hayes, 2007).  Examples of a property of a stimulus are described along broad 
relational themes such as differential relations, spatial relations, temporal relations, causal 
relations, and perspective-taking relations (Hayes, Fox, et al., 2001).  For example, comparative 
relations draw on distinctions such as before and after, more than and less than, smaller than and 
larger than, and similar other ones (D. Barnes-Holmes et al., 2001).  A number of studies have 
shown that such properties of a stimulus can influence an individual’s response or behaviour in 
an arbitrary manner and can lead to the formation of rules (Berens & Hayes, 2007; Dougher, 
Hamilton, Fink, & Harrington, 2007).  Such rules can develop in strength to become automatic 
responses coupled with the inability to discriminate between contexts.  Rule-governed 
behaviour is necessary for the functioning of civil society, however, in private, rule-governed 
behaviour can lead to psychological problems because just about anything can be related to 
anything by virtue of relational framing (Torneke, 2010). 
The utility of the basic research in RFT is that it has been seamlessly used in ACT as it 
accounts for an analysis of verbal behaviour that can be influenced beyond the limitations of the 
therapy environment.  Basic research has demonstrated that various types of relational responses 
that reflect derived transformations of functions were seen in avoidant responses (Dymond, 
Roche, Forsyth, Whelan, & Rhoden, 2007), sexual arousal, (Roche et al., 2000), and self-
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discrimination (Dymond & Barnes, 1995).  The relational nature of language is well-known; 
however, responses derived from the transformation of functions of a stimulus are what have 
prompted the direct application of this principle in clinical settings.  In ordinary daily life, these 
verbal processes are essential for dealing with survival and evolutionary activities in the form of 
problem-solving, but the same verbal processes can also result in transforming functions that are 
unwanted and that keep us stuck in a repetitive psychological cycle.  The implications drawn 
from RFT principles for application in clinical settings are that cognitions cannot be eliminated 
because an individual’s history cannot be subtracted and so by default, learning has an additive 
nature.  Second, because learning is a process in which only more can be added, direct attempts 
to change or alter cognitions simply add on to the relational network.  As relational cues 
potentially become functional cues, the importance and centrality of those problematic 
cognitions are actually increased rather than diminished (Levin & Hayes, 2009).  Finally, the 
relational network carries all the relational and functional cues which are under the influence of 
an individual’s past history and immediate context (also called contextual control).  So rather 
than manipulating the cognitions (e.g. form, content, or frequency of thoughts) to reduce the 
effects of the harmful functions, the relevant context can be manipulated instead to transform 
the way one relates to thoughts and emotions (Hayes et al., 2006).  The relevant context can be 
manipulated by influencing antecedents or by influencing consequences (Torneke, 2010).  
 The PF construct emerged from RFT principles and represents a model of well-being 
and psychopathology.  The PF construct can be used for assessing patterns of behaviour that can 
become pervasive and can therefore be used to guide targeted intervention programs.  PF is the 
unifying construct that brings together RFT principles and the ACT agenda of maintaining 
psychological health and functioning.  An RFT conceptualization of the PF construct is 
presented below. 
RFT Conceptualization of PF 
 The RFT/ACT explanation for psychopathology assumes that a part of being human 
involves the experience of pain, loss, and traumas.  However, human experiences become a 
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source of suffering when language processes interact with direct contingencies to create a 
singular focus on minimizing or managing painful experiences that are unhelpful and obstructs 
engagement in behaviours that lead to valued actions.  The relentless pursuit to minimize 
painful experiences culminates in to psychological inflexibility as it is a result of a weak and 
unproductive control of contextual cues.  According to RFT, the ineffective control of 
contextual cues can also be referred to as ineffective rule-governed behaviour.  PF can be 
understood as rule-governed behaviour that is explained by verbal processes described in RFT.  
Some basic assumptions of RFT need to be presented in order to highlight some of its relevant 
aspects for rule-governed behaviour and psychopathology. 
 As mentioned above, in the normal development of language in humans, people learn 
how to relate stimuli and as more vocabulary is added, the ability to relate stimuli becomes 
more arbitrary and soon develops into a generalized operant response (Healy, Barnes-Holmes, 
& Smeets, 2000).  As language develops and becomes more complex through implicit and 
explicit training (multiple exemplar training), people learn to use contextual cues (e.g. same as 
opposite of, more than, better than, part of etc.) for relating and abstracting meaning to 
arbitrarily apply to new stimuli.  What this means is that a child will eventually learn how to 
apply or transfer the meaning of one stimulus to another stimulus that share no formal properties 
and without actually having learned this before.  This transfer of meaning is called functional 
cues and the choice of which function is transferred depends upon what is promoted in the 
social context (Hayes et al., 2001).  The main result of this ability is that the arbitrarily 
established relations actually alter the function or meaning of the stimulus.  For example, an 
arbitrary stimulus A is equivalent to an arbitrary stimulus B, and B is equal to a third arbitrary 
stimulus C.  After a while, A is equal to C just through a mere transference of relation that B is 
equal to both A and C.  Similarly, if A was said to be tall, then through the same transference of 
equal relation, B and C would also be considered tall without having any previous direct contact 
with B and C.  The moving around of stimulus functions is called relational framing and the 
different relations among stimuli are called relational frames.  Relational frames represents 
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patterns of relations that are derived through relational framing/ responding and for this, 
relational cues could come from frames of coordination, comparison, distinction, opposition, or 
hierarchy (see Hayes et al., 2001for more details).  As soon as a child learns the basics of 
relational operants, they then start framing any stimuli relationally according to the 
reinforcement provided in their environment.  As development occurs, more complex relational 
frames are established until the child can derive rules for himself or herself.  Although the 
ability for relational framing is an important developmental marker of cognitive abilities, there 
is another side to this ability.   
The ability for moving relations around among stimuli in relational networks and the 
functions that may get transformed from derived relations in addition to ones that are derived 
through equivalence may help explain aspects of psychopathology.  Many problems can emerge 
from deficits in relational framing, through arbitrarily derived relations, and through the 
following of rules (Villatte, Villatte, & Hayes, 2016).  Deficits in relational framing have been 
shown to correlate with deficits in cognitive and social abilities in children, in particular,   
deficits in reasoning, problem-solving skills, theory of mind, perspective taking, and empathy 
(Barnes-Holmes, McHugh, Barnes-Holmes, 2004; Kishita, ohtsuki, & Stewart, 2013; Lipkens & 
Hayes, 2009;O’Hora, Pelaez, Barnes-Holmes, & Amesty, 2005).  Conversely, training in 
relational skills has been shown to improve IQ from an average of 12 to 15 points in normal 
children and children with intellectual disabilities (Cassidy, Roche, & Hayes, 2011).  Deficits in 
relational skills therefore indicate the inability for effective problem solving, the failure of logic, 
and/or inability to generate alternative solutions when challenges arise.  These deficits along 
with cognitive biases are often seen in those with psychological difficulties.   
Furthermore, the presence of relational skills can also be psychologically challenging.  
The ability for derived relational responding can be arbitrary where not only are the formal 
properties of related events linked but also non-formal properties are linked with any set of 
relata in the presence of relational cues.  In other words, training in relational frames usually 
progresses from non-arbitrary to arbitrary stimuli (see Torneke, Luciano, & Valdiva, 2008 for 
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more details).  By virtue of arbitrarily derived relational responding, anything can be related to 
anything.  Further, within these relations, the function of one relata can alter the function of 
another relata.  For example, remembering one painful memory in the past can alter the 
experience of the situation in the present.  Hearing a word such as relax can remind the person 
of a previous panic attack and eventually elicit a panic attack.  Arbitrarily derived relational 
responses can also be viewed as symbols where all emotional, cognitive, perceptual, or 
motivational symbols of an object or an event can be remembered or felt within an instant just 
by thinking or speaking about it and without coming into direct contact with it.  Very naturally, 
people will start avoiding any symbolic stimuli that has acquired the function of emotional pain 
or sensations.  Eventually, avoidance restricts people from engaging in a range of possible 
behaviours when the symbolic stimuli are present.  In conclusion, although derived relational 
skills are necessary for cognitive development, they may have disadvantages.  Disadvantages of 
derived relational skills can more clearly been seen with the application of rules that have 
become problematic.   
 Rule-governed behaviour was used by Skinner (1966) to explain complex human 
behaviour but its applicability in some instances was problematic (see Torneke, Luciano, & 
Salas, 2008 for an elaborate explanation).  In the past few decades, a large body of accumulated 
experimental research in RFT has shed light on how rule-governed behaviour (see Hayes, 1989) 
actually works through stimulus equivalence (see Sidman, 1994).  According to Skinner (1966), 
a rule actually works as an antecedent, functions as a contingency and therefore controls 
behaviour.  Rules can be explicit or implicit rules given by others (social verbal community), 
given to ourselves (self-rules or implicit rules), or self-directed (rules generated to maintain a 
conceptualized self; see Y. Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, McHugh, & Hayes, 2004 for 
details).  Rules work like a contingency-shaped operant and include antecedents, behaviours, 
and consequences.  A contingency-shaped behaviour is the result of a direct experience where 
the shaping of a behaviour occurred contingent upon a consequence.  The behaviour 
concurrently displayed may have been derived from the individual’s past history of 
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contingency-shaped behaviour.  Subsequently, rules influence behaviour through relational 
frames of coordination as they alter the function of properties as in arbitrarily derived relational 
responding.  In RFT terms, “rules may be defined as examples of relational networks and 
transformations of function that are more or less complex” (Y. Barnes-Holmes et al., 2004, p. 
365).  Rules can be characterized by three different kinds of reinforcement history: pliance, 
tracking, and augmenting.   
 Pliance can be considered behaviour that is under the control of speaker-mediated 
consequences.  For example, an individual responds to someone in order to obtain their favour. 
A behavioural response due to pliance is usually dependent upon social consequences.  Once 
pliance is reasonably established, then an individual is capable of tracking.  Tracking is 
behaviour under the control of the correspondence between the way the world is arranged and 
the rule and is therefore independent of social consequences.  Augmenting is unlike pliance and 
tracking as it does not rely on specific consequences or contingencies but rather changes or 
augments the reinforcing value of the specific consequences in the rule.  Augmentals do not 
only exert control over consequences that are directly contacted but also over abstract 
consequences that have not been directly experienced.  In this way, augmentals promote 
flexibility by opening up the possibility for delayed responding as behavioural consequences 
can be contacted in the distant future and can be extremely abstract.   
All three characteristics of rules are necessary elements for appropriate behavioural and 
cognitive functioning but they can become problematic when rule-following results in 
insensitivity to the context at hand.  The advantage of delayed responding in rule-following can 
become a disadvantage when contact with direct contingencies is not considered any more.  
Rules can be followed blindly without taking into consideration the possibility that changes may 
have occurred in the same situation.  Experimental studies have shown that rule-following can 
become a hindrance when adjustment to a new or changed situation is required (Hayes, 
Brownstein, Zettle, Rosenbarb, & Korn, 1986; Matthews, Shimoff, Catania, & Sagvolden, 
1977).  From an RFT perspective, rule-governed behaviour participates in psychopathology by 
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overriding direct contingencies and contributes to rigid behavioural repertoires.  Psychological 
problems resulting from rule-following can be seen when augmenting interacts with pliance and 
tracking to alter the functions of direct contingencies. 
The main problem with pliance is when a person is primarily driven by socially-
mediated consequences.  Consequently, they are likely to have problems contacting other 
reinforcers.  Socially-mediated consequences are not in one’s control as “other’s” play the role 
of providing reinforcement, which can be highly unpredictable.  A person is most likely to 
experience multiple rejections because the contingencies are controlled by others.  In this way, 
sensitivity towards consequences provided by others increases and sensitivity towards direct 
consequences is prevented.  The consequence of problematic pliance also hinders tracking as 
direct consequences are not contacted.  Problems with tracking occur when the track does not 
match with the specified consequence.  Over time, the tracking of behaviour is abandoned 
because desired consequences are not contacted.  A good example of inaccurate tracking can be 
seen in addictive behaviours where short term and long term consequences are not coordinated.  
The person will track the short-term consequence of reducing pain through alcohol or drugs and 
not track the long term destructive consequences.  Tracking in the short term will not be 
effective for the long term as tracking strengthens in the short term through continued drinking 
but the problems will not go away in the long term.  The same principle can be applied to 
anxiety and depression.  The reason why people stick to pursuing certain rules is due to 
problematic augmenting.      
Interaction between augmenting and pliance contributes to the perpetuation and 
extension of pliance.  Although people feel the need to obtain approval from others to obtain 
more concrete forms of reinforcement, generalized pliance occurs under the control of more 
abstract, verbally constructed, and socially mediated consequences.  For example, “being a 
lovable person,” “being a good parent,” “being a good citizen” are all ultimate reinforcers in the 
repertoire of a person.  The arbitrary relation of coordination between being a lovable person 
and complying will be established in a relation of opposition to consequences of not complying 
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and punishing to the extent that complying is the ultimate reinforcer or valued goal.  This kind 
of augmenting based on generalized pliance can become problematic.  Relational framing can 
be more complex and a good example is that of rumination or thinking over.  According to RFT, 
rumination is considered a problem solving strategy as this is what people think that should be 
done when they want to make problems disappear.  For a depressed person, ruminating is what 
is done in efforts to make problems disappear so that they can feel better.  By feeling better, the 
depressed person believes that they can then pursue what is important for him or her.  The 
relational frame sequence starts with rumination as a strategy to problem solving and for feeling 
better and feeling better then becomes the condition for valued goals.  Essentially, the 
behavioural repertoire that a ruminating individual engages in has the condition that unless they 
feel better, they are unable to pursue valued goals.  This chain of relational frames functions as 
an augmental whereby the avoided thoughts become even more aversive because they are 
established in opposition to pursuing valuable goals.  The detrimental effects of avoidance are 
likely to become exacerbated when an individual is unaware of the difference between himself 
or herself having these thoughts and the actual contents of the thoughts (Barnes-Holmes et al., 
2001; Luciano et al., 2004).  This kind of rule-following eventually leads to many kinds of 
avoidant efforts if the private events are experienced as aversive and are in opposition to valued 
goals due to the inability to discriminate between the “I” as the context and the content of 
experiences in the form of thoughts, emotions etc.  Further, these kinds of relational frames 
function as augmentals as long as the valued goal is reinforcing for the person (“I have to feel 
better so that I can pursue my goals”).  Effectively, the described example above is a reflection 
of experiential avoidance.  As more control efforts are used to avoid or escape aversive private 
events such as memories, emotions, thoughts, and bodily sensations, the more they are feared 
and the more entanglement occurs with private events in the long term.  Consequently, life 
satisfaction reduces as more and more stimuli enter the relational network over time and acquire 
characteristics or functions of established relational frames.   
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The acquisition of characteristic relational frames is a result of the human ability for 
bidirectional responding.  Bidirectionality is a basic principle in RFT which states that humans, 
as opposed to animals, are capable of responding bidirectionally.  For example, when an 
individual is told A is equal to B, then the individual can derive the other implicit relationship 
that B is equal to A.  Similarly, if an individual is told that C is smaller than B, then an 
individual is again capable of deriving the implicit relationship that C is also smaller than A.  
Although the ability for bidirectional responding is an important developmental milestone in 
language-able humans, it also participates in different rule-governed behaviours and opens the 
trap to experiential avoidance.  Private events such as memories, affect, or thoughts elicited in 
the presence of aversive conditions can acquire aversive functions through bidirectional 
responding (Wilson, Hayes, Gregg, & Zettle, 2001).  More specifically, relational frames 
become more complex as diverse thoughts and feelings acquire bidirectional functions and enter 
into frames of coordination with feared relational frames and in opposition to desired or valued 
goals, thus becoming susceptible to avoidance efforts.  Essentially, bidirectional responding 
along with rule-governed behaviour in which deliberate avoidant efforts are maintained are the 
basis of psychological inflexibility.    
In conclusion, the role of rule-governed behaviour in the development and enhancement 
of social control and awareness of long-term consequences of behaviour are important for the 
development of normal verbal behaviour but at the same time, their participation in 
psychological problems cannot be underestimated.  The reduced benefits of rule-governed 
behaviour are usually brought about by increasing insensitivity to changes in contingencies.  
This leads to an increasing susceptibility to social consequences that interfere with effective 
tracking of behaviour.  Tracking cannot work when the behaviour and consequences specified in 
the rule is incompatible with rule-following.  Moreover, although augmenting normally 
contributes to behavioural flexibility, benefits of augmenting reduce with increasing 
insensitivity towards changing contingencies.  In other words, as consequences become more 
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abstract, direct consequences become harder to contact.  In this manner, augmenting can lead to 
the emergence of deliberate avoidance efforts that constitutes psychological inflexibility. 
3.2  Empirical Evidence for Psychological Flexibility  
 In the last several decades a large body of evidence has accumulated suggesting that PF 
can function to facilitate well-being or can be considered a psychological vulnerability factor.  
Accordingly, PF has been examined in many ways.  Low PF is associated with a range of 
psychopathological conditions and behavioural difficulties and has also been demonstrated to be 
distinct from other psychological constructs (Chawla & Ostafin, 2007).  The evidence for PF 
has predominantly been investigated through correlational, experimental, and treatment 
mediation and moderation.  A few longitudinal studies examining the predictive role of PF have 
been conducted, however, the number of studies remain very small.  A brief review of research 
on PF is presented below, but first the operationalization of the PF measure used in the present 
study is described.          
3.2.1  Operationalizing Psychological Flexibility  
 Psychological flexibility has widely been measured by the Acceptance and Action 
Questionnaire (AAQ; Hayes et al., 2004) in adults.  The AAQ is a self-report measure that 
assesses the two aspects of those low in PF, namely experiential avoidance and cognitive fusion.  
Respondents are asked to rate the degree to which they feel entangled with their difficult 
thoughts, the extent to which private experiences are negatively evaluated, the extent to which 
they avoid, escape or control their emotions and the extent to which in the presence of difficult 
thoughts and feelings, they are unable to act effectively.  The 9 and 16 item versions were 
developed to capture the PF phenomena as a unidimensional construct, and reliability and 
validity studies on all versions predominantly point to a single latent factor (Hayes et al., 2004).  
The AAQ has been used in a wide array of studies.  In a meta-analytic study, the AAQ was 
shown to predict a wide range of psychopathological and well-being measures, including 
depression, anxiety, general mental health, quality of life, job satisfaction, future absenteeism, 
and future performance on the job (Hayes et al., 2006).   
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 Although the AAQ demonstrated good reliability and criterion-related, convergent, 
predictive, and discriminative validities at the time of development, there has been a problem 
with the internal consistency of the AAQ in subsequent studies (Bond et al., 2011).  Low alphas 
were observed particularly in community samples and subpopulations with low education and 
amongst those with English as a second language.  Revisions to address the weaknesses of the 
AAQ, led to the development of the AAQ-II (Bond et al., 2011).  In addition to the AAQ-II, 
several variants of the AAQ for particular problems were also developed.  Some of the problems 
for which the AAQ measure has been modified include smoking (Farris, Zvolensky, DiBello, & 
Schmidt, 2015), substance abuse (Luoma, Drake, Kohlenberg, & Hayes, 2011), body image 
(Sandoz, Wilson, Merwin, & Kate Kellum, 2013), weight (Lillis & Hayes, 2008),  auditory 
hallucinations (Shawyer et al., 2007), chronic pain (McCracken, Vowles, & Eccleston, 2004), 
tinnitus (Westin, Hayes, & Andersson, 2008) and diabetes (Gregg, Callaghan, Hayes, & Glenn-
Lawson, 2007).  In the disorder specific versions, the more general terms pertaining to thoughts, 
feelings, and actions in the items have been replaced with more domain specific terms of the 
clinical problems.  Similarly, an entirely new measure of PF, the Action and Fusion 
Questionnaire for Youth (AFQ-Y; Greco, Lambert, & Baer, 2008), was developed specifically 
for children and adolescents. 
 Similar to the AAQ, the AFQ-Y also assesses experiential avoidance and cognitive 
fusion and high scores on the AFQ-Y are indicative of psychological inflexibility and low scores 
psychological flexibility.  The AFQ-Y is a self-report measure with a short version consisting of 
8 items and a long version consisting of 17 items (Greco et al., 2008).  The internal consistency 
reliability for the AFQ-Y has been high in youth populations with reported alphas ranging from 
.81 to .93 (Fergus et al., 2012; Greco et al., 2008; Howe-Martin et al., 2012; Schmalz & 
Murrell, 2010).  The intended purpose of the AFQ-Y was to assess PF in children at least 10 
years of age and also to enhance comprehension through the reduced use of ACT specific 
language in the items.  The items use simple language to facilitate more valid responding among 
young people.  Content-wise, the items in the AFQ-Y represent general response behaviours 
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although items are specific to setting events, reminiscent of the domain specific AAQ measures.  
A sample question would be “I do worse in school when I have thoughts that make me feel 
sad.” 
 Although the AFQ-Y was developed for children and adolescents, the AFQ-Y should 
ideally show a meaningful association with existing measures of PF and be comparable in 
relation to measures of psychopathology and well-being.  To examine the relationship between 
the AFQ-Y and AAQ-II, two different samples of adults were assessed (Fergus et al., 2012).  In 
the first sample consisting of college students, the reading level and factor structure for the 
using the AFQ-Y was assessed.  In the second sample, 115 patients with multiple diagnoses 
from an intensive anxiety outpatient program completed several clinical measures in addition to 
the AFQ-Y and AAQ-II which included the Anxiety Sensitivity Index-3 (Taylor et al., 2007), 
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961), the Social 
Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS; Mattick & Clarke, 1998), the Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; 
Beck, Epstein, Brown, & Steer, 1988), the Panic and Agoraphobia Scale (PAS; Bandelow, 
1999), and the Dimensional Obsessive-Compulsive Scale (DOCS; Abramowitz et al., 2010).  
In both samples, the factor structure of the AFQ-Y yielded a one-factor model, 
confirming its construct validity.  A high value for the Cronbach’s alpha statistic (α = .93) 
indicated excellent internal consistency in the sample involving college students.  In the clinical 
population, internal consistency for the AFQ-Y was reported as α = .90 and for the AAQ-II α = 
.89.  The correlations between the AFQ-Y and AAQ-II in the second sample was r = .70.  The 
convergent correlations between the two PF measures were considered high enough to 
demonstrate that the same underlying construct was being measured; however, this was further 
tested by incremental concurrent validity tests.  The AFQ-Y incrementally predicted the scores 
of all psychological symptoms above and beyond the AAQ-II except for the obsessive 
compulsive measure (Fergus et al., 2012).  However, the AAQ-II did not predict any unique 
variance for all psychological symptoms except for the obsessive compulsive measure.   
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In another study comparing the AFQ-Y and AAQ-II in adults, a college sample 
completed the AFQ-Y, the AAQ-II, the Symptom Checklist-90-R (SCL-90-R; Derogatis, 1994), 
the Depression Anxiety Stress Scale (DASS; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995), the Kentucky 
Inventory of Mindfulness Skills (KIMS; Baer, Smith, & Allen, 2004) and the Quality of Life 
Inventory (QOLI; Frisch, 1994) (Schmalz & Murrell, 2010).  The factor structure of the AFQ-Y 
also yielded a one-factor model and the Cronbach’s alpha was similar to the above sample of 
college students (α = .92).  In this study, the AFQ-Y did not predict unique variance for the 
quality of life measure above and beyond the AAQ-II (Schmalz & Murrell, 2010). 
In conclusion, the AFQ-Y was found to be applicable for all ages starting from the fifth 
or sixth grade comprehension levels (Greco et al., 2008) and was comparable with the AAQ -II 
in terms of the underlying construct, in measuring symptom-based psychological constructs 
(Fergus et al., 2012), and in measuring well-being in terms of quality of life (Schmalz & 
Murrell, 2010).  Moreover, the AFQ-Y was inversely related to measures of psychological 
symptoms and directly related to measures of well-being (Greco et al., 2008).   
3.2.2  Evidence for PF in Adults and Adolescents 
Increasing empirical evidence shows that PF acts as a broad vulnerability for various 
kinds of emotionally-related distress.  The PF construct has been examined in several ways 
since its initial application in ACT with a wide range of psychological disorders and problems 
having been investigated (Ruiz, 2010).  Measures of PF, namely the AAQ and AFQ-Y, correlate 
as expected with a broad range of measures and forms of psychopathology, measures of 
behavioural medicine (e.g. chronic pain), workplace variables (e.g., job burnout, propensity to 
innovate, workplace well-being and performance), measures of coping, and measures of quality 
of life and well-being (Hayes et al., 2006).  Several meta-analyses involving the PF construct 
have been conducted to date.  One of the first meta-analyses involved 32 studies and a total of 
6628 participants (Hayes et al., 2006).  Higher PF was positively associated with higher quality 
of life, positive emotional experiences, and perceived well-being (Hayes et al., 2006).  Low PF 
was associated with a range of psychological disorders including depression, anxiety, 
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somatisation, PTSD (re-experiencing and arousal subscales), social phobia, agoraphobia, 
blood/injury phobia, anxiety sensitivity, fear of suffocation, fear of body sensations, stress, 
trauma-related symptoms and beliefs, dissociative experiences, alcohol dependence, job-
induced tension, worries, fear of intimacy, and pain (Hayes et al., 2006).  Low PF may also play 
a role in eating disorders, specifically in patients with anorexia nervosa (Rawal, Park, & 
Williams, 2010) whereas psychological acceptance is associated with lower levels of disordered 
eating behaviours (Masuda, Price, Anderson, & Wendell, 2010).    
In a second meta-analysis by Ruiz (2010), empirical evidence for PF was examined in 
correlational, experimental, component, and outcome studies.  The main highlight of the 
correlational studies was that the weighted average correlation between PF and depressive 
symptoms was r = -.55 and between PF and anxiety symptoms was r = -.52.  The high 
correlations indicate that the PF construct potentially plays an important role in emotion-related 
psychological problems.  However, correlational studies only indicate that there is an 
association between two variables.  In order to determine whether PF plays an active role in 
psychological processes, results from experimental studies are briefly examined below. 
In the experimental studies reviewed, participants’ levels of PF were assessed in 
conjunction with experimental tasks such as the examination of tolerance by keeping hands in 
cold water (Zettle et al., 2005), the assessment of performance on a challenging perceptual-
motor task (Zettle, Petersen, Hocker, & Provines, 2007), and a comparison between acceptance 
and suppression conditions using a carbon-dioxide enriched air challenge (Feldner, Zvolensky, 
Eifert, & Spira, 2003).  Overall, participants who scored high on the AAQ (low PF) in these 
studies, had found the tasks more challenging and displayed more emotional discomfort in 
comparison to those who scored low on the AAQ.  In another experimental study that assessed 
high vs. low levels of PF, emotional reactions of participants were compared when they viewed 
pleasant, neutral, and unpleasant films (Sloan, 2004).  In this study, participants with lower 
levels of PF tended to report higher levels of emotional experiences along with higher heart 
rates when they viewed pleasant and unpleasant films in comparison to the participants with 
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higher levels of PF (Sloan, 2004).  In conclusion, the pattern of findings seems to suggest that 
those who were low in PF tended to report greater emotional distress across different 
experimental tasks.  Moreover, the differences observed in emotional reactions between high vs. 
low PF indicates that the PF construct possibly acts as an emotion regulation strategy.  
Additionally, Ruiz (2010) reviewed several empirical reviews that compared the ACT 
protocol and other established treatments.  In ACT, the goal of treatment is to enhance PF by 
using mindfulness and acceptance processes along with behavioural change processes to change 
the function of private experiences rather than the content of private experiences with 
consideration given to values and goals that matter to the individual.  ACT methods involve 
metaphors and exercises used for integrating PF processes as a whole.  These studies may not 
have necessarily used PF measures to assess efficacy but therapists involved in the studies have 
predominantly been trained with the ACT protocol  Three meta-analyses that assessed the 
clinical efficacy of ACT based on evidence from RCTs and processes of change were examined 
(Hayes et al., 2006; Ost, 2008; Powers, Zum Vorde Sive Vording, & Emmelkamp, 2009).  In 
approximately 21 RCT’s, ACT interventions were found to be better than control or no 
treatment, treatment as usual (TAU), and also better than structured interventions (Hayes et al., 
2006).  In the review by Ost (2008), 15 RCT’s were considered and ACT was similarly found to 
be superior to no treatment, to TAU, and other active treatments.  Similar conclusions were 
established in another review in which ACT was found to be better than wait-lists and TAU but 
not significantly better than other established treatments (Powers et al., 2009).  In conclusion, 
the three reviews established that ACT interventions were effective and significantly improved 
specific psychological symptoms but more evidence is needed to show that ACT or the 
enhancement of PF is clinically efficacious in comparison to established treatments, in 
particular, CBT.  These reviews also demonstrate support for the PF construct as mindfulness 
and acceptance processes that can impact broadly on human functioning and contribute to 
positive outcomes through therapy.  
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ACT interventions have only recently started being examined in adolescent populations 
for specific problems.  Most of the adolescent studies have either been pilot or preliminary 
investigations with the purpose of determining efficacy of the ACT protocol and therefore 
sample sizes have been small.  Adolescents’ ages in these studies ranged from 11 to 18 and 
clinical samples ranged from non-severe to severely disordered and delinquent.  Most of the 
ACT intervention studies reviewed below have used the AFQ-Y as an assessment measure to 
gauge improvement in participants before and after treatment.  ACT interventions have been 
conducted in adolescents with specific psychological problems such as eating disorders and 
obsessive-compulsive disorders, in adolescents with chronic pain, and in school settings.     
In a systematic review comparing processes of change in ACT versus CBT in anxious 
adolescents (N = 49, 12-17 years), significant decreases in the AFQ-Y were found following 
treatment (Swain, Hancock, Hainsworth, & Bowman, 2013).  The AFQ-Y has also been used to 
gauge the influence of an ACT intervention in adolescents with eating disorders.  In a pilot 
study, six adolescents with anorexia nervosa and their parents participated in a family-based 
ACT intervention (Merwin, Zucker, & Timko, 2013).  All but one participant showed 
improvements in weight and had reduced attempts to control eating, as well as improvement in 
interpersonal relationships, personal adjustment, self-reliance, and self-esteem.  The AFQ-Y 
was used as part of the pre-and-post assessments.  For most participants, significant declines 
were observed in the AFQ-Y from pre-to-post intervention (except for two participants).   
Similarly, in another study, three adolescents with obsessive-compulsive disorder were treated 
with 8-10 sessions of ACT with results showing mean reductions in self-reported compulsions 
of 40% from pre-treatment to post-treatment with gains maintained at 3-month follow-up 
(Armstrong, Morrison, & Twohig, 2013).  Ratings on the AFQ-Y and Children’s Yale-Brown 
Obsessive Compulsive Scale also showed significant improvements from pre-treatment to post-
treatment. 
In the area of health psychology, ACT was compared to TAU in children with chronic 
pain and significant improvements were observed in the ACT condition in the areas of fear of 
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re-injury, pain interference, and quality of life (Wicksell, Melin, & Olsson, 2007).  
Improvements were maintained at 6 month follow-up. 
In school settings, ACT was compared to passive coping in a RCT study in a school 
setting with significant improvements in outcomes and measures of stress and PF for up to two 
years later (Livheim, 2004).  Subsequent studies have used ACT in comparison to TAU in 
school-based group intervention programs in adolescents with stress and depression (Livheim et 
al., 2014) and in adolescents with ADHD (Murrell, Steinberg, Connally, Hulsey, & Hogan, 
2014).  Findings from the first study indicated that ACT has potential as a group intervention as 
significant reductions were observed in depressive symptoms and stress in comparison to the 
TAU group and that AFQ-Y scores decreased in the ACT group (Livheim et al., 2014).  In 
adolescents with ADHD, significant change was seen in the Behaviour Assessment Scale for 
Children and the values assessment, however, the AFQ-Y was not useable as these adolescents 
were unable to comprehend what the items meant even though they were able to read them 
(Murrell et al., 2014).   
Another ACT group intervention study was conducted in a school in order to assess the 
useability of the AFQ-Y in adolescents with behavioural problems.  Fifteen adolescents (aged 
12-15 years), assessed as either high or low on the Behaviour Assessment System for Children 
in a school setting (BASC; Reynolds & Kamphaus, 2004),  participated in two defusion 
exercises (Luciano et al., 2011).  The researchers attempted to differentiate between types of 
relational frames in the defusion exercises in order to determine their usefulness in interventions 
among low-risk and high-risk adolescents (Luciano et al., 2011).  The Spanish version of the 
AFQ-Y and the acceptance without judgment scale of the Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness 
Skills (KIMS; Baer et al., 2004) were used to assess the difference between pre and post 
training in the two defusion protocols.  In the low risk group, decreases in the AFQ-Y and 
increases in the accepting without judgment subscale (KIMS) were observed with a 100% 
reduction rate in problematic behaviours.  In the high-risk group, a reduction in problematic 
behaviours and a significant increase in accepting without judgment scores were observed, 
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however, no significant changes in the AFQ-Y was observed.  The results of this study indicate 
that the AFQ-Y can be used to discriminate the effectiveness of interventions between low-risk 
groups and high-risk groups of adolescents.     
Although the studies conducted with adolescents are preliminary, they still are an 
indication that PF can be enhanced in adolescents through psychotherapeutic interventions and 
that psychological outcomes can be improved.  Unlike other trait measures such as self-esteem 
for example, PF can be modified in treatment.  But nevertheless, more research is required to 
gain a better understanding of how PF processes function in adolescence and whether the AFQ-
Y can differentiate between varied levels of PF in conjunction with other risk factors.   
3.2.3  Psychological Flexibility as a Psychological Vulnerability 
Many of the above listed disorders belong to the Axis I category of the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5; American Psychiatric Association, 2013) and 
certain forms of avoidance are a predominant feature in disorders such as depression, anxiety, 
PTSD, and alcohol dependence in adults (Plumb, Orsillo, & Luterek, 2004; Stewart, Zvolensky, 
& Eifert, 2002; Tull, Gratz, Salters, & Roemer, 2004) and in adolescents (Venta, Sharp, & Hart, 
2012).  Moreover, the comorbidity among the listed disorders suggests that there are common 
underlying processes that contribute towards their co-occurrence.  For example, depression is 
known to be comorbid with many disorders and psychological difficulties such as anxiety 
(Copeland et al., 2014).  In a study conducted to determine risk factors of substance abuse in a 
predominant male veteran sample who were seeking treatment, PF was found to be strongly 
negatively correlated with anxiety sensitivity, depression, and anxiety (Forsyth, Parker, & 
Finlay, 2003).  Moreover, from pre-to-post treatment, significant increases in PF were observed 
in all categories of substance use.  The PF construct also discriminated between those with 
primary substance use disorder and comorbid substance use disorders (Forsyth et al., 2003).  
The strong negative correlations between PF and psychological distress and PF and 
psychopathological variables suggest that low PF is an underlying psychological vulnerability.   
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In survey research with inpatient adolescents, the AFQ-Y demonstrated sensitivity and 
specificity in the diagnosis of anxiety disorders in a clinical sample (Venta et al., 2013).  
However, the AFQ-Y was not able to separate other comorbid psychological disorders 
(especially depression) from pure anxiety disorders as intended by the researchers in this study.  
But this may suggest that low levels of PF represent co-occurring processes that underlie a 
range of psychological disorders as have been found in other adult studies that used the AAQ.  
In this respect, PF can be considered as a potential transdiagnostic approach to psychopathology 
(Boulanger et al., 2010).         
Findings from non-clinical samples of adolescents support the hypothesis that low PF is 
a marker of vulnerability.  In empirical research with two samples of adolescents (N = 513 and 
N = 675), PF was shown to be negatively correlated with clinical measures of anxiety, 
somatisation, and behavioural problems and positively correlated with quality of life, social 
skills, and academic competence (Greco et al., 2008).  In another empirical study, adolescents 
from two high schools (N = 211) were surveyed to examine the relationship between non-
suicidal self-injury (NSSI) and experiential avoidance using the AFQ-Y (Howe-Martin et al., 
2012).  NSSI was found to be common in adolescents (33% of those surveyed), with more 
females engaging in these behaviours.  Gender differences were also found for the AFQ-Y and a 
separate measure of thought suppression with females reporting higher scores in general.  
Thought suppression and alexithymia appeared as significant differentiating variables between 
adolescents with and without a history of NSSI but higher levels of experiential 
avoidance/cognitive fusion correlated with reported multiple psychopathological behaviours, 
such as disordered eating, substance abuse, and suicidal ideation/behaviours in addition to NSSI 
(Howe-Martin et al., 2012).   
Mediational studies between PF, coping styles, and psychopathology provide further 
evidence of PF as a potential transdiagnostic variable.  PF was found to be distinct from several 
other coping strategies where PF mediated the relations between maladaptive emotional 
response styles and uncontrollability on daily mood and anxiety-related distress using 
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experience sampling method (Kashdan et al., 2006).  For example, PF fully mediated the effects 
of expressive suppression and cognitive reappraisal and daily functioning.  The conclusion to 
the study suggested that low PF is a “ toxic self-regulatory diathesis” underlying other coping 
and emotion regulation strategies and that through this mechanism, diminished well-being, less 
frequent positive affective events (emphasis added), and increased distress were experienced 
(Kashdan et al., 2006, p. 1315).  
 In other recent mediation studies, low PF has been found to partially and fully mediate 
a wide range of coping styles and emotionally related psychological symptoms.  For example, 
PF partially and fully mediated the relation between childhood psychological abuse and adult 
psychological distress (Reddy, Pickett, & Orcutt, 2006), materialism and diminished well-being 
(Kashdan & Breen, 2007), passive coping and depression/anxiety, passive coping and 
emotional/psychological well-being (Fledderus, Bohlmeijer, & Pieterse, 2010), anxiety 
sensitivity and borderline personality disorder (Gratz, Tull, & Gunderson, 2008), self-reported 
negative affect intensity and childhood trauma on the tendency to engage in problem behaviours 
(Kingston, Clarke, & Remington, 2010), heart beat reactivity and cortisol reactivity on child 
maltreatment and PTSD symptoms (Shenk, Putnam, & Noll, 2012), rational coping and 
detached/emotional coping on stress and depression for chronic pain (Costa & Pinto-Gouveia, 
2011), fear of cognitive dyscontrol and disordered eating (Fulton et al., 2012), and cognitive 
flexibility on PTSD severity and depression (Palm & Follette, 2011).  The significant 
meditational role of low PF shows that it is an underlying vulnerability that impairs adaptive 
coping and perpetuates maladaptive coping processes.  Although the mediational studies 
provide an indication of the role of PF processes in the development of more severe 
psychological disorders, PF is still considered a correlate of other psychological processes.  It 
remains unclear as to whether PF precedes these other processes or is a consequence of them.   
In addition to the mediating role of low PF as an explanation for comorbidity among 
psychological disorders, processes proposed in the PF construct have also been shown to be 
distinct from other coping and emotion regulation response styles. The PF measure 
121 
 
distinguished between individuals with severe and normal levels of depressive symptoms in 
comparison to other emotion dysregulation measures such as the difficulties in emotion 
regulation measure (DERS; Gratz & Roemer, 2004).  PF also mediated the association between 
fear of cognitive dyscontrol and fear of publicly observable anxiety reactions and depressive 
symptoms (Tull & Gratz, 2008).  In another study, the motivation to drink in young adults was 
examined by looking at the role of anxiety sensitivity, PF, and alexithymia (Stewart et al., 
2002).  PF and alexithymic coping were found to partially mediate the relationship between 
anxiety sensitivity and coping-motivated drinking but PF was a stronger mediator than 
alexithymia.  In a different study however, PF was not found to be a stronger mediator than 
alexithymia in the relationship between avoidant coping and fear of uncertainty with 
psychosocial outcomes (Berrocal et al., 2009).  Both PF and alexithymia appeared to be 
independent psychological dimensions in relation to psychosocial well-being.  High anxiety-
sensitive individuals were more likely to cope by drinking when they were also high in EA 
(Stewart et al., 2002).  In a study examining PF and forgiveness in the relationship between 
traumatic interpersonal events and PTSD, both PF and forgiveness partially mediated the 
relationship (Orcutt, Pickett, & Pope, 2005).  Individuals who experienced interpersonal trauma 
were more at risk of developing PTSD especially when they were low in PF and also when they 
were unwilling to forgive an interpersonal wrongdoing. 
The psychological vulnerability aspect of PF has also been investigated in regression 
studies.  PF correlates with a number of coping and emotion regulation strategy measures and 
other psychological measures that are considered vulnerability factors and/or risk factors.  Low 
PF correlates with thought suppression and self-focused attention (Glick & Orsillo, 2011), 
avoidant coping, fear of uncertainty (Berrocal et al., 2009), anxiety sensitivity (Kampfe et al., 
2012), and alexithymia (Berrocal et al., 2009; Howe-Martin et al., 2012; Stewart et al., 2002)  
Theoretically, these measures are also conceptually assessing fear and/or avoidance of unwanted 
private events.  However, PF has been shown to contribute unique variance in explaining 
psychological outcomes in addition to these other coping strategies and psychological 
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vulnerability measures.  The additional unique variance attributed to the PF construct is possibly 
due to its pervasive pathological function underlying many forms of emotion regulation 
strategies used in many contexts and is likely to contribute to greater life restrictions and further 
to psychopathology (Boulanger et al., 2010).       
Research on PF in conjunction with other vulnerability/risk factors has also been 
conducted in order to understand pathways to certain psychological symptoms.  For example, 
PF and other risk factors such as the difficulties with emotion regulation (as measured by the 
DERS), distress intolerance and low PF were examined in relation to symptom severity in 
borderline personality disorder (BPD; Iverson, Follette, Pistorello, & Fruzzetti, 2012).  Only PF 
and difficulties with emotion regulation contributed significantly to BPD symptom severity.  
However, only low PF remained a unique contributor of BPD symptom severity in a regression 
analysis after controlling for depressive symptoms and difficulties with emotion regulation 
(Iverson et al., 2012).  In a study examining commonalities and differences in major depressive 
disorder (MDD) and borderline personality disorder (BPD), it was found that negative affect 
was associated with both disorders while positive affect was associated with MDD and affect 
intensity with BPD (Cheavens & Heiy, 2011).  Low PF was found to partially mediate the 
relationship between affect and symptoms and MDD and BPD.  The findings in this study 
suggests that although PF played a role in exacerbating the experience of affect in MDD and 
BPD, affect still plays an important role in delineating symptoms in MDD and BPD symptoms.  
It is unclear whether affect had an effect on PF or PF had an effect on affect.     
In another study, the Brief COPE (a measure of many coping styles; Carver, 1997) was 
compared to the AAQ-II (Karekla & Panayiotou, 2011).  Both constructs overlapped in 
predicting psychological distress and quality of life but PF added unique variance to the model.  
The findings suggested that PF accounts for many coping styles and explains additional 
variance over and above established measures of coping (Karekla & Panayiotou, 2011).   
PF has also been investigated with mindfulness measures such as the Five Facet 
Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ; Baer et al., 2006).  This study examined the moderating 
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effects of PF and mindfulness on the trait-like Behavioural Inhibition System (BIS) sensitivity 
and psychological distress as measured by the Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scales, (DASS; 
Hamill et al., 2015; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995).  The BIS sensitivity scale is an aversive 
motivational system that links the functions of the brain to behaviour and affect and is said to be 
highly sensitive to punishment and non-reward (Carver & White, 1994).  BIS sensitivity is 
highly linked with negative emotions such as fear, anger, guilt, and sadness (Dillard & Peck, 
2001).  Low PF and certain facets of mindfulness (e.g. nonreactivity subscale) moderated the 
relationship between BIS sensitivity and psychological distress symptoms.  This study suggests 
that heightened BIS sensitivity can be tempered with mindfulness-and-acceptance based 
practices and provides support for using ACT as a treatment modality (Hamill et al., 2015).  In 
another study that assessed the Mindful Attention and Awareness Scale (MAAS; Brown & 
Ryan, 2003) and the AAQ-II in an adult clinical sample, it was found that the correlation 
between dispositional mindfulness and PF was r = .558 (p < .01) (Silberstein, Tirch, Leahy, & 
McGinn, 2012).  The positive high correlations between PF and dispositional mindfulness 
suggested that elements of the two constructs may be measuring similar processes that consist 
of an open awareness and being nonjudgmental and accepting of emotional experiences in the 
present moment.   
3.3  Psychological Flexibility and Stress and Coping in Adolescents: 
Theoretical overlaps and distinctions 
3.3.1  Coping in Adolescents 
Due to biological, cognitive, and social developmental changes, adolescents experience 
increased levels of stress and corresponding appraisals of stress characterized by intense 
negative emotions (Folkman & Moskowitz, 2004; Larson & Ham, 1993; Rosenblum & Lewis, 
2003).  Stress and emotion are often viewed as interdependent as emotion is often present when 
there is stress (Lazarus, 1999).  Appraisals of stress initiate a coping process in order to deal 
with the potential loss of achieving important goals.  Coping is a complex and multidimensional 
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process in which individual characteristics and the socio-contextual environment influence the 
appraisal of stress and coping resources (Folkman & Moskowitz, 2004; Rudolph, Flynn, 
Abaied, Groot, & Thompson, 2009).  Coping is strongly associated with the regulation of 
emotions as emotions are featured throughout the coping process (Folkman & Lazarus, 1988).  
In the initial coping process, the first task of coping is mainly to down-regulate negative 
emotions as they can interfere with other instrumental coping tasks.  This is called emotion-
focused coping (Folkman, 1984).  Researchers have found that the consistent use of emotion-
focused coping featured with different kinds of avoidant strategies can be associated with 
negative mental health outcomes, while other kinds of coping resources such as seeking social 
support and problem-focused coping can be associated with a wider range of outcomes, both 
positive or negative outcomes, and can also be neutral (Folkman & Moskowitz, 2004).  In a 
recent review of coping styles, adolescents were found to switch to using more emotion-focused 
coping strategies with avoidant features such as distraction and escape when they experienced 
uncontrollable stressors and interpersonal problems (Zimmer-Gembeck & Skinner, 2011).   
Coping styles appear to play a key role in the link between stressors and adolescent 
psychopathology (Dumont & Provost, 1999; Seiffge-Krenke, 2000).  One of the most prevalent 
correlates of emotional and behavioural symptoms in children and adolescents is the use of 
avoidant coping, including both behavioural efforts and the avoidance of thinking about the 
problem (Aldridge & Roesch, 2008; Asarnow, Carlson, & Guthrie, 1987; Compas, Malcarne, & 
Fondacaro, 1988; Ebata & Moos, 1991; Garnefski, Kraaij, & van Etten, 2005; Herman-Stahl, 
Stemmler, & Petersen, 1995; Seiffge-Krenke, 1993; Silk et al., 2003).  Researchers have found 
that adolescent anxiety and depression were often influenced and exacerbated by avoidant 
coping.  Longitudinal studies have pointed to the pernicious effects of avoidant coping in the 
long term.  The use of avoidant coping (versus approach-oriented coping) is associated with 
increased depressive symptoms and   depression later on in life (Seiffge-Krenke, 1995).  In 
another study, the long term effects of the tendency to cope by avoiding and withdrawing, 
irrespective of when the avoidant behaviour emerged, eventually led to increases in depressive 
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symptoms and continued to influence the outcome of later development of depression (Seiffge-
Krenke & Klessinger, 2000).  Additionally, suppression and avoidance predicted an increase in 
emotional and behavioural problems in adolescents regardless of changes in life stress (Flouri & 
Mavroveli, 2013). 
 Three main conclusions can be drawn from the adolescent stress and coping literature.  
First, even though adolescents become more flexible with the ability to switch among coping 
strategies, they tend to rely on the same strategies that may have worked well in specific 
situations without taking into account situational differences (Lougheed & Hollenstein, 2012).  
This is mainly because they have not had experiences in the past that may have exposed them to 
the use of different coping styles in different situations.  As a result, they tend to become 
insensitive to the differences in the context at hand.  Second, the very capabilities applied for 
future planning as a result of an increase in cognitive capacities, also render them susceptible to 
worrying about the future (Flouri, Mavroveli, & Panourgia, 2013; Zimmer-Gembeck & Skinner, 
2011).  And by the same token, the increase in their quest for autonomy also makes them 
susceptible to using escape strategies when avoidance is the purpose (Zimmer-Gembeck & 
Skinner, 2011).  Third, avoidance strategies are the predominant coping strategies used in 
adolescence and their long-term effect is clearly associated with emotionally-related symptoms 
(Seiffge-Krenke & Klessinger, 2000; Silk et al., 2003).  Although the development in cognitive 
reasoning and the increase in the range of self-reliant coping strategies lead to effective action 
and emotion regulation, the same acquired abilities also introduce vulnerabilities.  Elements of 
these conclusions are all components of the PF construct and therefore it is important to further 
explore the construct in relation to other emotion regulation models to better understand how it 
contributes to adolescent well-being and also the maintenance of psychological problems. 
3.3.2  Psychological Flexibility and Emotion Regulation in Adolescents 
The incorporation of emotion regulation strategies in adolescent coping have gained 
increased attention from stress and coping researchers.   Coping and emotion regulation 
strategies are highly inter-related but they have also been found to be different or specific to the 
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situation (Flouri & Mavroveli, 2013).  Coping has been referred to as “conscious and volitional 
efforts to regulate emotion, cognition, behaviour, physiology, and the environment in response 
to stressful events or circumstances” (Compas, Connor-Smith, Saltzman, Thomsen, & 
Wadsworth, 2001, p. 89).  Some of the predominant coping styles include distraction, escape, 
social withdrawal, helplessness, positive restructuring, and support seeking (Zimmer-Gembeck 
& Skinner, 2011).  Although coping and emotion regulation have emerged from different 
psychological research areas, they are nevertheless closely related.  The link between coping 
and emotion regulation lies in the strategy used to regulate emotions when stress is encountered.   
Emotion regulation has emerged more recently than coping and therefore its 
investigation in adolescents is also recent.  Most of the research in adolescents has been drawn 
from the adult literature.  In a recent meta-analysis, large effect sizes were found for 
maladaptive strategies such as rumination and medium to large for avoidance and suppression 
(Aldao et al., 2010).  In contrast, for adaptive emotion regulation strategies, medium to large 
effect sizes was found for problem-solving and small to medium effect sizes for reappraisal and 
acceptance.  In general, cognitive reappraisal and problem solving are strategies thought to be 
adaptive across a variety of contexts and are negatively associated with emotional and 
behavioural problems while rumination, avoidance, and suppression contribute to emotional and 
behavioural problems.  In adolescents, emotion dysregulation has been shown to be a mediator 
of the association between stressful life events and internalizing disorders, especially in older 
adolescents over time (McLaughlin & Hatzenbuehler, 2009).  The potential role of mindfulness 
as an adaptive emotion regulation strategy is also emerging in adolescents (Chambers et al., 
2014).    
Two predominant models of coping and emotion regulation in adolescents have been 
identified in the extant literature: the hierarchical voluntary and involuntary coping model 
proposed by Compas and colleagues and the process model of emotion regulation proposed by 
Gross and colleagues (Compas, Connor, Saltzman, Thomsen, & Wadsworth, 1999; Gross & 
Thompson, 2007).  Both models capture different adaptive and maladaptive emotion regulation 
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strategies.  Evidence for the two models has also been empirically replicated in a number of 
studies.  More recently, another model has been gaining attention.  This model can be referred 
to as the difficulties with emotion regulation model proposed by Gratz and Roemer (2004).  In 
this model, several mindfulness aspects, for example, an awareness and acceptance of emotions, 
are incorporated within a multidimensional approach.  These aspects of emotion regulation have 
not been considered in other models.  In the following section, first the hierarchical voluntary 
and involuntary coping model is described followed by the process model and the difficulties in 
emotion regulation model.  Corresponding research findings are also presented. 
3.3.2.1  The hierarchical voluntary and involuntary coping model  
Emotion regulation strategies can also be seen as part of the hierarchical voluntary and 
involuntary coping model which has been empirically replicated in clinical and non-clinical 
samples of adolescents (Connor-Smith, Compas, Wadsworth, Thomsen, & Saltzman, 2000; 
Langrock, Compas, Keller, Merchant, & Copeland, 2002; Wadsworth & Compas, 2002).  
Voluntary responses, also known as controlled responses, are strategies used as a preference.  
Involuntary or automatic responses are considered strategies that individuals use automatically 
when they encounter unpleasant stimuli.  Involuntary strategies eventually take on a life of their 
own, as in the example of rumination.  Voluntary strategies can further be categorized as active 
engagement with and passive disengagement from the stressor.  Within active engagement, 
primary and secondary control strategies are reflective of the way an individual views the 
stressor (Thurber & Weisz, 1997).  Primary control is an attempt to engage with the stressor by 
modifying negative aspects of the situation (e.g. problem-solving), while secondary control is an 
attempt to make the best of the situation given the circumstances, and utilizes strategies such as 
distraction and cognitive restructuring.     
The experience sampling method was used to explore coping and emotion regulation 
strategies, based on the voluntary and involuntary coping model, in real time, as they unfolded 
in daily life among the adolescent participants (Silk et al., 2003).  Adolescents who were unable 
to regulate negative emotions, including sadness, anger, and anxiety, were found to be more 
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vulnerable to internalizing and externalizing disorders when compared to those who recovered 
from these emotional experiences more easily.  Contrary to their expectations, primary and 
secondary control strategies did not have a systematic effect on the regulation of emotions.  
None of the active engagement strategies, such as problem-solving, emotional expression, 
cognitive restructuring, and distraction, were reported as being used to regulate negative affect 
effectively.  Instead, emotion regulation strategies that were more influential were 
disengagement and involuntary engagement but these could also prove counterproductive.  
Disengagement strategies, such as avoidance, denial, escape, or wishful thinking, and 
involuntary strategies, such as rumination, were all detrimental as they supported the 
maintenance of higher levels of anger and sadness.  Furthermore, disengagement and 
involuntary strategies were associated with higher levels of depressive symptoms and problem 
behaviours, whereas primary and secondary control strategies were not highly associated with 
psychological symptoms.   Findings from this study highlight a few important points about 
emotion regulation in adolescents which are elaborated below. 
First, the social context of adolescents was taken into consideration with the use of the 
experience sampling method but the emotion regulation strategies from the hierarchical 
voluntary and involuntary model explained only a part of how individuals treated the experience 
of emotions.  Thus, there appears to be other processes involved in explaining how these 
adolescents experienced emotions.  Second, avoidance and its many forms played a large role in 
how these adolescents adapted to negative experiences.  Disengagement from a negative 
experience reduces exposure towards the experience and therefore interferes with processes that 
support habituation of the experience and related emotion(s).  In this way, the avoidance of 
internal experiences may in fact perpetuate painful events or situations through verbal behaviour 
that is rooted in the social context of adolescents.  Third, emotion dysregulation, irrespective of 
the strategies used, is a common correlate of internalizing and externalizing behaviours in 
adolescents.   
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Leading researchers in emotion regulation argue that emotion regulation strategies are 
critical underlying factors of several forms of psychopathology.  Additionally, it appears that the 
inflexible (emphasis added) use of emotion regulation strategies, irrespective of whether they 
involve active engagement or disengagement, influences the effectiveness of the strategies 
themselves (Bonanno, Papa, Lalande, Westphal, & Coifman, 2004).  Emotion regulation 
strategies applied with the intention to avoid emotions or to control the coping process are more 
likely to be used rigidly without taking into account the context at hand (Boulanger et al., 2010).   
3.3.2.2  The process model of emotion regulation  
The process model of emotion regulation examines two strategies, cognitive reappraisal 
and expressive suppression (Gross, 1998; Gross & John, 2003; Gross & Thompson, 2007).  In 
this model, emotion regulation strategies are categorized as either antecedent-focused strategies 
or response-focused strategies.  Cognitive reappraisal (ability to think about a situation from 
other aspects in order to change its emotional impact) is an antecedent focused strategy which is 
employed early in the emotion elicitation process.  Expressive suppression (suppression of 
emotional expression and experience) is a response-focused strategy used to manage distress 
when negative emotions are elicited.  Reappraisers and suppressors differ considerably in most 
aspects of emotional, social, cognitive, and behavioural outcomes.  Cognitive reappraisal 
strategies include the ability to approach stressful situations with optimistic attitudes and 
through reinterpretations of the situation, applying a concerted effort in repairing moods, and 
experiencing and expressing positive emotions more than negative emotions (Gross & John, 
2003).  On the social front, reappraisers also tended to have closer relationships with others and 
share both positive and negative emotions.  Cognitive reappraisal was also positively correlated 
to well-being measures such as self-esteem and life satisfaction.  In contrast, expressive 
suppression is known to have adverse effects on cardiovascular functioning, social support and 
relationships, and cognitive functioning in adults (Butler et al., 2003; Gross, 1998; Richards & 
Gross, 2000; Srivastava, Tamir, McGonigal, John, & Gross, 2009).  Studies using the emotion 
regulation questionnaire (ERQ: Gross & John, 2003) demonstrated that the tendency to suppress 
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or conceal emotional responses was associated with feelings of inauthenticity among 
participants, who also reported being unaware about what they were feeling, being unsuccessful 
at mood repair, and ruminating about events.  Moreover, efforts to suppress negative emotions 
also extended to the suppression of positive emotions and therefore less positive emotions were 
experienced (Gross & John, 2003). 
In a few cross-sectional and longitudinal studies, the ERQ has been associated with 
internalizing disorders such as anxiety, depression, and social anxiety.  Expressive suppression 
has been shown to be highly associated with depressive symptoms (Hughes, Gullone, & 
Watson, 2011; Lanteigne, Flynn, Eastabrook, & Hollenstein, 2014; Lougheed & Hollenstein, 
2012).  This seems to suggest that suppression is a strategy used considerably more by 
depressed individuals and that it contributes to the maintenance of depression as well as 
increases in levels of negative affect in comparison to the absence of cognitive reappraisal 
strategies (Aldao et al., 2010).  Additionally, adolescents who used a limited range of emotion 
regulation strategies, including those who relied on specific response-focused strategies, such as 
suppression/concealing and emotional disengagement, and those who reported using no 
strategies tended to report more internalizing symptoms (Lougheed & Hollenstein, 2012).  
Furthermore, the developmental trajectories of expressive suppression and cognitive reappraisal 
seem to decrease as age increases albeit at different ages in females and males (Gullone, 
Hughes, King, & Tonge, 2010).  With increase in age, suppression strategies stabilize, whereas 
– contrary to expectations, the ability to reappraise decreases.  Adolescent girls reported more 
use of expressive suppression than young women, while cognitive reappraisal strategies 
remained the same for both age groups (Gullone et al., 2010).  
The reviewed studies provide preliminary evidence for the role of emotion regulation in 
adolescent functioning, however, other aspects of emotion regulation are still lacking.  The 
majority of studies with adolescents have used this model; but the breadth of studies is fairly 
narrow, focusing mainly on depression as an outcome.  Moreover, only cognitive reappraisal 
and expressive suppression (Gross & John, 2003) have been examined to the almost complete 
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exclusion of other underlying emotion regulation processes that may be of importance in 
adolescence.  For example, in a study that compared the use of emotion regulation strategies in 
internalizing symptoms in female adolescents (Eastabrook, Flynn, & Hollenstein, 2014), 
emotional awareness (as measured by the DERS; Gratz & Roemer, 2004) was shown to be 
important for cognitive reappraisal (as measured by the ERQ; Gross & John, 2003).  Likewise, 
processes such as acceptance and mindfulness have been linked with psychological outcomes 
(e.g. depression and anxiety) that are highly associated with emotion dysregulation in adults and 
adolescents (Neumann et al., 2010; Roemer et al., 2009).  For example, PF was found to be 
strongly associated with quality of life in individuals with psychotic symptoms when compared 
to the weak association between cognitive reappraisal and quality of life (Vilardaga, Hayes, 
Atkins, Bresee, & Kambiz, 2013).  Moreover, no significant relationship was found between 
cognitive reappraisal and positive and negative affect whereas PF was associated with both of 
them.  Further, lagged-temporal analyses also suggested that PF and cognitive reappraisal are 
two distinct processes (Vilardaga et al., 2013).  Together these findings suggest that there are 
more processes involved in emotion regulation other than cognitive reappraisal and expressive 
suppression.  The PF construct is likely to capture other distinct processes that may be relevant 
in understanding emotional and social well-being in adolescents. 
3.3.2.3  The Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Model 
The Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale focuses on six aspects of emotional 
engagement (DERS; Gratz & Roemer, 2004).  These aspects are:  nonacceptance of emotional 
responses, difficulties engaging in goal-directed behaviour, impulse control difficulties, lack of 
emotional awareness, limited access to emotion-regulation strategies, and lack of emotional 
clarity.  The DERS has been tested in demographically diverse clinical and nonclinical samples 
and has been shown to apply similarly across age, gender, and racial group membership (see 
Ritschel, Tone, Schoemann, & Lim, 2015 for more details).  Additionally, the DERS has been 
found to have good psychometric properties that include good test-retest reliability (Gratz & 
Roemer, 2004), good internal consistency (Neumann et al., 2010), and adequate convergent and 
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discriminant validity (Gratz & Roemer, 2004; Ritschel et al., 2015).  Adequate convergent and 
discriminant validity of the DERS has also been demonstrated through its positive correlations 
with negative affect (Johnson et al., 2008; Roemer et al., 2009) and negative correlations with 
positive measures  such as mindfulness (Baer et al., 2006)  and self-compassion (Roemer et al., 
2009).  In a number of studies, maladaptive emotion regulation strategies, as measured by the 
DERS, have been found to correlate strongly with substance abuse (Fox, Axelrod, Paliwal, 
Sleeper, & Sinha, 2007), relational aggression (Gratz, Paulson, Jakupcak, & Tull, 2009), and 
non-suicidal self-injury (Gratz & Roemer, 2008).  Most of these studies have used emerging 
adult and adult populations, however, research using the DERS in adolescent populations is 
growing.      
Similar to research in the adult population, the DERS has been used in clinical and 
nonclinical adolescent populations.  The factor structure of the DERS found in adults was also 
replicated in samples of adolescents (Neumann et al., 2010; Weinberg & Klonsky, 2009).  
Notable gender differences were found on some factors with females reporting significantly 
higher scores on emotional nonacceptance and emotional awareness, but lower scores on access 
to effective emotion regulation strategies in comparison to their male counterparts (Neumann et 
al., 2010).  Males reported lower emotional awareness but were on par with females on 
difficulties controlling impulsive behaviours when distressed.  The DERS also accounted for a 
larger variance in internalizing disorders (i.e. anxiety and depression) and a smaller variance in 
externalizing disorders (i.e. aggression and delinquent behaviour) (Bender, Reinholdt-Dunne, 
Esbjorn, & Pons, 2012; Neumann et al., 2010).  Different factors of the DERS have also been 
useful in delineating among different forms of internalizing symptoms in males and females.  In 
females, anxiety was predicted by limited access to emotion regulation strategies and lack of 
clarity, while in males, anxiety was predicted by nonacceptance of negative emotional responses 
alone.  Emotion dysregulation has also been indicated in other maladjusted behaviours in 
adolescents.  Emotion regulation difficulties have been found to be a correlate of maladaptive 
adolescent behaviours such as suicidal ideation, eating disorders, and use of alcohol and drugs 
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(Weinberg & Klonsky, 2009), strong negative emotional intensity and greater drinking to cope 
(Veilleux, Skinner, Reese, & Shaver, 2014), and violence (Miller, Vachon, & Aalsma, 2012).  
Difficulties in emotion regulation also influence risky sexual behaviour, increases the 
vulnerability for revictimization (Messman-Moore, Walsh, & DiLillo, 2010), increase the 
chances of sexual victimization, and contributes to poor risk perception (Walsh, DiLillo, & 
Messman-Moore, 2012).    
In a study of rural high school students aged 14 to 18 years (N = 7,978; Pisani et al., 
2013) difficulties in emotion regulation and poverty in emotion regulation strategies emerged as 
one of the most potent correlates of suicide attempts.  Strong youth-parent communication 
partially buffered the effects of this association.  For example, among 80 parent-child dyads 
with child mean age of 13.6, parental emotion dysregulation was associated with parent emotion 
invalidation and that this in turn was related to difficulties in emotion regulation in adolescents 
(Buckholdt, Parra, & Jobe-Shields, 2014).  Moreover, difficulty regulating emotions in 
adolescents contributed in part to the association between parent invalidation and adolescent 
internalizing/externalizing symptoms.  In another study, significant positive correlations were 
found between difficulties in emotion regulation and emotional symptoms after controlling for 
paternal psychological control and gender (McEwen & Flouri, 2009).  Difficulties in emotion 
regulation mediated the association between paternal psychological control and emotional 
symptoms.  The findings indicate that paternal parenting has an effect on emotional symptoms 
via emotion dysregulation.   
It can be inferred from the studies above, particularly the parent-child dyad and paternal 
parenting studies, that adolescents who experience invalidation for emotional displays and those 
who are psychologically controlled may not seek support from parents.  In contrast, adolescents 
who can trust and communicate with a parent or adult even when they have inadequate skills in 
emotion regulation are less likely to be at risk for attempting suicide.  Given the findings from 
these studies, it is clear that both emotion regulation skills and the ability to seek support are 
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important processes in reducing psychopathological risk in adolescents, however, it remains 
unclear as to which of these factors is an antecedent of the other.   
The difficulties in emotion regulation model and the DERS measure are clearly linked 
to clinically relevant symptoms but have also been linked with other aspects of adolescent 
development.  The various emotion regulation factors measured by the DERS were examined 
with respect to development of identity in adolescence (Jankowski, 2013).  Levels of emotional 
awareness were found to be an important determinant of identity formation.  Those who were 
more emotionally aware reported achieving the highest identity dimension whereas those lower 
on identity achievement formation were characterized with lower levels of emotional awareness 
(Jankowski, 2013).  Difficulties in realizing goal-oriented behaviours and control over impulses 
were also associated with lower identity achievement status.  This study provides preliminary 
support for the role of emotion regulation skills in important developmental processes in 
adolescence which in turn can affect psychosocial adjustment.   
Another study investigated the role of emotion regulation in the association between 
adjustment/depression and two different functions of language: epistemic (personal sense of 
confidence in using language to explore and understand inner psychological experiences) and 
communicative (personal perceptions of the effectiveness of language in sharing psychological 
experiences) (Simsek & Cerci, 2013).  The researchers posited that a gap exists between inner 
psychological experiences and corresponding language that represents inner experiences.  This 
gap is a likely contributor to mental health and can be used to diagnose mental health problems.  
The researchers further proposed that processes through which language contributes to mental 
health could possibly be via emotion regulation.  Using structural equation modelling, emotion 
regulation was found to partially mediate the relationship between language gap and adjustment.  
Emotion regulation and adjustment fully mediated the association between language gap and 
depression and adjustment mediated the relationship between emotion regulation and 
depression.  This study provides evidence for the contribution of underlying processes such as 
the gap between personal experiences and language usage, emotion regulation, and adjustment, 
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as contributors to mental health problems (Simsek & Cerci, 2013).  This is important in the 
context of the current study because RFT, the theory of language and cognition underlying the 
PF construct, suggests that language processes influences inner psychological experiences.   
Similarly, the role of language and cognition has been examined in other constructs in 
other ways.  Language and cognition in the form of verbal behaviour, as reflected  in the PF 
construct, has been investigated along with difficulties in emotion regulation as underlying 
processes affecting the inability to identify and describe emotional states in words (i.e. 
alexithymia) (Venta et al., 2012).  An inpatient adolescent group with higher levels of 
alexithymia reported higher levels of difficulties in emotion regulation and lower levels of 
psychological flexibility (Venta et al., 2012).  In addition, lower levels of psychological 
flexibility partially mediated the relationship between alexithymia and difficulties in emotion 
regulation.  The findings from this study suggest that in addition to having difficulties regulating 
emotions and the inability to identify and describe emotions, the adolescents were also 
unwilling to tolerate the aversive nature of the emotions they were experiencing (Venta et al., 
2012).  
In another study, the association between borderline personality features and both 
difficulties in emotion regulation and PF in 208 inpatient psychiatric adolescents were examined 
(Schramm, Venta, & Sharp, 2013).  Borderline personality features were positively linked with 
difficulties in emotion regulation and negatively linked with PF.  PF added significant 
incremental validity and contributed independently to borderline personality features above and 
beyond difficulties in emotion regulation.  Psychological flexibility seems to capture other 
processes that are not present in the DERS. 
In conclusion, increasing evidence for the utility of the DERS as a measure of emotion 
dysregulation has demonstrated utility in adolescents.  Different dimensions of difficulties in 
emotion regulation are associated with clinically relevant symptoms and with specific 
developmental measures in adolescence.  The studies reviewed above highlight the need to 
target emotion regulation skills in treatment, especially PF.  Although there is conceptual 
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similarity between the DERS and PF, PF has made a significant and independent contribution to 
our understanding of emotionally-related problems in adolescents and has been shown to have 
incremental validity over the DERS.  The PF construct includes features of emotion regulation, 
but is also a broader construct in the contribution towards emotionally-related psychological 
symptoms (Chapman, Dixon-Gordon, & Walters, 2011).  Emotion regulation focuses 
specifically on mechanisms – whether deliberate or automatic - that have the goal of changing 
or moderating the experience of emotions.  PF extends to include the regulation of an 
individual’s experience of many other private events, such as thoughts, sensations, images, and 
memories in connection with emotions.    
3.4  Summary and Conclusion  
 In this section, PF has been shown to be associated with a broad range of psychological 
symptoms, psychological distress variables, and other psychological vulnerability/risk factors.  
In intervention studies, PF has been shown to be a mechanism of change for a range of 
psychological symptoms (Hayes et al., 2006; Ruiz, 2010).  The evidence also shows that PF 
plays a role in the relationship between psychological symptoms and negative outcomes.  In 
these studies, psychological symptoms have been shown to potentially lead to psychopathology 
or increases in psychopathology via decreases in PF.  Furthermore, PF acts as a psychological 
vulnerability for emotionally-and-socially-related problems.  PF is similar to other coping and 
emotion regulation strategies but is a different, broader construct, explaining additional variance 
in studies when it was examined with other constructs (Kashdan et al., 2006a).  In adults, PF has 
been found to mediate the relationship between psychological symptoms and various forms of 
coping by suppression and avoidance.  The body of evidence suggests that individuals may 
engage in many forms of coping and/or emotion regulation in an avoidant and suppressive 
fashion that may bring relief to them in the short term but may actually continue to become 
detrimental in the longer term (Boulanger et al., 2010).  Many of these forms of coping by 
suppression and avoidance have been implicated in studies associating coping and emotion 
regulation strategies with psychological symptoms in adolescents.  For example, research 
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examining the AFQ-Y and DERS in adolescents has shown that both constructs are associated 
with psychological symptoms.  Furthermore, the studies reviewed above showed that there is 
evidence for similarity between PF and difficulties with emotion regulation. The similarity 
between PF and difficulties in emotion regulation shows that PF can be viewed as an emotion 
regulation variable but PF offers additional unique variance in predicting psychological 
symptom severity (Chapman et al., 2011).  It is possible that the unique variance in the PF 
construct represents the willingness to be open to experiences that are linked with effective 
action in realizing values or goals (Boulanger et al., 2010).          
 At present, studies that examined the PF construct have mainly been cross-sectional in 
nature and therefore what is known is that PF is a correlate of psychological disorders, other 
forms of coping and emotion regulation constructs and certain cognitive vulnerabilities.  Based 
on the RFT literature, the ability for language and cognition commences at an early age but it is 
still unclear as to when these language and cognitive abilities can develop into maladaptive 
forms of coping or contribute to the dysregulation of emotions.  Longitudinal studies are needed 
to provide a better understanding of how the PF construct is related to emotional and social 
well-being.  Adolescence is a crucial developmental period in which intensive emotions are 
experienced and disruptions in social networks are also likely to be experienced.  It seems that 
the adolescence period provides a good opportunity to explore the temporal sequencing between 
PF and emotional and social well-being over time.  The next chapter provides an overview of 
the emotional and social developments in adolescence and how these developments can lead to 
the links between emotional well-being and mental health and social well-being and mental 
health.  Further, the connections between specific emotions and PF are considered followed by 
the connection between perceived social support and PF. 
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Chapter 4:  Emotional and Social Well-being as Markers of Mental 
Health Risk in Adolescents  
Emotional well-being and social well-being are equally important aspects of 
development in adolescents.  In this section, emotional well-being in adolescents will be 
considered first, followed by social well-being in adolescents.  However, before emotional and 
social well-being are considered, unique biological and social changes that occur during 
adolescence are described in order to provide a perspective of the adolescent emotional and 
social context. 
The research undertaken seeks to target a vulnerable period in adolescence and identify 
common processes that contribute to psychological difficulties.  Adolescence is most often 
marked as a period of transition between childhood and adulthood.  Adolescence typically 
commences from the age of 11 until the age of 19 and the length of the adolescence period is 
typically organized as early adolescence (ages 11-13), mid-adolescence (ages14-16), and late 
adolescence (ages 17-19).  Adolescence is a crucial period for understanding how the 
developing brain interacts with the environment to produce behaviours and attitudes in the 
service of attaining increasing independence from parents and family, developing relationships 
with peers including the opposite gender, fulfilling academic requirements, planning for an 
occupation, and working out a set of values that would guide them as they move into adult roles. 
Numerous developmental interactions take place during adolescence, highlighting the 
bidirectional nature of genes, hormones, and neural structures with environmental influences 
(Dahl, 2004; Susman & Rogol, 2004).  Changes that occur due to the interaction between 
biology and environment often have an effect on emotional, cognitive, and social systems.   
Accumulated research has shown that during adolescence, it is normal for adolescents 
to engage in increased risk-taking and reward-seeking behaviours (the tendency to seek out 
novel and stimulating experiences that are potentially harmful) with peaks seen in mid-
adolescence and declines observed in early adulthood (Braams et al., 2015; Col- lado et al., 
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2014; Hale et al., 2014; Romer et al., 2014).  At the same time, research indicates that distinct 
and complex self-regulatory mechanisms are being developed, such as impulse control and 
delayed gratification, as adolescents become exposed to different situations and influences.  In 
addition, research also indicates that the consumnption of alcohol commences in early/mid-
adolescence with typical initiation at the age of 15 years possibly due to environmental factors   
(Masten, Faden, Zucker, & Spear, 2009).   Research indicates that some environmental factors 
that influence drunkenness in mid-adolescence include family variables such as parental 
acceptance, father drunkenness, and low parental support and peer variables such as peer 
support, acceptance, and drunkenness (Heismisdottir, Vilhjalmsson, Kristjansdottir, & 
Meyrowitsch, 2010).  A similar influence of peers during mid-adolescence was observed for 
smoking (Mercken, Candel, Wilems, & de Vries, 2009).  Research suggests that as adolescents 
attempt to gain a balance between their impulses and risk-taking tendencies, a propensity for 
substance use can develop (Masten, Faden, Zucker, & Spear, 2009).  If adolescents start 
indulging in higher levels of alcohol consumption and smoking during this period, then it can 
adversely influence their reward sensitivity levels and social and emotional behaviour. The 
number and kinds of influences can be varied and this can be a concern especially during mid-
adolescence.  Taken together, mid-adolescence is a period in which rapid changes are occurring 
internally and in the external environment and these are likely to influence cognitive and socio-
emotional development.  The greatest challenge for adolescents is to be able to develop 
appropriate self-regulatory skills in the face of typical developmental challenges.    
An attempt to understand adolescent behaviour involves taking a look at the context of 
the behaviour including other factors that have an effect on the pervasiveness of that context. 
The adolescent context is unique as it involves the transitional period from late childhood to 
early adulthood and the beginning of reproductive maturity in humans.  Adolescents typically 
experience greater stress and instability in emotional and social experiences as a result of this 
transition (Larson, Moneta, Richards, & Wilson, 2002).  Adolescents are known to be 
influenced by their childhood environment (eg. family socialization) and their own individual 
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constitution that involve temperament and genetics.  Developmental changes at the biological 
and social levels also have an effect on adolescents.  The accentuation hypothesis asserts that 
when stress is encountered during this transition period, behavioural problems that had been 
observed in childhood can also be observed in adolescence (Caspi & Moffitt, 1991; Laceulle et 
al., 2014).  In other words, a continuity in personality characteristics or the way response 
systems have been shaped and formed in childhood can be observed in adolescence during this 
disruptive transition period.  Generally, the majority of adolescents will face difficulties as it is 
implicit in this developmental stage.  Nevertheless, the extent to which difficulties are 
experienced and the degree to which responses become reactionary also depend upon the 
context.  The intensity of problems faced by adolescents, to a large extent, depends upon the 
availability and perceptions of social support in the form of family, friends, and peers.  Those 
who receive support are better equipped with resources to face challenges in this life stage.  
Additionally, from a psychosocial perspective, the development of emotions and reactions to 
emotions occurs within social interactions.  This makes the social context an important ground 
for identifying, understanding, and labelling specific emotions.  Social interactions also provide 
a means to consider when and where certain emotions and their intensities should be expressed.  
Social interactions and context establish rules for feeling appropriate emotions in particular 
circumstances.  Thus, important changes that occur at the biological and social levels can be 
viewed as the context for the majority of adolescents.   
4.1  Biological and Social Changes in Adolescence  
Although certain developmental processes in childhood continue into adolescence, 
advances in neuropsychological research have shown that development during adolescence is 
different due to biological changes (Hollenstein & Lougheed, 2013).  Structural and functional 
biological changes influence adolescent behaviour via several mechanisms that include changes 
at the physical level (e.g., height, weight, secondary sex characteristics etc.), the neurochemical 
level (e.g. puberty and the pruning of synaptic connections), and at the cognitive functioning 
level (frontal and parietal regions).  On one level, adolescents experience accelerated physical 
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growth that contributes to enhanced strength and endurance.  On another level, pubertal 
maturation involves fluctuations in hormones, testosterone, and estradiol.  Hormonal 
fluctuations influence the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axes and hypothalamic-pituitary- 
gonadal axes at different rates and amplitudes at different periods in adolescence and have 
effects on the balance of neurochemicals in the brain (McCartney et al., 2009).  Additionally, 
rapid cognitive development in the domain of processing speed, prospective memory, and 
working memory increases cognitive capacity and decision-making abilities.  But the disparity 
between the early maturation of the emotional sub-system (limbic system) versus the late 
maturation of the cognitive sub-system (prefrontal cortex) renders adolescents susceptible to 
heightened risk taking behaviour in adolescence particularly during early to mid-adolescence 
(Giedd et al., 1999; Shaw et al., 2008; Steinberg, 2008).   
Adolescent behaviour can be highly sensitive to biological changes.  Hormonal changes 
during puberty have an effect on bodily changes and adolescents become exceedingly self-
conscious about their body.  Bodily changes are highly scrutinised by peers and become an 
issue for social comparison in adolescence (Brooks-Gunn & Warren, 1989).  For boys, a 
postpubertal physical form becomes a focus as it is socially desirable (Petersen & Crockett, 
1985).  Moreover, body-consciousness in today’s contemporary culture has evoked body image 
concerns that may have an effect on eating habits and emotional well-being (Hughes & Gullone, 
2011).  Put together, structural and functional changes in biology are ubiquitous and inevitable 
and have an influence on adolescent emotional functioning; however, environmental influences 
in the form of social and cultural context play a significant role in enacting biological changes 
with consequences bearing on emotional processes during adolescence (Hollenstein & 
Lougheed, 2013).  Various challenges stemming from emotional processes in childhood coupled 
with developmental changes in adolescence can either become a basis for the skilful 
management of emotions or the dysregulation of emotions.  Many adolescents learn how to 
navigate these challenges successfully; however adolescents who lack adaptive strategies in 
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managing these challenges are particularly at risk of developing psychopathology (Lougheed & 
Hollenstein, 2012; Silk et al., 2009).  
Adolescents also experience considerable changes in social relationships.  Changes that 
have been observed in adolescents are primarily the distancing from parents and the increased 
movement towards peers for support (Helsen et al., 2000; Hombrados-Mendieta, Gomez-
Jacinto, Dominguez-Fuentes, Garcia-Leiva, & Castro-Trave, 2012; Scholte & Van Aken, 2006).  
Friends and peers provide increasing emotional and informational support in general but girls 
usually report higher levels of support from friends and peers than boys (Hombrados-Mendieta 
et al., 2012).  Emotional support is provided in the form of affection and time in listening to 
expressions of feelings while informational support is provided in the form of useful tips and 
information concerned with typical daily problems and tasks.  Peers also become more 
important as popularity and peer approval become the focus of their social world.  As 
adolescents become more peer-oriented, social contextual cues that guide emotion management 
decisions are also transformed as peer expectations and prosocial goals become their primary 
concern (Zeman & Shipman, 1998).  Adolescents increasingly become more self-absorbed as 
they place higher value on self-image and self-presentation (impression management) with 
concerns about feeling vulnerable (regulating sadness more than anger) (Shipman, Zeman, 
Nesin, & Fitzgerald, 2003).  Moreover, as adolescents are developing a sense of identity and 
autonomy, they are also redefining their role across different social contexts (e.g. at home and in 
school) at the same time (Petersen, Kennedy, & Sullivan, 1991).  Another contemporary social 
change for adolescents is the use of social media.  Social networking sites are the predominant 
means of making friends, communicating with peers, and a means of identity exploration.  
Social networking sites have significant positive and negative impact on the emotional and 
social well-being of adolescents (Cookingham & Ryan, 2015).  
The diverse and considerable biological changes experienced in the physical body, the 
changes in family relationships, and the increased focus on peers and how they present to their 
peers creates intense psychological needs in adolescents.  Adolescents are constantly adjusting 
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their self-image to peer expectations, striving to acquire independence, endeavouring to succeed 
academically, and trying to experience fun and excitement in the midst of it all.  In trying to 
realize psychological needs, adolescents are also coping with emotions and stress.  In light of 
these unique developmental changes, coping processes learned in childhood may also change or 
become more pronounced in adolescence.  For example, adolescents in the 14-16 years age 
bracket tend to reduce their use of problem-focused coping (e.g. cognitive problem-solving, 
planning) and switch to using more emotion-focused coping (e.g distraction, escape) (Zimmer-
Gembeck & Skinner, 2011).  Additionally, their experience of different emotions and their 
perceptions of the availability of social support are liable to change during this period.  For 
example, adolescents usually feel more conscious about their body image and how they present 
to the outside world.  Consequently they are also more likely to perceive themselves as 
inadequate and this may be heightened by a global sense of shame and/or sadness (Angold & 
Costello, 2006).  Given that adolescents increasingly rely on their peers instead of family 
members for emotional support (Zimmer-Gembeck & Skinner, 2011), it is probable that the 
experience of emotions and perceived social support will be different in adolescence in 
comparison to childhood.  Adolescents are more likely to manage different emotions in 
alignment with goals of their peer group.  Shifts in perceived social support are also likely, 
consistent with adolescents’ increasing dependence on peers to manage emotions.  
4.2  Emotional Well-being and Mental Health  
Emotional well-being can be seen as a continuum between momentary emotional states 
that accumulate and develop into a central tendency or more sustained emotional experience 
(Larsen, 2009).  In other words, there is a continuum between daily experiences of an affective 
state, such as sadness, that can develop into emotional distress and manifest as depression.  
Affective experiences can be viewed from an integrative hierarchical model that has three 
different levels (Tellegen, Watson, & Clark, 1999).  The first level consists of the bipolar 
dimensions of pleasant versus unpleasant (Green, Goldman, & Salovey, 1993).  The second 
level consists of positive and negative affect (Watson & Tellegen, 1985) and the third level 
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consists of discrete emotions (Frijda, 1986; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985).  Robust empirical 
support has been found for the valence level of emotions.  Negative and positive affect are two 
broad and independent dimensions and have corresponding links with psychological symptoms 
(Diener & Larsen, 1993; Watson & Tellegen, 1985).  However, research is accumulating for the 
third level consisting of discrete emotions and their individual links with well-being and 
psychological disorders. 
Adolescents typically experience a downward shift that can be explained as increases in 
negative emotions and decreases in positive states in their daily range of emotions between early 
and late adolescence (Larson, Moneta, Richards, & Wilson, 2002).  In particular, levels of 
happiness continue their downward shift until greater stability is attained in late adolescence 
(Larson et al., 2002).  Further, in the period between early and late adolescence, stress and 
adjustment (e.g. self-esteem and problem behaviours) levels have been observed to remain 
stable, suggesting that there is a tendency for adolescents to experience increasing levels of 
negative affect and decreasing levels of positive affect regardless of stress levels (Larson et al., 
2002; Costa & McCrae, 1990).  Additionally, gender differences in negative and positive 
emotions have also been found to be mixed.  In some studies, girls were found to have increased 
levels of negative affect in comparison to boys (Holsen et al., 2002; Petersen, Sargiani, & 
Kennedy, 1991) while in another study, both girls and boys were found to experience similar 
increased levels of negative affect and decreased levels of positive affect (Larson et al.,, 2002).  
Although the discrepancies can be attributable to measurement differences, more research is 
needed to investigate gender differences.  The general picture of emotional experiences during 
adolescence can be quite disconcerting as greater negative emotions are experienced beginning 
in early adolescence due to developmental stresses and cognitive changes, but they do not 
necessarily reverse when negative emotions stabilize in late adolescence (Larson & Asmussen, 
1991; Larson et al., 2002).  A similar phenomena has also been observed with positive 
emotions.  The implication of these studies for mid-adolescents is that even though the 
downward shift occurs in early adolescence and stabilizes in late adolescence, mid-adolescence 
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can be the lowest point as negative emotions are possibly at a peak level and positive emotions 
are possibly at the lowest levels.        
4.2.1  The Link between Positive Affect and Negative Affect and Mental Health 
From a subjective well-being perspective, positive and negative emotionality is a large 
component of subjective well-being in addition to life satisfaction (Lucas, Diener, & Suh, 
1996).  However, positive and negative emotional experiences also contribute to life 
satisfaction.  In particular, the experience of positive emotions is more strongly correlated to life 
satisfaction than negative emotions and therefore positive experiences are considered an 
important pathway to experiencing life satisfaction (Kuppens et al., 2008).  When viewed from 
another perspective, subjective well-being can be considered as seeking to promote the 
experience of positive emotions while minimizing the experience of negative emotions.  
Emotional distress as expressed in depression can be viewed as the opposite of being in a state 
of well-being.  The experience of more negative emotions and less positive emotions 
contributes to psychological difficulties.   
 Watson and colleagues identified that negative and positive affect link well-being with 
distress.  Through a series of studies, the researchers found that high levels of negative 
affectivity and low levels of positive affectivity had a pervasive influence on physical health and 
stress, depression and anxiety, and lay on a continuum with a neurotic temperamental 
predisposition (Chorpita, 2002; Joiner, Catanzaro, & Laurent, 1996; Mineka, Watson, & Clark, 
1998; Watson & Clark, 1984; Watson & Pennebaker, 1989; Watson & Walker, 1996).  The 
tripartite model that emerged out of empirical evidence showed that negative affectivity 
accounted for comorbidity between depression and anxiety.  Positive affectivity and 
physiological arousal accounted for differences between depression and anxiety.  This model 
was supported in children, adolescents, and adults (Chorpita & Daleiden, 2002; Joiner et al., 
1996; Mineka et al., 1998).  
However, an alternative model built upon the initial tripartite model proposed that fear 
appeared to be a better construct in the delineation of depression and anxiety.  In a clinical 
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sample, fear was found to distinguish between depression and anxiety better than physiological 
arousal (Chorpita et al., 1998).  The researchers argued that fear captured a wider range of 
anxiety disorders and that the original tripartite model did not take into account the 
heterogeneity of anxiety disorders.  A modified tripartite model that consisted of negative affect, 
positive affect, and fear was supported by subsequent research (Muris, Schmidt, Merckelbach, 
& Schouten, 2001).  Correlations depicting the modified tripartite model between fear and 
depression were in the lower range (r = .20), between anxiety and fear in the moderate range (r 
= .38) and between anxiety and depression in the higher range (r = .64) (Muris et al., 2001).  
The finding that fear (as a discrete emotion) was a better alternative than physiological arousal 
has prompted questions regarding the utility of higher order factors (negative affect and positive 
affect) in explaining comorbidity between depression and anxiety.  Weak correlations were 
found between negative affect and specific anxiety disorders in normal and clinical populations 
in children, adolescents, and adults.  This supports the view that lower order discrete emotions 
may be more useful in explaining differences among anxiety disorders (Chorpita, Plummer, & 
Moffitt, 2000; Watson et al., 2005).  Fear has been found to better explain specific anxiety 
disorders (e.g. social phobia) while physiological arousal is more of a characteristic of panic 
disorders (Brown, Chorpita, & Barlow, 1998; Mineka et al., 1998).  Moreover, positive affect, 
originally considered as a differentiating factor between depression and anxiety, has been 
implicated as a stronger predictor of social phobia (Brown et al., 1998; Chorpita et al., 2000) 
and unspecified anxiety disorders (Jacques & Mash, 2004) in adolescent clinical populations.  
Together these studies suggest that specific emotions may be important in explaining specific 
mental health problems that seem to escape the broader dimensional approach of emotions.   
  Other specific negative emotions can be differentiated based on their meaning for an 
individual.  For instance, the experience of sadness while grieving for the loss of a significant 
person is different from the experience of shame which involves a tendency to consider oneself 
as globally unworthy.  Positive affect also has different facets such as joy, interest, and 
activation, which may have unique relationships with coping and self-regulation (Egloff, 
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Schmukle, Burns, Kohlmann, & Hock, 2003).  Furthermore, research on specific dominant and 
nondominant emotions and their corresponding effects on coping dispositions also contribute to 
the limitations of valence states (Egloff & Krohne, 1996).  For example, a provoked dominant 
emotion carries more intensity than nondominant emotions (Egloff & Krohne, 1996).  Given the 
limitations at the level of the valence states (i.e. positive and negative affect), it is worth 
examining lower order discrete emotions as specific emotions may have different effects on 
cognition (Frijda, 1986; Roseman, 1984; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985) and physiology (LeDoux, 
1992; Levenson et al., 1990; Panksepp, 1993) beyond valence and arousal states.   
4.2.2  Specific Emotions and Mental Health in Adolescents  
Research on the link between individual discrete emotions and well-
being/psychopathology has been accumulating.  Emotional development theories emphasize the 
embeddedness of the experience of emotions in socialization processes in the family and 
according to prescribed rules of expression at the societal/cultural level (Campos et al., 1989; 
Saarni, 1990).  Children learn at a very young age that the expression of negative affect in 
comparison to positive affect can result in unfavourable responses from others with the 
consequence of reduced comforting, help, and support (Coyne, 1976; Malatesta & Haviland, 
1982).  Moreover, in the context of specific emotions, the profiles of different negative and 
positive emotion differed in the comparison between depressed and nondepressed youth (Carey, 
Finch, & Carey, 1991).   Each discrete emotion, irrespective of negative or positive valence, 
influences mental health and well-being in different and independent ways even though they 
may be associated.   
  Fear plays a large role in the etiology of anxiety and anxiety disorders.  Fear and 
anxiety have separate factor structures but they are highly interlinked (Chorpita et al., 1998).  
The pathology of fear and anxiety in youth has received much attention in the past decade due 
to the high prevalence of anxiety disorders.  Research on the pathogenesis of anxiety disorders 
has revealed that fear and anxiety cannot be discriminated as anxiety can shift into a fear 
response and can intensify into a panic or phobia when exposed to the stimuli or situation.  The 
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relationship between fear and other psychological disorders such as anxiety and depression have 
been shown to be distinct but correlated as a group of negative emotions (Muris et al., 2001).  
Moreover, from a developmental psychopathology perspective, a continuum exists between 
normal fear and anxiety disorders which can be attributed to shifts in cognitive development 
during the teenage years (Cicchetti & Cohen, 1995).     
Sadness in adolescents has mainly been examined as dysphoria and depression (Kovacs 
& Yaroslavsky, 2014).  Persistent sadness acts as a vulnerability factor that may eventually lead 
to depression (Wakefield, Schmitz, & Baer, 2010).  Moreover, prior research has also identified 
sadness as being present in depression rather than as depression being present in sadness 
(Leventhal, 2008).  Research in child and adolescent depression increasingly shows the 
detrimental effects of familial depression on depressed and never-depressed adolescents through 
displays of dysphoric experiences, the inability to repair mood, and impaired mood repair 
mechanisms (Kovacs & Yaroslavsky, 2014).  Adolescents who experience sadness and view 
their difficult circumstances as being uncontrollable are also more likely to use alcohol and 
other drugs regularly and find it more difficult to access sustaining and reliable social supports 
(MacLean, Kutin, Best, Bruun, & Green, 2014).  Sadness prompts certain coping responses that 
can lead individuals down a pathway where it can intensify and become increasingly difficult to 
return to a state of normalcy.  More research is therefore required to identify risk factors 
associated with sadness and the manner in which sadness is regulated. 
Early research on hostility was mainly associated with physical health outcomes and in 
particular, coronary heart disease (CHD) (Miller, Smith, Turner, Guijarro, & Hallet, 1996).  
Although children are rarely known to suffer from CHD, research evidence suggests that 
atherosclerosis begins in adolescence and that a pattern of hostile-anger pattern possibly begins 
in childhood and becomes more pronounced in adolescence (Matthews & Woodall, 1988).  The 
interpersonal component of the psychosocial vulnerability model, in particular perceptions of 
low social support, has often been used to explain ill health in highly hostile individuals with 
males exhibiting more overt verbal and behavioural hostility than females (Hart, 1999). 
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Similarly, there is a growing body of literature linking hostility with stress and depression in 
adolescence (Felsten, 1996; Weiss et al., 2005).  Hostile attributions are also known to predict 
aggressive behaviour (Burks, Laird, Dodge, Pettit, & Bates, 1999; Godleski & Ostrov, 2010; 
Orobio de Castro, Veerman, Koops, Bosch, & Monshouwer, 2002).  Genetic factors play a role 
– albeit a small role - in the heritability of hostile/anger profile (Cates, Houston, Vavak, 
Crawford, & Uttley, 1993; Smith, McGonigle, Turner, Ford, & Slattery, 1991).  Etiological 
correlates of hostility have been clearly established, but little is known about coping strategies 
used by hostile individuals and whether hostility has more specific markers of risk. 
Proneness to shame can become exacerbated when shame is experienced continually 
and can lead to a wide range of psychological problems.  In adults, shame has been associated 
with a variety of anxiety disorders, depression, anger, substance abuse, somatization disorders, 
and eating disorders (Andrews, Qian, & Valentine, 2002; Sanftner, Barlow, Marschall, & 
Tangney, 1995; Tangney, Burggraf, & Wagner, 1995; Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, & Gramzow, 
1992).  Other psychological symptoms have also been associated with shame such as the fear of 
negative social evaluation, externalizing blame, and feelings of inferiority.  In children between 
5 and 13 years, shame-proneness has been broadly associated with internalizing and 
externalizing disorders, suggesting that shame-proneness underlies a range of psychological 
disorders (Ferguson, Stegge, Eyre, Vollmer, & Ashbaker, 2000; Ferguson, Stegge, Miller, & 
Olsen, 1999).  Results from longitudinal studies indicate that adolescents who tend to 
experience increases in shame and decreases in the experience of guilt are prone to experience 
depression and to become involved in delinquent  behaviour in late adolescence (Stuewig & 
McCloskey, 2005; Tilghman-Osborne, Cole, Felton, & Ciesla, 2008).  In another longitudinal 
study among early adolescents, differences between guilt and shame were evaluated on 
prosocial, withdrawn, and aggressive behaviours (Roos, Hodges, & Salmivalli, 2014).  The 
tendency for guilt-proneness contributed to reparative actions accompanied by the likelihood of 
remaining disengaged in maladaptive behaviours while shame-proneness tended towards less 
prosocial behaviour. 
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The role of positive emotions has mainly been examined in relation to its pleasant 
characteristics and its relationship with well-being.  The role of positive affect in 
psychopathology has been neglected despite the viewpoint that deficits or excesses in positive 
emotions can also be maladaptive (Gilbert, 2012).  Due to a lack of research in adolescents there 
is a need to rely on data from adult models of the dysregulation of positive emotions.  Support 
for the dysregulation of positive emotions can be applied to some specific disorders such as 
major depression, social anxiety, bipolar disorder, externalizing disorders, and eating disorders 
(Gilbert, 2012).  The dysregulation of positive emotions is marked by deficits in or low levels of 
the experience of positive emotions, imbalances between the experience of positive and 
negative emotions, the inability to differentiate between high-approach motivation and low-
approach motivation emotions, or elevated reward-seeking and sensation-seeking tendencies 
(Gilbert, 2012).  Adolescents typically report experiencing more negative affect in comparison 
to positive affect as is evidenced by a linear increase in negative affect and a substantial decline 
in positive affect as adolescence progresses (Henker et al., 2002; Silk et al., 2009).  The risk of 
psychopathology increases in adolescence when the ratio of negative to positive emotions 
experienced become greatly unbalanced (Fussner, Luebbe, & Bell, 2015).  In addition, 
adolescents experience greater intensity and variability in emotions on a daily basis and extreme 
feelings of both negative and positive emotions.  Adolescents also react quicker to emotional 
stimuli than children and adults and this explains the accelerated responding in emotional 
situations, especially when in conflict with parents and in risk-taking activities during this age 
period (Tottenham, Hare, & Casey, 2011).  Research is increasingly showing that apart from the 
contribution of high levels of negative affect on internalizing disorders (e.g. anxiety, 
depression), low levels of positive affect also contribute to increases in psychopathology 
(Gilbert, 2012; Neumann, van Lier, Frijns, Meeus, & Koot, 2011).   
4.2.3  Specific Emotions and Gender Differences 
Gender differences in the intensity and variability in each discrete emotion have mainly 
been found to be mixed with no consensus in either direction.  However, when discrete 
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emotions are scrutinized in specific contexts, gender differences appear and are more 
consistently dependent on context.  For example, girls are known to be more prone to shame 
than boys due to physical changes and this has an effect on their cognitions about the global self 
in relation to perceptions of body image (Reimer, 1996; Rosenblum & Lewis, 1999).  Girls tend 
to attribute negative evaluations in areas of achievement and global self-worth during these 
physical changes which indicates shame proneness (Eberhart, Shih, Hammen, & Brennan, 
2006).  Similarly, hostile males tend to exhibit more overt verbal and behavioural hostility than 
females (Hart, 1999).  In the case of sadness, boys tend to express and exhibit less sadness when 
compared to girls (Zeman & Garber, 1996).  Girls generally report being more fearful than boys 
on general measures of fear (Muris & Rijkee, 2011; Ollendick, King, & Muris, 2002) and this 
gender imbalance can also be seen in those who report higher levels of general and specific 
anxiety (Zahn-Waxler, Shirtcliff, & Marceau, 2008).  Gender role orientation has been shown to 
play a role in the experience of the intensity of fear in children (Ginsburg & Silverman, 2000; 
Muris, Meesters, & Knoops, 2005).  The display of fear in girls socialized with feminine roles is 
more acceptable whereas in boys socialized with masculine roles, the display of fear is not very 
well tolerated as they are expected to be courageous and brave (Ollendick, Yang, Dong, Xia, & 
Lin, 1995).  With respect to joy, gender differences are not very prominent, although in a daily 
diary report of emotion and mood study, adolescent girls reported lower levels of happiness than 
boys (Henker et al., 2002).  Taken together, these findings suggest the need to consider gender 
differences in the experience of specific emotions.   
4.3  Social Well-being and Mental Health in Adolescents  
 A sense of social well-being is experienced when people perceive that they have an 
adequate number of people they can rely on and express satisfaction with these relationships.  
The protective aspect of social support can be considered to contribute to resilience in young 
people (Pinkerton & Dolan, 2007).  The link between positive perceptions of social support and 
physical and mental well-being are well established and reflects a range of social and 
interpersonal competencies along with stable and distinct patterns of perceptions of social 
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relationships (Geckova, Van Dijk, Stewart, Groothoff, & Post, 2003; Kyngas, 2004; Martire, 
Lustig, Schulz, Miller, & Helgeson, 2004; I. Sarason, Sarason, & Pierce, 1990).  Adolescents 
who perceive strong social support are considered to cope better with major and minor life 
changes whereas those who perceive little or no social support are more vulnerable to negative 
life reactions to life changing experiences (Bal, Crombez, Oost, & Debourdeaudhuij, 2003; 
Herman-Stahl & Petersen, 1996; Murberg & Bru, 2004).  Research on the link between social 
well-being and mental health support the view that higher levels of perceived social support are 
related to lower levels of distress, more moderate reactions to negative events and stress, and 
lower levels of depression (Cornwell, 2003; Frey & Rothlisberger, 1996; Galaif, Sussman, 
Chou, & Wills, 2003; Garnefski & Doets, 2000; Kaltiala-Heino, Rimpela, Rantanen, & 
Laippala, 2001; Plesko, 2004).  However, considerable fluctuations in social support over time 
can contribute to increasing levels of depression (Cornwell, 2003; Needham, 2008).  Low 
perceptions of social support are associated with emotional difficulties and problem behaviours 
in children and adolescents (Demaray & Malecki, 2002).  A lack of positive perceptions of 
social support is also indicated in hostile-prone individuals (Vranceanu, Gallo, & Bogart, 2006).   
 In adolescents, PSS and social support seeking have been categorized as separate 
protective components from other protective factors (e.g. positive personality traits, self-esteem, 
self-efficacy, and functional coping styles) and vulnerability factors (e.g. neuroticism and 
dysfunctional coping and emotion regulation strategies) (Muris, Mayer, Reinders, & 
Wesenhagen, 2011).  This component of “social connectedness,” included the personality trait 
of agreeableness, suggesting that the social support recipient is more likely to garner support 
with an agreeable personality.  PSS often serves as a barometer of self-worth and a sense of 
being cared for which produces a sense of stability and predictability in coping with life and a 
more permanent feeling of psychological health (Cobb, 1976; Cohen & Wills, 1985; Compas et 
al., 1986).  A sense of well-being is experienced when individuals assign more positive 
attributes and less negative attributes to themselves (B. Sarason et al., 1991).  Individuals who 
perceive high social support are also more interpersonally effective and this is reflected in how 
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they confront challenges and solve problems which eventually lead to an enhancement of their 
coping repertoire (I. Sarason & Sarason, 1986; I. Sarason, Sarason, Keefe, Hayes, & Shearin, 
1986).  In other words, supportive others are given the opportunity to render support to 
individuals with high perceived social support and in turn, the expectation of receiving support 
is continuously reinforced (Pierce, Sarason, & Sarason, 1992).   
High parental support predicts better adjusted and less distressed children (Holahan, 
Valentiner, & Moos, 1995).  Even in the case of abused children, parental support contributed to 
less intense behavioural difficulties (Tremblay, LeMarquand, & Vitaro, 1999).  Females were 
less likely to engage in violent behaviours despite being exposed to violent friends and adults 
when they perceived support from at least one parent (Connell, Spencer, & Aber, 1994; Helsen 
et al., 2000; Zimmerman, Steinman, & Rowe, 1998).  Adolescents who perceive low levels of 
social support are at a higher risk of psychological problems (Helsen et al., 2000; Kinard, 1995; 
Spaccarelli & Fuchs, 1997).  In a comparison of the causes of severe to less severe stress levels, 
sexually abused adolescents used less social support seeking strategies and more avoidance 
strategies than adolescents who encountered less severe causes of stress (Bal et al., 2003; 
Spaccarelli, 1994).  Adolescents with low PSS may avoid seeking support in the fear that help 
may not be forthcoming or they may rely on peers for support which can actually contribute to 
an increased risk of poor adjustment (Feiring, Taska, & Lewis, 1998). 
 The buffering effect model of social support suggests that social support intervenes 
between the stressful event and psychological well-being by influencing cognitive evaluations 
or by moderating the person’s reaction (Cohen & Wills, 1985; Frey & Rothlisberger, 1996).  
The buffering effect model is considered applicable in those who suffer relatively mild stress or 
physical ailments than those who suffer more severe stress (e.g., sexual abuse) (Bal et al., 2003; 
DiMatteo, 2004).  PSS has also been shown to moderate the relationship between daily negative 
events and daily well-being in college students (Nezlek & Allen, 2006). 
 Some individuals manage stressful life events better than others by using their family 
and peers for support.  Positive social support is linked with well-being.  Social support 
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instability or decreases in social support can have deleterious effects during adolescence 
(Brausch & Gutierrez, 2010).  Social support decay occurs when increasingly detached feelings 
from usual supports (e.g. parents or grandparents) take place over time (Cornwell, 2003).  
Eventually, mental health becomes compromised due to the erosion of self-esteem and feelings 
of non-acceptance from others (Marshall, Parker, Ciarrochi, & Heaven, 2014).  Decreases in 
social support over time can result in chronic stress and that can eventually lead to 
psychological problems, in particular depression.  Adolescents who experience support decay 
have been found to report higher levels of depression than those who perceive stable or 
increased levels of social support (Cornwell, 2003).  The implication of these findings is that the 
effects of support decay are greater in magnitude than the stability or growth in support.  To put 
the implications in practical terms according to Cornwell (2003), to lower or deny social support 
to the extent that will make an adolescent depressed is far easier than it is to improve an 
adolescent who is already experiencing depression by providing additional social support.  Low 
levels of positive perceptions of social support have been found to be negatively related to other 
forms of well-being.  For example, low PSS leads to increases in unhealthy lifestyles and life 
dissatisfaction (Allgower, Wardle, & Steptoe, 2001; Thorsteinsson & Brown, 2009; Vermeulen 
& Mustard, 2000).  Currently, there is a lack of understanding of factors that influence decays in 
PSS. 
 The ongoing receipt of social support is an essential ingredient in maintaining a sense of 
well-being (Cornwell, 2003).  In adolescence, the central position of the social network is 
occupied by parents due to the high frequency of contact.  But friends become increasingly 
important in mid-adolescence (Helsen et al., 2000).  Adolescents who reported lower levels of 
parental PSS and higher levels of peer PSS also had higher levels of emotional problems 
(Helsen et al., 2000).  Girls are usually considered to have a larger support network due to the 
demand for more emotional support when compared to boys but gender differences in PSS have 
not been prominent (Frey & Rothlisberger, 1996; Helsen et al., 2000).  Boys generally receive 
less support from peers in terms of tangible support (Frey & Rothlisberger, 1996).  Overall, 
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perceived parental support has been shown to have positive outcomes among adolescent beyond 
gender and adversity.  Although support is available for the majority of adolescents, disruptions 
in social support may still occur.   
4.4  Emotional and Social Well-being and Psychological Flexibility 
4.4.1  Specific Emotions and Psychological Flexibility in Adolescents  
Several studies have started examining the relationship between emotion regulation 
strategies and specific emotions.  Zimmerman and Iwanski (2014) have shown that use of 
emotion regulation strategies depend upon the intensity and quality of experience of specific 
emotions.  In a sample of low risk participants from the age of 11 to 50 years (N = 1,305), 
emotion regulation strategies used depended on specific emotions such as sadness, fear, and 
anger (Zimmerman & Iwanski, 2014).  In general, those who experienced sadness used more of 
passivity, avoidance, and social support seeking strategies while those who experienced fear 
used more of expressive suppression and rumination strategies.  Those who experienced anger 
were more likely to use dysregulated and dysfunctional rumination strategies.  Additionally, the 
researchers found that emotion regulation develops through the experience of specific emotions 
rather than a general development of emotion regulation strategies.  However, only the adaptive 
emotion regulation strategies and social support seeking approaches were considered more 
general emotion regulation strategies (Zimmerman & Iwanski, 2014).  Moreover, declines in 
adaptive emotion regulation strategies were observed for sadness and anger from early 
adolescence to mid-adolescence and an increase in the use of expressive suppression for fear 
was found from early adolescence to adulthood.  Similarly, another study has shown that the 
development of emotion regulation and its use have been shown to vary between anger, fear, 
and sadness in children and adolescents based on appropriateness of expression in relation to 
socially-related goals (Zeman & Shipman, 1997).  In these studies, the researchers have brought 
to light that specific emotions are important in determining the development of emotion 
regulation strategies during adolescence and emerging adulthood but it is still unclear as to how 
individual differences in emotion regulation can act as a vulnerability.  Moreover, the utility of 
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investigating individual emotions can also be questioned when it is considered from the 
perspective of how it can inform or enhance our knowledge of the individual effects of emotions 
on negative psychological outcomes such as anxiety and depression.   An example of a 
longitudinal study that investigated specific emotions and its contribution in anxiety and 
depressive symptoms is presented below.   
    In a one-year longitudinal study in adolescents, the contribution of levels and 
variability of different emotions (happiness, anger, anxiety, and sadness) were found to be non-
specific in depressive and anxiety symptoms (Neumann et al., 2011).   In the same study 
however, the emotion dynamics were more specific in contributing to the development of 
aggressive behaviour as they included only negative emotions.  In this study, only levels of and 
variability in emotional dynamics were used to predict anxiety symptoms, depressive 
symptoms, and aggressive behaviours whereas emotion regulation strategies were not assessed.  
In light of the studies described in the preceding paragraph and this longitudinal study, it can be 
said that at present, due to the paucity of studies, more definitive conclusions about the 
relationship between emotion regulation strategies and specific emotions is premature.  Some of 
the unanswered questions were considered in the current study. 
As described in the preceding chapter, PF is increasingly being seen as a mindful ER 
variable and as a psychological vulnerability.  High PF is considered as ER processes that 
contribute to adaptive outcomes while low PF contributes to maladaptive outcomes.  Individual 
differences between basic emotions such as fear, sadness, and hostility in relation to PF are 
likely to be different.  Moreover, the reciprocal influence of PF in relation to each emotion is 
likely to provide an indication of how PF acts as a psychological vulnerability and whether 
differences in the reciprocal relationships will confirm whether specific emotions are important 
for determining when ER strategies are used.  For example, the relationship between fear and 
PF when compared to sadness and PF is likely to differ with respect to how processes in the PF 
construct are used in order to regulate these emotions.  As described in the above study 
(Zimmerman & Iwanski, 2014), those who experience fear are more likely to use expressive 
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suppression strategies while those who experience sadness are more prone to use passive 
avoidance strategies.  Similarly, the difference between fear and sadness in relation to PF is also 
expected to be different in terms of when PF exerts its influence in the emotion generation 
process model but these differences are difficult to predict in advance.  The same difference can 
be expected in the relationship between hostility and PF.        
Hostility is widely implicated in the relationship between social adjustment and 
psychological symptoms.  Although hostility and anger/aggression are often used 
interchangeably, there are differences between them.  Hostility consists of a series of hostile 
attribution patterns and action tendencies as suggested by the social information processing 
model (SIP; Crick & Dodge, 1994) while emotion and behaviour are more relevant in anger and 
aggression (Smith, 1992).  Based on the SIP, hostility can be dysregulated in children and 
adolescents when confronted with ambiguous social situations.  They attend to cues that have 
been selectively encoded to include hostile intentions, attribute hostile intentions to others, 
select aggressive or revenge goals, engender aggressive responses, tend to select aggressive 
responses as these are evaluated more favourably, presume affirmative outcomes from 
aggressive behaviour, and indulge in self-confidence when executing aggressive actions (Crick 
& Dodge, 1994).  Furthermore, the acquisition and maintenance of trait-like aggressive 
behaviour appears to be fed by hostile attributions that originate from the family environment 
(Huesmann, 1998).   
According to Huesmann’s (1998) observations, children are capable of learning 
complex behaviours that are encoded in memory and are retrieved during social interactions.  
Cognitive scripts encoded into memory from previous experiences and exposure to aggressive 
behaviours tend to become resistant to change and can persist in adulthood.  The development 
and persistence of hostile attributions are consistent with the RFT conceptualization of the 
development of cognitions based on observational learning.  Cognitive scripts are learned 
through respondent and operant conditioning of language and cognition.  For example, when a 
child is repeatedly exposed to aggressive behaviour, they have essentially observed a series of 
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relational operants from which meaning and action tendencies have been abstracted (D. Barnes-
Holmes et al., 2001).  Hostile attributions can be said to be a result of this learning process in 
which verbal and behavioural items are matched according to the consequences observed.  The 
child observes contingencies of behaviour(s) and begins to relate it with many other events in 
the observed aggressive interaction(s) and this kind of learning tends to influence how they 
respond emotionally in future social interactions (D. Barnes-Holmes et al., 2001).  From an RFT 
perspective, hostile attributions can be dysregulated through processes inherent in cognitive 
fusion and experiential avoidance.  In a study examining the AAQ-II and a range of 
psychological symptom measures, the correlation between the AAQ-II and hostility was .58 
(Gloster et al., 2011).  Aggressive behaviours in children and adolescents have often been 
observed in those that have a tendency for delinquency and therefore it has been suggested that 
mindfulness interventions are better placed at altering the relationship between the individuals’ 
context and their thinking rather than seeking to change thinking in order to change behaviour 
(Montgomery, Kim, Springer, & Learman, 2013).  Given PF is a mindful ER variable, 
enhancing PF in children and adolescents with aggressive behaviours is likely to counteract 
hostile attributions.         
Besides the basic emotions, self-conscious emotions, such as guilt and shame, have also 
become important emotions for study in adolescence.  Self-conscious emotions differ from basic 
emotions in that they require more advanced cognitive capacities for self-reflection and self-
awareness (Tracy & Robins, 2004).  Experiences of shame may trigger self-evaluative processes 
indicating that an individual may be engaging in a certain kind of self-awareness.  For example, 
an individual may be evaluating the discrepancy between the ideal self and the failed attempt to 
live up to a desired self-representation.  In other words, shame is an emotion that is highly 
associated with a conceptualized view of the self.  The conceptualized self is a verbal 
construction of the self that contains a history of descriptive and evaluative relational networks 
about the self (Y. Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Roche, & Smeets, 2001).  From an RFT 
perspective, a conceptualized self is learned in childhood when language is acquired.  A 
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conceptualized self emerges when children are taught how to name, categorize, and evaluate 
through language.  Eventually, a narrative surrounding a conceptualized self is formed and 
strong emotions can be evoked when inconsistencies in the narrative are seen as threatening 
(Hayes et al., 2012).  According to the PF model, an attachment to a conceptualized self is most 
likely an indication of being fused with aspects of the self that includes emotions such as shame 
and guilt.  Although self-conscious emotions have a useful purpose in deterring undesirable 
behaviours in societies and communities, they are likely to become aversive when fused with a 
dysfunctional conceptualized self.  This can become problematic as the desire to maintain a 
consistent narrative of a conceptualized self becomes an ongoing pursuit.  For example, feelings 
of shame experienced when incompetent behaviour is displayed in one area of life can become a 
belief that one is globally incompetent.  In this way, fusion with the belief that one is 
incompetent can potentially add to an existing view of a conceptualized self and become 
globally pervasive in how one conducts his/her life.  Shame can become internalized and an 
individual can feel flawed at a fundamental level (Harper, 2011). 
It is likely that the relationship between shame and PF is linked by how an individual 
conceptualizes the self (Hayes et al., 2012).  An individual can have high levels of cognitive 
fusion (low PF) with automatic self-critical and self-judgmental statements pertaining to shame-
proneness.  Automatic statements of self-invalidation are often not processed or not allowed in 
the periphery of awareness due to its association with a history of pain and therefore one 
engages in experiential avoidance.  By nature, shame acts as a barometer for socially desirable 
behaviours and promotes the capacity for self-reflection and self-evaluation but the same 
function of shame can become dysfunctional when self-evaluations are focused on discrepancies 
between the real self and ideal self. An increased focus on such kinds of self-evaluations often 
amplifies the intensity and aversiveness of an emotion and can restrict PF (Hayes et al., 2012). 
In a longitudinal study, avoidant-coping fully mediated the relationship between shame 
proneness and depressive symptoms in adolescents (De Rubeis & Hollenstein, 2009).  Although 
shame is linked with many psychological problems, some adolescents can manage the 
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experience of shame better than others.  At present, research on shame proneness and the 
regulation of shame in adolescents is limited and mixed.  There is a possibility that higher levels 
of PF may influence lower levels of shame but when shame is internalized, there is also a 
possibility that high levels of shame may adversely influence PF. The current study will seek to 
clarify the relationship between shame and PF.       
Apart from negative emotions, positive emotions also play an important role in well-
being.  Although there is clear evidence that positive and negative affect are two separate 
factors, some research lines of enquiry suggest that the regulation of positive emotions is 
connected with the regulation of negative emotions.  For example, when people are rigidly 
attending to their anxious thoughts and feelings, they have reduced cognitive resources in the 
form of attention to spare towards recognizing reward cues in their immediate environment 
(Gross & John, 2003).  In other words, when negative emotions are being experienced, the 
attempt to suppress or control negative emotions extends to the suppression of positive emotions 
as well.  Research evidence is accumulating that this occurs for some psychological disorders.  
In the case of social anxiety disorder (SAD), diminished positive emotional experiences have 
been the distinguishing factor between SAD and other anxiety disorders (Brown, 2007).  In a 
study comparing people with SAD and healthy individuals, people with SAD maintained low 
levels of positive emotions and relied on experiential avoidance in their daily social interactions 
(Kashdan et al., 2013).  Likewise, similar conclusions have been found for people with 
functional impairments where social anxiety is regulated through experiential avoidance 
(Kashdan & Steger, 2006).  Although these findings have only been found for one particular 
psychological disorder, there is reason to believe that positive emotional experiences can be 
clouded by excessive expenditure of finite self-regulatory resources on regulating negative 
emotions.  Self-regulatory resources that are used for the immediate temporary escape from 
emotions experienced as aversive are usually made at the expense of contacting potentially 
more rewarding long-term goals that are attached to achieving a sense of well-being and balance 
in life (Baumeister & Vohs, 2007).  People low in PF have the tendency to use these finite self-
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regulatory resources for alleviating temporary feelings of discomfort associated with negative 
emotions, thus increasing the burden of stress.  At present, research on the regulation of positive 
emotions has mainly been implicated in psychological disorders, however, there is scant 
information on the relationship between PF and positive emotions in normal populations.  
Positive emotions by themselves are associated with extraversion, optimism, and sociability.  
Positive emotions also lead to successful outcomes as suggested by the broaden-and-build 
model as cognitive and behavioural repertoires align and produce increased flexibility 
(Fredrickson, 2001; Fredrickson & Levenson, 1998).  Although benefits of the frequent 
experience of positive emotions has been extensively examined (see Lyubomirsky, King, & 
Diener, 2005 for details), the desire to maintain positive mood can compromise self-regulation 
in various ways (Aspinwall, 1998) or have a positive effect on self-regulation (Tice, 
Baumeister, Shmueli, & Muraven, 2007).  For example, desired positive mood maintenance can 
compete with functional aspects when negative emotions emerge.  Or, positive mood can help 
improve self-regulation by counteracting the effects of ego depletion (Tice et al., 2007).  Based 
on evidence from these studies, there is also reason to believe that positive emotions can have 
an effect on PF, a proposition which will be tested in the proposed research.  
4.4.2  Social Well-being and Psychological Flexibility in Adolescents  
 According to Lazarus and Folkman (1987), when there is a mismatch between 
perceived social support and the appraisal of stress, then negative outcomes can be expected.  
The ability to manage stress and maintain wellbeing was examined in a study that investigated 
social support, problem-focused coping, and avoidance coping in college students using the 
COPE questionnaire (Carver, Scheier, & Weintraub, 1989; Chao, 2011).  High levels of 
problem-focused coping contributed towards the maintenance of well-being when stress was 
experienced, whereas well-being was compromised when levels of problem-focused coping 
were low.  Moreover, problem-focused coping mediated the moderating effects of social support 
between stress and well-being.  High avoidant coping was linked with reduced well-being 
regardless of the level of social support.  These findings suggest that avoidant coping can 
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influence well-being even when there are high perceptions of positive social support.  Not only 
have the findings in this study added to our understanding of the stress, appraisal, and coping 
conceptual framework (Lazarus & Folkman, 1987) but has also provided preliminary evidence 
for the association between social support and problem-focused coping and social support and 
avoidant coping.  Similarly, emotional competencies have been found to influence support 
seeking behaviours, even with high levels of PSS (Ciarrochi et al., 2002; Ciarrochi et al., 2003).   
Findings that PF is associated with both suppression and the COPE questionnaire 
indicate that there may be a relationship between PF and social support.  In the longitudinal link 
between the ERQ (Gross & John, 2003) and social functioning in college students, suppression 
predicted poorer social connections over a four year time period but was not related to 
sociometric standing (social standing and likeability) whereas cognitive reappraisal predicted 
better social connections and sociometric standing (English, John, Srivastava, & Gross, 2012).  
Similarly, another study was conducted to examine overlaps and distinctions between coping 
strategies in the COPE questionnaire and PF (Karekla & Panayiotou, 2011).  In addition, a 
quality of life questionnaire was also used as a measure in this study.  The AAQ-II was found to 
be correlated at r = .50 with the social subscale of the quality of life questionnaire, whereas the 
correlation between acceptance (in the COPE questionnaire) and the social subscale of the 
quality of life questionnaire was r = .00 (i.e., no relationship) (Karekla & Panayiotou, 2011).  
The AAQ-II and emotional support (in the COPE questionnaire) were also significantly 
correlated (r = .30).  Evidence from all the studies reviewed above (including studies that have 
used other avoidant and ER measures) suggest that the potential association between PF and 
perceptions of social support is worth investigating longitudinally to determine the temporal 
relationship between the two coping variables.                             
4.5  Summary and Conclusion  
 Adolescence is a transitional period between late childhood and early adulthood.  
Adolescence is a crucial period for understanding how the developing brain interacts with the 
environment to produce behaviours and attitudes in the service of attaining increasing 
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independence from parents and family, developing relationships with peers including the 
opposite gender, fulfilling academic requirements, planning for an occupation, and working out 
a set of values that would guide them as they move into adult roles.  Mid-adolescence is a peak 
time during adolescence in which adolescents are prone to engage in increased risk-taking and 
reward-seeking behaviours.  At the same time this is also a time in which adolescents learn 
more refined self-regulatory behaviours.  The greatest challenge for adolescents is to be able to 
develop appropriate self-regulatory skills in the face of typical developmental challenges.   
 Biological and social changes during adolescence pose as greatest challenges for 
adolescents.  Structural and functional biological changes influence adolescent behaviour via 
several mechanisms.  Social changes in the form of the shift away from parents and towards 
peers often influence adolescent social relationships.  The diverse and considerable biological 
changes experienced in the physical body, the changes in family relationships, and the increased 
focus on peers and how they present to their peers creates intense psychological needs in 
adolescents.   
 Mental health is linked with both specific emotions and PSS.  The studies reviewed 
above have implications for the roles of emotional and social well-being as risk factors in 
adolescent mental health.  However, specific discrete emotions go beyond positive and negative 
affect in explaining well-being and psychological symptoms.  Emotional responses for each 
discrete emotion are more varied than just the valence of emotions (Roseman, 2008).  Social 
well-being is strongly influenced by positive perceptions of social support (Pinkerton & Dolan, 
2007).  Decreases in the positive perceptions of social support can be seen as a risk factor for 
the development of psychological and physiological symptoms (Cornwell, 2003).   
 During adolescence, emotional and social well-being can become compromised due to 
the inability to manage emotional states effectively and the perception that social support is not 
likely to be available when it is needed.  Moreover, the ability to pursue important life goals 
involves the management and tolerance of a broad range of emotional states and interpersonal 
relationships.  The adaptive regulation of emotions is an important factor in emotional and 
164 
 
social well-being.  PF is likely to play a role in the successful management of emotional states 
and in positive perceptions of social support in adolescents.   
Aims 
The aim of the present study was to (1) examine the longitudinal relationship between 
psychological flexibility, a behavioural mindfulness and acceptance-based ER variable, and 
discrete emotions (i.e. fear, hostility, sadness, shame, and joy); (2) examine the reciprocal 
relationship between intrapersonal ER and interpersonal ER using a longitudinal design; (3) 
assess whether any gender differences will exist in the relationships in (1) and (2).   
Hypotheses  
(i) Does greater PF contribute to more positive emotional experiences? 
– Will PF predict specific positive and negative emotions or will specific 
positive and negative emotions predict PF? Or will there be reciprocal 
relationships between PF and specific positive and negative emotions.  
(ii) Does PF influence the amount of and satisfaction with perceived social 
support?  
– Will PF predict PSS or will quantity of PSS predict PF? 
– Will PF predict the quality of PSS or will quality of PSS predict PF?  
(iii) Do boys and girls differ in the relationship between PF and specific 
emotions?  
– Does gender moderate the relationship between PF and each specific 
emotion? 
(iv) Do boys and girls differ in the relationship between PF and the amount of 
and satisfaction with PSS? 
– Does gender moderate the relationship between PF and quantity of 
PSS? 
– Does gender moderate the relationship between PF and quality of PSS?  
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Chapter 5: Methodology 
 The research presented in this thesis is part of a larger research project called the 
Wollongong Youth Study.  Research approval was obtained from the Human Research Ethics 
Office (Ethics Number: HE10/158) at the University of Wollongong, New South Wales, 
Australia.   
5.1  Participants and Procedure 
Participants were recruited from an on-going longitudinal study investigating social and 
emotional well-being in early to late adolescents from five high schools in a Catholic Diocese of 
New South Wales, Australia.  The questionnaires used in this study were measures that were 
included in the broader survey.  For this study, questionnaires of students from Year 9 (Total 
students = 786; mean age = 14.68 years, SD = 1.47; 50.89% males) and Year 10 (Total students 
= 778; mean age = 15.41, SD = 0.53; 50.13% males) were used.  The total number of students 
who completed questionnaires in both years was 883.  Students were from lower to upper 
middle class socioeconomic standing and from diverse cultural backgrounds.  The professions 
for parents, in the order of father then mother, included professionals & associate professionals, 
28.3% and 28.8%,  managers & administrators, 3.5% and 0.3%, , tradespersons, 24.7% and 
2.1%, intermediate transport/production/sales & service, 11.9% and 16.4%, elementary 
sales/clerical/labourers, 6.7% and 13.5% respectively with the rest 
retired/unemployed/homemaker or not codable.  Furthermore, reported parental status consisted 
of 85.2% married or cohabiting, 11.4% divorced or separated, and 3.4% were unknown.  
Ninety-five percent of students indicated they were born in Australia, however, only 28% 
indicated that both parents were born in another country.    
Each year at the start of the second term of school (middle of the year), consent from 
schools, parents, and students was obtained and students were then invited to participate in the 
“Youth Issues” study.  Each school informed all parents in this cohort of students prior to the 
testing day and parents provided consent accordingly.  Students were surveyed in the second 
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term of their third and fourth years (Year 9 and Year 10) in high school through a standardized 
data collection method.   Questionnaires were completed anonymously during regular class 
times under the supervision of the research team and teachers.  At the end of the survey session, 
students were debriefed and thanked for their participation.  Students who participated in both 
years were paired by their enrolment number provided by the school along with initials of their 
school name in order to obtain a unique ID.  The remaining students who participated in either 
Year 9 or Year 10 consisted of students who were absent on the day of data collection or 
students who had changed schools.  Differences between those who completed the 
questionnaires in both years and those who completed questionnaires at only one time point 
were 111 in Year 9 and 103 in Year 10 respectively.   
The Catholic Diocese is based in the city of Wollongong, but also services the south-
western metropolitan Sydney area.  Students from schools in the south-western Sydney area 
were also surveyed, thereby contributing to the diversity and heterogeneity of the population 
sampled.  The particular age range was chosen because mid-adolescents (14-16 years of age) 
have low emotional stability due to biological and social changes (as elaborated in chapter 4).           
5.2  Attrition Analysis  
In order to gauge if there was any difference between the students who could be paired 
(in Years 9 & 10) and students who completed the questionnaire at only one time point ( in Year 
9), mean levels of PF, the main variable of interest, were compared and found to be quite 
similar (paired MAFQ-Y = 1.11 and non-paired MAFQ-Y = 1.04).  The similar PF mean levels 
indicate that there were no significant differences between students who participated and who 
were paired in Year 9 versus those who had changed schools or were absent.  Moreover, no 
students who completed the survey had complained of any difficulties.  
5.3  Measures 
 Psychological Flexibility (PF) was measured by the Avoidance and Fusion 
Questionnaire for Youth (AFQ-Y; Greco, Lambert, & Baer, 2008).  Low scores on the AFQ-Y 
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indicate more psychological flexibility whereas high scores indicate that EA and cognitive 
fusion are more prevalent.  Because the AFQ-Y was specifically developed for children and 
adolescents, it was used in this study.  Additionally, the AFQ-Y has been shown to be 
psychometrically sound and is comparable to the adult version of the PF scale (i.e. the AAQ).  
Furthermore, various studies using the AFQ-Y in adolescents have not only been shown to be 
conceptually similar to other ER measures such as the DERS (Gratz & Roemer, 2004) but also 
contributed significantly and independently to emotionally-related problems in adolescents.          
The AFQ-Y questionnaire consists of 17 items with respondents indicating how true 
each statement is for them (0 = Not at All True; 4 = Very True).  Two sample questions are: “I 
push away thoughts and feelings I don’t like”, “I can’t be a good friend when I feel upset”.  The 
AFQ-Y captures a single construct that measures two overlapping processes of psychological 
flexibility: (a) cognitive and emotional fusion, which refers to the entanglement and attachment 
with cognitive processes taking place privately and responding to them in a literal manner 
(Luoma & Hayes, 2009); and (b) experiential avoidance/control, which is the unwillingness to 
experience negatively evaluated private events.  The total score was used for all statistical 
analyses. 
Psychometric properties of the AFQ-Y were assessed over five studies using high-
school samples.  The reliability of AFQ-Y with 17 items was cross-validated between three 
measurement modelling methods, namely CFA, classical test theory, and Rasch modelling and 
was deemed to have adequate psychometric properties (Greco et al., 2008).   Moreover, the 
AFQ-Y items were able to detect youth with elevated levels of psychological inflexibility 
(emphasis added) in a school sample which indicates its reliability in assessing individual 
patients. The AFQ-Y also showed adequate concurrent validity as scores on the AFQ-Y and 
child-reported anxiety, somatic complaints, and problem behaviour correlated significantly in 
the expected direction with medium to large effect sizes.  The construct validity of the AFQ-Y 
was also supported by significant correlations between the AFQ-Y and similarly related 
measures such as the Child Acceptance and Mindfulness Measure (CAMM; Greco & Baer, 
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2006) and the White Bear Suppression Inventory (WBSI; Wegner & Zanakos, 1994). Further 
regression analyses were conducted to determine these relationships. The results suggested that 
while the AFQ-Y overlapped with the CAMM and WBSI, it also contributed uniquely to the 
child-reported measures after controlling for the effects of the CAMM and WBSI. This 
indicates that while the AFQ-Y is comparable to similar constructs, it has also been shown to be 
different from them.      
Greco et al. (2008) obtained Cronbach alphas of .90 for the AFQ-Y and similar alphas 
of .87 (Year 9) and .89 (Year 10) were obtained in the present study.  Item-total correlations 
(Table 5.1) ranged from .34 to .58 in year 9 and .30 to .61 in year 10.  The scale demonstrated 
adequate homogeneity in both years.   
Table 5.1 Item-total correlation for the AFQ-Y, Year 9 and Year 10 
 AFQ-Y 
Items Year 9 Year 10 
Item 1 .454 .463 
Item 2 .592 .624 
Item 3 .550 .557 
Item 4 .560 .615 
Item 5 .524 .538 
Item 6 .397 .463 
Item 7 .454 .507 
Item 8 .449 .522 
Item 9 .574 .591 
Item 10 .450 .574 
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Item 11 .501 .592 
Item 12 .534 .598 
Item 13 .516 .596 
Item 14 .536 .570 
Item 15 .410 .467 
Item 16 .584 .583 
Item 17 .318 .298 
 
Affective States (discrete emotions): The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule – 
Expanded Form (PANAS-X; Watson & Clark, 1994) assesses a broad range of affective states 
that include negative affect and positive affect.  Affect represents the valence and arousal 
aspects of discrete emotions and is generally considered as the organizing feature of emotions.  
The PANAS-X is a standard self-report measure of affect at the higher order level and discrete 
emotions at the lower order base level (Tellegen et al., 1999).  Research shows that self-report 
measures have supported the affect level, i.e., positive and negative affect, categorization of 
emotions, but not enough research has examined a broad range of discrete emotions in one 
single measure.  In this respect, the demonstrated hierarchical structure of the PANAS-X is a 
reliable measure of the different levels consisting of affect and emotions (Tellegen et al., 1999).  
For example, mean score patterns of the discrete emotions have been shown to be similar to the 
higher order scales as rated time frame (e.g. today, past few days, past week, and past month) 
lengthens for a range of clinical and non-clinical populations (Watson & Clark, 1994).  
Independent multifactorial analysis of the discrete emotions have also yielded clean and distinct 
one factor solutions for the various discrete emotions and appear to be broadly consistent with 
existing discrete emotion models proposed by Ekman (1993) and Izard (1993).  Items 
170 
 
representing each discrete emotion appeared to be reasonably homogenous with little variability 
in reliability of the scales between rated time frames.      
The norms and psychometric properties of the PANAS-X have also been assessed 
across clinical and non-clinical populations and different age groups ranging from early adults 
(undergraduate students) to a mixed pool of adults (Watson & Clark, 1994).  Watson and Clark 
(1994) noted that the PANAS-X differentiated clinical patients from non-clinical samples as 
clinical patients reported significantly higher negative affect.   The PANAS-X has been shown 
to have adequate internal consistency and construct validity.  Cronbach’s alpha for the discrete 
emotions ranged from the high .80’s to the mid .90’s across 11 samples and different rated time 
frames (Watson & Clark, 1994).  In order to demonstrate convergent and discriminant validity, 
PANAS-X was compared to the Profile of Mood States questionnaire (POMS; McNair, Lorr, & 
Droppleman, 1971).  The PANAS-X and the POMS was administered to an undergraduate 
sample (N = 563) with time frame instructions of “Past Few Weeks.”  The PANAS-X 
demonstrated convergent validity through its correspondence with the basic emotions scales of 
the POMS with high coefficients ranging from .85 to .91.  The PANAS-X has also been shown 
to have strong self-peer convergence.  Discriminant validity was demonstrated by comparing 
the mean correlations between discrete emotions in the PANAS-X and the POMS.  The mean 
correlations in the PANAS-X between fear, hostility, sadness, and fatigue were significantly 
lower than the POMS.  Additionally, modest gender differences were observed in some of the 
expected discrete emotions (e.g. men reported significantly higher in hostility while women 
reported significantly higher in fear), indicating a certain level of distinction among discrete 
emotions.       
Apart from the more than acceptable hierarchical structure and psychometric properties 
of the PANAS-X, it has also been shown to be suitable for studies with a survey design.  The 
relatively quick but comprehensive assessment of discrete emotions makes the PANAS-X easy 
to administer in surveys.  Additionally, discrete emotion items are made-up of relatively simple 
single words which considerably reduce confounding with other psychological variables in 
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comparison to other single emotion measures such as the STAXI or the guilt measures that uses 
short sentences to assess emotions.  Furthermore, the PANAS-X can also be used as state or 
trait measures.  The PANAS-X has been shown to correlate strongly with other state measures 
that assess state affect and psychiatric symptoms, indicating its short-term applicability (Watson 
& Clark, 1994).  Similarly, the trait-like applicability of the PANAS-X was demonstrated 
through its temporal stability in a longer-term analysis of responses from undergraduates 
approximately six months apart for almost four years.  The retest stability correlation over the 
extended period of time was significant and was .43 for negative affect and .39 for positive 
affect (Watson & Clark, 1994).                      
The structural model of the PANAS-X has also been investigated in children and 
adolescents.  Investigations of the structure of the PANAS and the PANAS-C in children and 
adolescents have mainly yielded a two-factor solution, i.e. negative affect and positive affect. 
More recent investigations have shown that the underlying common variance yielded a three-
factor model consisting of positive affect, fear and distress in children, adolescents, and young 
adults (Allen, Lonigan, & Phillips, 2015).  Fear and distress emerged as separate negative affect 
factors, demonstrating a more granulized aspect of negative affect.  These results indicate that 
the PANAS-X represents an integrative measure where lower order levels are subsumed in the 
preceding levels but each particular level have their own characteristics (Lerner & Kauffman, 
1985).  Based on these recent findings of the granularity of negative affect in the PANAS-X, it 
can be assumed that the measurement of discrete emotions using the PANAS-X is appropriate 
and that the integrity of the results can be maintained.  
The PANAS-X consists of 60 items that assesses 11 specific affects; fear, sadness, guilt, 
hostility, shyness, fatigue, surprise, joviality, self-assurance, attentiveness, and serenity.  In 
order to reduce testing demands (completion time), only fear (e.g., “afraid,” “scared”; six items 
in total), hostility (e.g., “scornful,” “disgusted”; seven items in total) sadness (e.g., “sad,” 
“blue”; five items in total) and shame (e.g., “disgusted with self,” “ashamed”; six items in total) 
were administered to represent negative affect (NA).  For positive affect (PA), only joviality 
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was used since it reflects a wide range of PA with items such as “happy,” “joyful,” “delighted,”  
“cheerful,” “excited,” “enthusiastic,” “lively,” and “energetic)” (8 items in total).  Students were 
asked to describe their feelings and emotions during the past month on a 5 point rating scale (1 
= Very slightly or not at all; 5 = Extremely).   
In this study, internal reliabilities (Table 5.2) for the five affective states in year 9 and 
year 10 ranged from .84 to .96, which is similar to Cronbach alphas obtained across several 
samples in the PANAS-X manual (Watson & Clark, 1994).  Moreover, mean averages of the 
discrete emotions examined in year 9 and year 10 in this study were similar to mean averages of 
undergraduate students in the PANAS-X manual.   
Table 5.2 Cronbach Alphas for Fear, Hostility, Sadness, Shame, and Joy in Year 9 and Year 10 
                                                      Cronbach Alphas 
Affective States 
Fear 
Hostility 
Sadness 
Shame 
Joy 
Year 9 
.89 
.85 
.92 
.94 
.92 
Year 10 
.89 
.84 
.93 
.96 
.91 
 
Social Support: The Social Support Questionnaire (SSQ; I. Sarason, Sarason, & 
Shearin, 1986) is a subjective measure of the quantity (SSQ number or SSQ-N) and quality 
(SSQ satisfaction or SSQ-S) of relationships in the life of an individual.  What this 
questionnaire attempts to measure is the respondent’s perception of whether they feel loved or 
valued. These feelings are based on the number of people in their social support network and the 
satisfaction with the people they have indicated.  The number of people indicates the people 
they can rely on and from whom they can expect support from in certain circumstances and the 
second part indicates satisfaction with these social supports.  The SSQ-N and SSQ-S have been 
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found to have a modest correlation which indicates that the two subscales are not measuring the 
same concept (I. Sarason, Levine, Basham, & Sarason, 1983). The SSQ was developed based on 
the assumption that an individual develops a general sense of support through an aggregate of 
perceived supportive interactions which culminate into expectations of how a social 
environment is likely to be (Pierce, Sarason & Sarason, 1996).  Social support as perceived has 
appeared to be stable for approximately 3 years (Sarason, Sarason, & Shearin, 1986).   
The SSQ has evolved out of a number of pilot studies (I. Sarason et al., 1983).  The 
SSQ has been assessed with measures of personality, social desirability, positive-negative life 
experiences, self-esteem, and internal-external locus of control.  It was found that the SSQ was 
negatively related to psychological discomfort, neuroticism, and pessimism, particularly in 
females.  In contrast, the SSQ-N was positively correlated with extraversion but not SSQ-S.  A 
positive correlation was also found between SSQ and self-esteem.  People who reported more 
positive than negative life events were also found to report a higher number of social supports 
and were more likely to experience positive events as they had expected.  The researchers 
suggested that those who were high on social support were better able to manage their own 
psychological needs and were therefore better at managing social support relationships as they 
experienced more rewarding interpersonal relationships (I. Sarason et al., 1983). 
The SSQ has also been used extensively with adolescents and young adults in order to 
assess the protective effects of social support (e.g. Compas, Slavin, Wagner, & Vannatta, 1986; 
Dumont & Provost, 1998; Holden, Brown, & Mott, 1988).  The full SSQ (27 items)was  
administered to 20 participants in a pilot study consisting of alcohol abusing and nonabusing 
adolescents in the age bracket of 12-17 years (Holden, Brown, & Mott, 1988).  Some of the 
questions appeared to be confusing for these adolescents, especially items pertaining to marital 
social support.  However, some relevant items were also found and these have been used to 
guide the choice of questions in the Wollongong Youth Study. 
In the current study, the brief version of the SSQ was used which contained four items 
for four sets of circumstances.  The original version of the SSQ contains 27 questions but only 
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four items were selected due to two reasons.  First, only those items were selected that have 
been found relevant for adolescents and second, the questionnaire had to be abbreviated due to 
the length of the battery of questionnaires in the survey.  The students first listed the number of 
people that they perceived were available for support.  Then they were asked to rate how 
satisfied they were with the people they listed on a 6-point scale ranging from very dissatisfied 
(1) to very satisfied (6). The four-items included the following questions: (1) “Who do you feel 
really appreciates you as a person?” (2) “Who can you count on to help you out in a crisis 
situation, even though they would have to go out of their way to do so?” , (3) “Whose lives do 
you feel you are an important part of?” ,  and (4) “Who can you really count on when you need 
help?’,  
Responses to the SSQ were then coded according to categories for type of support 
which included parent, nonparent family member, friend, others, and no-one.  The number of 
social supports were counted and used as the total number for each question and then the mean 
number of social supports was extracted based on the four questions for each individual. The 
total number of social support ranged from zero to ten.  Similarly, mean scores of the dimension 
measuring satisfaction was averaged across the four questions for each individual to obtain the 
perceived satisfaction with social support score.   
The SSQ, both quantity and quality, have been shown to have good internal consistency 
with alphas greater than .80 (Ciarrochi, Heaven, Supavadeeprasit, 2008; Dumont & Provost, 
1999; Compas et al., 1986) and likewise in the present sample, alphas were all greater than .80 
for both years.  The SSQ also has good criterion-related validity (see Friedman et al., 2006).  It 
seems that the abbreviated version had homogeneity for both constructs.  Additionally, 
significant correlations were obtained between the SSQ-N and SSQ-S  (Year 9, r = .36; Year 10,  
r = .44).  This is in line with other studies in adolescents (Compas et al., 1986; Dumont and 
Provost, 1999; Rao, Hammen, & Poland, 2010).  The reported amount of PSS may not 
necessarily match with that of satisfaction with PSS as satisfaction is a reflection of the 
perceived support received in the past and this may not be the same as current reports of PSS 
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networks.  Furthermore, similar item-total correlations for the SSQ-S were obtained in Year 9 
and Year 10, suggesting that the same underlying construct was being measured in both years 
(see Table 5.3. for item-total correlations)  
Table 5.3 Item-total correlations for perceived satisfaction with social support in Year 9 and 
Year 10 
Items Year 9 Year 10 
Item 1. Who do you feel really 
appreciates you as a person?  
How satisfied are you with this 
support? 
 
.609 .645 
Item 2. Who can you count on to 
help you out in a crisis situation, 
even though they would have to 
go out of their way to do so? 
How satisfied are you with this 
support? 
.609 .660 
Item 3.  Whose lives do you feel 
you are an important part of?   
How satisfied are you with this 
support? 
.657 .707 
Item 4.  Who can you really 
count on when you need help? 
How satisfied are you with this 
support? 
 
.633 .696 
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Chapter 6: Results  
6.1  Preliminary analyses   
Preliminary descriptive analyses and correlations were conducted with the overall 
dataset consisting of 883 participants.  Means and standard deviations are presented in Table 
6.1.  In the initial analysis, mean differences were explored for PF and each emotion between 
Year 9 and Year 10 participants.  No significant mean differences were observed for PF and any 
of the negative emotions, however, positive affect and amount of social support decreased 
significantly from Year 9 to Year 10.   
Table 6.1  Means and Standard Deviations for PF and Specific Emotions and Amount of and 
Satisfaction with Social Support for Years 9 and 10 
Variables Year 9 Year 10  
 Means SD Means SD t-value 
Psychological Flexibility 1.10 .69 1.13 .72 .78 
Fear 1.85 .83 1.84 .80 .26 
Hostility 1.94 .81 1.97 .79 -.69 
Sadness 2.00   1.07 2.01     1.06  .04 
Shame 1.76 .95 1.76 .90   .58 
Joy 4.00 .88 3.94 .90    2.40* 
Social Support Amount 5.91  2.31 6.29     2.25   -4.51* 
Social Support Satisfaction 5.33 .68  5.36 .72     -1.22 
* p < .05   
 Additionally, the effect of gender (between subjects variable) between year 9 and year 
10 was also evaluated using a 2 (gender) by 2 (year) repeated measure ANOVAs for the PF 
measure, each emotion, and number of and satisfaction with social support.  No significant 
interactions were observed between time (from Year 9 to Year 10) and gender.  No significant 
gender effects were found in PF, hostility, and social support satisfaction.  However, significant 
gender effects were found for fear (Mboys = 1.66, Mgirls = 2.06, F = 55.36, p < .01), sadness (Mboys 
= 1.73, Mgirls = 2.27, F = 58.56, p < .01), joy (Mboys = 3.92, Mgirls = 4.07, F = 5.81, p < .05), 
shame (Mboys = 1.68, Mgirls = 1.83, F = 5.76, p < .05), and social support quantity (Mboys = 5.58, 
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Mgirls = 6.63, F = 49.78, p < .01).  In general, girls reported higher levels of negative affect and 
lower levels of positive affect than boys.  Similarly, girls reported higher amounts of social 
support than boys.   
Pearson’s correlations between Years 9 and 10 PF with each discrete emotion are 
presented in Table 6.2.  These findings indicate significant negative associations between PF 
and negative affect and significant positive associations between PF and positive affect and 
social support variables.  Larger correlations were observed between PF and negative emotions 
in comparison with PF and Joy and PF and the social support variables. 
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Table 6.2  Correlations between PF and Specific Emotions and Amount of and Satisfaction 
with Perceived Social Support for Years 9 and 10 
 Psychological Flexibility 
Emotions & Social Support 
Year 9 
Year 9  
N = 737-761 
Year 10 
N = 654-674 
 
Year 9 
  
   Fear  -.43** -.31**   
   Hostility -.37** -.30** 
   Sadness -.48** -.44** 
   Shame -.54** -.41** 
   Joy  .28**  .22** 
Social Support Amount .22** .09* 
Social Support Satisfaction .22** .17** 
 
 
 
Emotions and Social Support 
Year 10 
Psychological Flexibility 
Year 9                                               Year 10 
                    N = 649-664                                     N = 756-774 
   
   Fear  
 
-.32** 
 
-.41** 
   Hostility -.30** -.38** 
   Sadness -.34** -.45** 
   Shame -.29** -.47** 
   Joy  .24**  .31** 
Social Support Amount  .22** .16** 
Social Support Satisfaction  .24** .19** 
   
   
*p < .05, **p < .01 
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6.2  Data Analyses 
Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) was used to determine the most appropriate 
factorial invariant model based on the maximum likelihood technique in Mplus 6.1 (Muthen & 
Muthen, Los Angeles, CA).  To test the hypotheses of the reciprocal relationships between PF 
and discrete emotions across gender, a multi-group cross-lagged panel model between PF and 
each emotion and PF and the amount of and satisfaction with social support were analysed.  
Latent variables were used for all analyses as measurement error can be estimated (Little, 2013).  
To represent a latent variable, three item parcels were used to limit the number of indicators.  
Items were assigned to three parcels so that parameters estimated were kept to the minimum 
possible in order to allow for sufficient power in modelling especially while estimating 
correlated errors (Hau & Marsh, 2004).  Each parcel was assigned an equal number of items as 
far as possible; however, given the odd number of items for certain variables, some items were 
unevenly distributed.  For example, for PF with 17 items, two parcels contained 6 items and 1 
parcel had 5 items.  Only items for the social support quality and quantity variables were not 
parcelled as these variables contained only 4 items each.  The analytical procedure was 
conducted in three steps. 
In step 1, multi-group SEM were specified and tested for invariance in males and 
females.  The analyses commenced with separate confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) models 
for all variables (PF, 5 emotions, and 2 social support variables) across gender.  Measurement 
invariance across gender was conducted by starting from the least restrictive model, i.e. 
configural invariance (baseline model with no constraints) to weak (equality constraints for 
factor loadings) and finally to strong (equality constraints for intercept) invariance.  If the test 
for strong measurement invariance passes, it can be concluded that the same underlying 
construct is being measured in both groups and therefore strong measurement invariance is 
achieved.  In step 2, longitudinal measurement invariance was added to the CFA model in order 
to test whether the constructs remained unchanged over the passage of time, which in this case 
is over a one year time period.  Factor loadings were constrained across time in addition to 
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measurement invariance across gender.  In step 3, the structural part of the model was fitted and 
tested to determine the predictive relationships between PF and each emotion and to determine 
whether there were any differences between males and females. These were tested by placing 
equality constraints on the cross-lagged paths in males and females.  If gender was not a 
moderating factor, then the combined dataset (both boys and girls included) was used to test the 
temporal status of PF.  Only longitudinal measurement constraints were placed starting from 
configural invariance to strong invariance.  If strong invariance held, then the structural model 
was fitted and tested.  
Both gender and longitudinal measurement invariance is demonstrated when a set of 
goodness of fit statistics does not deteriorate significantly while comparing increasingly 
restricted models.  The criteria for goodness of fit statistics between PF and each emotion model 
and between PF and the amount of and satisfaction with social support models were all 
considered separately.   The goodness of fit statistics used for accepting each model were as 
follows: (a) the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) value of 0.05 or less, (b) the 
comparative fit index (CFI) values greater than 0.95, and (c) the Tucker-Lewis index (TLI) or 
the non-normed fit index (NNFI) values greater than 0.95.  The evidence for measurement 
invariance is confirmed when the goodness of fit statistics is compared from the least restricted 
baseline model to the more restricted nested models (Cheung & Rensvold, 2002; Chen, 2007).  
Change in RMSEA values of less than or equal to .015 and the changes in values of the CFI and 
TLI/NNFI  of .01 or less were used as criteria for accepting more restricted nested models.  Chi 
square tests were not used in determining tests of weak to strong factorial invariance of the 
measurement models as they are often sensitive to large sample sizes.  The RMSEA, the CFI, 
and the TLI/NNFI are more widely used with larger sample sizes for comparing nested models 
(Cheung & Rensvold, 2002; Meade, Johnson, & Braddy, 2008).   
6.2.1  Treatment of Missing Data and Non-Normal Data  
Of concern were two kinds of missingness observed in the dataset.  First, missingness 
due to attrition consisted of students who completed the questionnaires at only one time point 
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whereas missingness due to nonresponse consisted of attempted questionnaires with incomplete 
answers.  Missingness due to attrition is not really considered as missing completely at random 
and therefore traditional methods such as listwise deletion can bias the parameter estimates.  
Furthermore, the dataset was analysed for multivariate normality but was found to have a non-
normal distribution.  A non-normal data distribution violates the SEM assumption of normality 
which can again lead to biased parameter estimates.  To address both kinds of missingness and 
non-normal distribution of data, the MLR estimator in Mplus 6.1 was used.  The MLR estimator 
is considered to be robust and is comparable to other estimators. 
6.2.2  Measurement Invariance across Gender and Time 
The preliminary statistics results were used to guide the SEM analyses.  In the pairwise 
repeated measures test for gender above, most emotions indicated significant differences 
between boys and girls and therefore, a multi-group model was used to test for measurement 
invariance that first commenced with establishing invariance across gender.  While proceeding 
from the configural model to strong invariance model for gender, the model maintained a good 
fit to the data for all emotions and PF with a minimal deterioration in the goodness of fit 
statistics and with cut-offs of RMSEA, CFI, and TLI/NNFI below the threshold for acceptable 
model fit as recommended by Chen (2007).  Strong measurement invariance held across gender 
between PF and all emotions and between PF and amount of social support and satisfaction with 
social support.  This implies that the measurement characteristics of the indicators were the 
same for both boys and girls.  After verifying measurement invariance across gender, 
constraints to factor loadings across time were added to the model to test for the interaction 
between measurement invariance across gender and weak invariance across time.  The goodness 
of fit statistics remained within a good range with minimum deterioration in the threshold of 
acceptable model fit.  A further measure of strong invariance across time was not attempted as it 
was deemed unnecessary given that no mean differences were found for most variables (except 
for joy and amount of social support).   
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6.2.3  Evaluation of the Structural Models for the Moderating effects of Gender 
The core estimated model included autoregressive paths for PF and each emotion, 
within-time correlations (i.e. correlations between Time 1 PF and Time 1 emotion), and 
bidirectional cross-lagged paths (i.e. PF to emotion and emotion to PF).  This was deemed the 
most parsimonious model given data for only two time points.  The autoregressive paths are a 
priori directional paths that provide information on the stability of each latent construct from 
Time 1 to Time 2.  Higher values indicate that the construct is considered more stable.  The 
bidirectional cross-lagged paths represent possible associations between PF and each emotion 
with information on the effect of change from one variable on another over time.   
The aim of the current study was to test the hypothesis of the temporal status of PF and 
each emotion and PF and the amount of and satisfaction with social support and whether the 
moderating effects of gender play a role in each relationship.  A fully forward model was tested.   
With data spanning only two time points, a series of full cross-lagged panel models were tested 
and specified cutoff values in the fit indices were used to determine any deterioration in the 
model.  Model 1 is the baseline model and is equivalent to the CFA model in terms of degrees 
of freedom.  In the baseline model, factor loadings and intercepts are constrained for gender 
invariance but the autoregression paths and cross-lagged paths are freely estimated.  Model 2 is 
similar to the baseline model with autoregression and cross-lagged paths freely estimated but 
further constraints placed on factor loadings across time.  Model 3 maintains the constraints, 
however, cross-lagged paths are constrained to be equal between boys and girls to test for 
moderation effects.   
Table 3 provides model fit indices between PF and each emotion and PF and amount of 
and satisfaction with social support when proceeding from Model 1 to Model 3.  Upon 
observation of the fit indices, Model 1 is the best fitting model as a larger number of parameters 
are unconstrained and allowed to be freely estimated.  While proceeding from Model 1 to Model 
3 with increasingly constrained parameters, a decrease in model fit can be seen with increases in 
chi square values.  Although a worsening of model fit indices was obtained, changes in CFI, 
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TLI and RMSEA (using indices criteria as specified by Cheung and Rensvold (2002) and Chen 
(2007), did not indicate meaningful changes in the indices.  This suggests that invariance is 
present from Model 1 to Model 3 (see Table 6.3 for goodness of fit indices for all 3 models for 
PF and each emotion and PF and PSS).   
In total, seven SEM analyses were conducted and these included PF and fear, PF and 
hostility, PF and sadness, PF and shame, and PF and joy, PF and amount of social support, and 
PF and satisfaction with social support.  Gender did not have any moderating influence in the 
relationship between PF and each emotion and between PF and amount of and satisfaction with 
social support.  The results obtained were concluded to be generalizable across gender.    
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Table 6.3  Goodness of Fit Indices for PF, Specific Emotions and Amount of and Satisfaction 
with Perceived Social Support – Structural Models 
Model χ
2
 Df RMSEA CFI TLI 
Fear              N = 883 
Model 1 
Model 2 
Model 3 
 
153.257 
163.351 
171.790 
 
100 
104 
108 
 
.035 
.036 
.037 
 
.986 
.985 
.983 
 
.982 
.980 
.980 
Hostility       N = 882 
Model 1 
Model 2 
Model 3 
 
115.292 
123.960 
125.550 
 
100 
104 
108 
 
.019 
.021 
.019 
 
.996 
.994 
.995 
 
.994 
.993 
.994 
Shame         N = 882 
Model 1 
Model  2  
Model 3 
 
120.318 
125.494 
145.111 
 
100 
104 
108 
 
.021 
.022 
.028 
 
.996 
.996 
.993 
 
.995 
.995 
.991 
Joy               N = 882 
Model 1 
Model 2 
Model 3 
 
109.577 
119.296 
125.835 
 
100 
104 
108 
 
.015 
.018 
.019 
 
.998 
.997 
.996 
 
.997 
.996 
.995 
Social Support Amount   
N = 883 
Model 1 
Model 2 
Model 3 
 
 
222.880 
230.826 
231.428 
 
 
148 
153 
157 
 
 
.034 
.034 
.033 
 
 
.981 
.981 
.981 
 
 
.977 
.977 
.978 
Social Support Satisfaction  
N = 883 
Model 1 
Model 2 
Model 3 
 
 
194.517 
201.144 
203.161 
 
 
148 
153 
157 
 
 
.027 
.027 
.028 
 
 
.984 
.984 
.984 
 
 
.981 
.981 
.982 
Note: χ
2
 = 
 
Chi Square, RMSEA = Root Mean Square of Approximation, CFI = Comparative Fit 
Index, TLI = Tucker Lewis Index 
185 
 
6.2.4  Analyses of the temporal status of PF 
 Given that gender was not a moderating factor, the combined dataset (both boys and 
girls together) was used instead and only longitudinal measurement invariance was imposed to 
test for the antecedent, consequence, and reciprocal status of PF.  Table 6.4 contains goodness 
of fit indices for the configural, weak, and strong invariance models.  Strong invariance held for 
most relationship combinations except for PF and shame.  This is an indication that there is 
more variability in the mean levels of the shame emotion.  For further analysis of the structural  
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Table 6.4  Goodness of Fit Indices for PF and Specific Emotions and Amount of and 
Satisfaction with Perceived Social Support - Longitudinal Invariance 
Model χ
2
 Df RMSEA CFI TLI 
Fear              N = 883 
Configural Invariance 
Weak Invariance 
Strong Invariance 
 
84.059 
93.048 
109.111 
 
42 
46 
52 
 
.034 
.034 
.035 
 
.989 
.988 
.985 
 
.983 
.982 
.981 
Hostility       N = 882 
Configural Invariance 
Weak Invariance 
Strong Invariance 
 
40.682 
49.149 
69.807 
 
42 
46 
52 
 
.000 
.009 
.020 
 
1.000 
.999 
.995 
 
1.001 
.999 
.993 
Sadness       N = 882 
Configural Invariance 
Weak Invariance 
Strong Invariance 
 
53.430 
60.535 
71.532 
 
42 
46 
52 
 
.018 
.019 
.021 
 
.998 
.997 
.996 
 
.996 
.996 
.995 
Shame             N = 882 
Configural Invariance 
Weak Invariance 
Strong Invariance 
 
65.723 
70.744 
1034.053 
 
42 
46 
52 
 
.025 
.025 
.146 
 
.995 
.995 
.805 
 
.993 
.993 
.753 
Joy                N = 882 
Configural Invariance 
Weak Invariance 
Strong Invariance 
 
49.898 
58.777 
74.855 
 
42 
46 
52 
 
.015 
.018 
.022 
 
.998 
.997 
.995 
 
.997 
.996 
.994 
Social Support Amount   
N = 883 
Configural Invariance 
Weak Invariance 
Strong Invariance 
 
 
104.572 
112.043 
142.689 
 
 
64 
69 
76 
 
 
.027 
.027 
.032 
 
 
.987 
.986 
.978 
 
 
.981 
.981 
.973 
Social Support Satisfaction  
N = 883 
Configural Invariance 
Weak Invariance 
Strong Invariance 
 
 
71.395 
76.967 
91.621 
 
 
64 
69 
76 
 
 
.011 
.011 
.015 
 
 
.997 
.997 
.994 
 
 
.996 
.996 
.993 
Note: χ
2
 = 
 
Chi Square, RMSEA = Root Mean Square of Approximation, CFI = Comparative Fit 
Index, TLI = Tucker Lewis Index 
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The structural part of the model was considered after examining measurement 
invariance.  The cross-sectional associations between PF and each emotion and PF and PSS 
were first examined.  Significant correlations were found for all seven cross-lagged models.  
Next, significant autoregressive estimates from Time 1 to Time 2 were also observed for all 
variables, i.e., PF, each emotion, and the amount of and satisfaction with social support.  The 
autoregressive estimates across all seven models for each variable were high enough to suggest 
that the aggregate standing of the constructs being measured in Time 1 and Time 2 were 
relatively the same.  Cross-lagged paths were used to determine antecedent, consequence, and 
reciprocal relationships between PF and each emotion and PF and amount of and satisfaction 
with social support.  PF is considered an antecedent of an emotion or PSS when the cross-
lagged estimate from PF in Time 1 to the emotion or PSS in Time 2 is significant while the 
cross-lagged estimate from an emotion or PSS in Time 1 to PF in Time 2 is not significant.  PF 
is considered a consequence when the cross-lagged estimate from an emotion or PSS in Time 1 
to PF in Time 2 is significant but the cross-lagged estimate from PF in Time 1 to an emotion or 
PSS is not significant.  A reciprocal relationship between PF and an emotion or PSS is obtained 
when cross-lagged estimates for both PF and an emotion or PSS from Time 1 to Time 2 are 
significant.  The relationship between PF and each emotion and were not all the same whereas 
the relationship between PF and the amount of and satisfaction with social support were the 
same.  Figures 6.1 to 6.7 contain the estimates of the structural paths for PF and each emotion 
and PF and amount of and satisfaction with social support.   
In the category of negative emotions, fear was found to have a reciprocal relationship 
with PF (Figure 6.1).  In the reciprocal relation between fear and PF, the effects of change from 
PF to fear were notably larger than the effects of change from fear to PF.  The magnitude of the 
cross-lag paths with PF as an antecedent and as a consequence were tested for significance by 
comparing a model with cross-lag paths constrained to be equal against a model with 
unconstrained paths.  A significant difference in the chi-square was found and therefore it was 
concluded that PF was a stronger predictor of fear.  
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Figure 6.1  SEM of Year 9 PF and Fear predicting Year 10 PF and Fear 
 
 
***p< .001, **p< .01, *p < .05 
Psychological flexibility was found to be an antecedent of hostility (Figure 6.2), the 
amount of social support (Figure 6.3), and satisfaction with social support (Figure 6.4).  The 
cross-sectional correlation between PF and hostility were in the high range while the cross-
sectional correlation between PF and the amount of and satisfaction with social support were in 
the small to moderate range.  In all three models, the autoregressive estimates were high enough 
(p < .001) to suggest that the relative standing of each construct (i.e. PF, hostility, and PSS) 
measured in Time 1 and Time 2 were likely to have measured the same construct.  The cross-
lagged estimates indicate that in addition to the correlation at baseline between PF and hostility, 
a decrease in PF (from Time 1 to Time 2) is likely to have an effect on hostility.  While an 
increase in PF is likely to positively influence the amount of social support and satisfaction with 
social support.     
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Figure 6.2  SEM of Year 9 PF and Hostility predicting Year 10 PF and Hostility 
 
 
***p< .001, **p< .01, *p < .05 
Figure 6.3 SEM of Year 9 PF and Amount of Social Support predicting Year 10 PF and Amount 
of Social Support 
 
 
***p< .001, **p< .01, *p < .05   
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Figure 6.4 SEM of Year 9 PF and Social Support Satisfaction predicting Year 10 PF Social 
Support Satisfaction 
 
 
***p< .001, **p< .01, *p < .05 
 Psychological flexibility was found to be a consequence of sadness (Figure 6.5) and 
shame (Figure 6.6).  The cross-sectional correlations at baseline and the autoregressive 
estimates were considered as being in the high range (p < .001) for both models.  The high 
autoregressive estimates indicate that each construct (i.e. PF, sadness, and shame), measured in 
Time 1 and Time 2, were measuring the same construct.  The cross-lagged estimates suggest 
that in addition to the high correlations at baseline, those that experienced increases in sadness 
or shame, were most likely to become less psychologically flexible.   
Figure 6.5 SEM of Year 9 PF and Sadness predicting Year 10 PF and Sadness 
 
***p< .001, **p< .01, *p < .05 
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Figure 6.6 SEM of Year 9 PF and Shame predicting Year 10 PF and Shame 
 
 
***p< .001, **p< .01, *p < .05 
As for the relationship between PF and joy (Figure 6.7), cross-sectional correlations 
were in the moderate range but autoregressive estimates were in the high range (p < .001).  The 
high autoregressive estimates suggest that the same constructs were being measured (i.e. PF and 
joy) in Time 1 and Time 2.  Cross-lagged path estimates between PF and joy were not found to 
be significant in both directions indicating that although PF and joy were moderately correlated 
at baseline, changes in either PF or joy did not have an effect on the other variable.  
Figure 6.7 SEM of Year 9 PF and Joy predicting Year 10 PF and Joy 
 
 
***p< .001, **p< .01, *p < .05 
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Chapter 7:  General Discussion 
 The objectives of this study were to explore the reciprocal relationship between PF, 
emotional well-being, and social well-being in adolescents using a longitudinal design. 
Additionally, this study also explored whether gender varied in the transactional relationships.  
Psychological flexibility, emotional experiences, and social support are all considered risk and 
protective factors in adolescents and the relationships between them is likely to enhance an 
understanding of the development of emotional and social well-being for adolescents identified 
with mental health problems.  This discussion will focus on (1) the reciprocal influences 
between PF and each emotion and between PF and the amount of and satisfaction with social 
support, (2) the limitations of the study, and (3) theoretical implications and suggestions for 
future research.  First, a summary of the main results are presented below. 
 Descriptive statistics showed that during the one year period, adolescents experienced a 
significant reduction in joy.  The finding of a significant decrease in positive affect is similar to 
previous research findings suggesting that the experience of positive emotions decreases 
substantially during this age period (Larson & Lampman-Petraitis, 1989; R. W. Larson et al., 
2002).  Additionally, a significant decrease in the perception of the amount of social supports 
was reported in the one year period.  Mid-adolescents (14-16 years of age) are likely to report 
reduced numbers in perceived social support as they tend to become increasingly autonomous 
from their parents while learning to make decisions independently (Eccles et al., 1993).  
Consequently, adolescents are likely to perceive that they have less people to rely on for support 
due to a temporary increase in conflict with parents during mid-adolescence (De Goede, Branje, 
Delsing, et al., 2009).  Additionally, although adolescents become increasingly closer to their 
peers, they are still settling into their peer groups and therefore they are likely to report fewer 
social supports (De Goede, Branje, Delsing, et al., 2009).   
 Gender differences were observed for several emotions and for the amount of social 
support.  Girls experienced significantly higher levels of fear, sadness, shame, and joy than 
boys.  Girls also reported greater amounts of social support than boys, which is consistent with 
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prior research.  No significant gender differences were found for PF, hostility, and satisfaction 
with social support.  Reliable gender differences in affect have not been found in adults (Watson 
& Clark, 1994) and nor in the studies that examined the structure of the tripartite model in 
adolescents (Chorpita, 2002; Lonigan, Phillips, & Hooe, 2003).  However, these studies mainly 
examined emotions in the context of the higher dimensional approach (i.e. negative affect and 
positive affect).  Similarly, gender differences have not been reported in studies that have 
examined specific emotions (e.g. De Rubeis & Hollenstein, 2009).  In contrast, gender 
differences in specific emotions have been found in other studies (e.g. Eberhart et al., 2006; 
Hankin & Abramson, 2001; Hart, 1999; Muris et al., 2005).  The issue of possible gender 
differences in specific emotions deserves additional investigation due to conflicting findings.  In 
this study, girls also reported a significantly greater amount of social support than boys.  Gender 
differences in the amount of social support are consistent with another longitudinal study that 
suggested that girls reported higher numbers of social supports while numbers of social support 
reported by boys usually stabilize during mid-adolescence (De Goede, Branje, & Meeus, 2009).  
Gender differences in each emotion will be discussed further in the implications of the 
longitudinal relationships sections for each emotion.  
This thesis examined reciprocal relationships between PF and each emotion, PF and 
PSS by using a 1-year cross-lagged longitudinal panel design.  It was found that PF was 
predictive of hostility, sadness and shame was predictive of PF, PF had a reciprocal relationship 
with fear, and PF was not significantly related to joy.  PF was also found to be predictive of the 
perceived amount of and perceived satisfaction with social support.  In the analysis of the 
moderating role of gender, boys and girls did not differ in the longitudinal relationship between 
PF and emotions and between PF and the amount of and satisfaction with perceived social 
support.     
When low PF precedes an emotion or PSS, it could be viewed as a precursor or a 
vulnerability to that variable.  The results in this study support the proposition that low levels of 
PF can act as a psychological vulnerability and as ER processes that can lead to potential 
emotional problems or perpetuate the dysregulation of emotions (Forsyth et al., 2003; Kashdan 
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et al., 2006a; Venta, Hart, & Sharp, 2013).  The predictive status of PF is similar to the original 
vulnerability-stress model in which some cognitive styles can act as a psychological 
vulnerability and can influence the development of negative psychological outcomes (Abramson 
et al., 1989; Beck, 1983).   
When emotion is predictive of PF, then PF can be viewed as a coping style that is 
similar to emotion-focused coping.   Emotions are usually appraisals of the strain or stress 
experienced in a particular situation.  Low levels of PF can serve to perpetuate the experience of 
emotions and contribute to the maintenance of those emotions (Hughes et al., 2011; Silk et al., 
2003; Veilleux et al., 2014).  The interaction between emotions and low levels of PF can 
eventually contribute to the development of psychopathology as has been found in other 
longitudinal studies in which avoidance mediated the association between the emotion and 
depression (e.g. De Rubeis & Hollenstein, 2009).   
The reciprocal relationship between low levels of PF and an emotion indicates that PF 
and negative emotions mutually influence each other.  In other words, when one variable 
decreases (e.g. PF), the other increases (e.g. negative affect) and when one increases, the other 
decreases.  The reciprocal relationship is consistent with the transactional cognitive 
vulnerability to stress model in which cognitive style and emotions are likely to influence each 
other reciprocally over time (Calvete et al., 2013; Hankin & Abramson, 2001).   
The insignificant gender differences in the longitudinal relationships between PF, 
specific emotions, and PSS suggests that even though gender differences exist at the single 
variable level, the longitudinal effects disappear when emotions and PSS are paired with an ER 
variable such as PF.  These findings are both similar and contrary to some findings found in 
other studies.  In several other multi-wave longitudinal studies that investigated transactional 
models or pathways, gender differences were not found (e.g. Barrocas & Hankin, 2011; Calvete 
et al., 2013, 2015).  Contrary to the findings in the current study, gender differences were found 
in other longitudinal studies (e.g. Abela & Hankin, 2011; Abela et al., 2012; Calvete, 2011).  It 
seems that the mixed findings of the role of gender suggest that it depends on the variables 
being used to model the longitudinal relationships.  For example, in some of the studies in 
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which gender differences were found, rumination was used as a cognitive vulnerability.  Girls 
have been found to ruminate more than boys and this has been a consistent finding in studies 
investigating rumination and depression (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2012).  In contrast, gender 
differences in PF have not been a common finding when compared to the larger number of 
studies that have found gender differences in rumination.     
Overall, the results of this study contribute to a more specific understanding of the role 
of PF in the emotion generation process model.  It can be said that specific emotions determine 
when a vulnerability/ER processes (i.e. PF in this case) will exert its effects on an emotion, 
irrespective of valence of the emotion.  These findings are consistent with findings that emotion 
regulation develops in an emotion-specific manner (Zimmerman & Iwanski, 2014).  The varied 
relationships between PF and specific emotions are consistent with the differential emotions 
theory (DET; Izard, 1997) the appraisal theories (Lazarus, 1991), and the different emotional 
responses that go beyond the dimensional level (i.e. negative and positive emotion) (Roseman, 
2001).  According to Izard (1997), each emotion has a different evolutionary function and the 
different characteristics of each emotion are likely to influence when and how each emotion is 
regulated.  The appraisal theory posited that patterns of appraisal for each emotion is different 
and is connected with goal-directed action which in turn leads to different emotional responses 
that may be adaptive or maladaptive  (Lazarus, 1991; Roseman, 2001).  
The exploration of specific emotions has also provided further clarification for the 
argument of whether emotions and ER are facets of one factor or are two distinct factors.  
Moreover, the findings of the current study render support to prior evidence in which different 
emotions were found to have different emotional responses (Roseman, 2001).             
The results of this study have provided a clearer explanation for whether emotions and emotion 
regulation should be considered as one factor or as two factors.  Campos et al. (2004) argued 
that emotions and emotion regulation are likely to be facets of a single factor while other 
researchers have suggested that emotions and emotion regulation are clearly two distinct factors 
(e.g. Cole et al., 2004; Gross & Barrett, 2011; Thompson, 2011).  A clear cut distinction 
between a one factor model and a two factor model cannot be determined due to the varied 
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relationships between PF and emotions in this study.  However, the relationship between PF and 
some emotions (e.g. sadness and shame) could possibly indicate that emotions and ER can be 
said to be a one factor model as the emotions preceded ER.  When an emotion precedes ER, the 
emotion can possibly be said to be regulating as it influences any subsequent responses or 
reactions (Campos et al., 2004).  In contrast, the relationship between PF and other emotions 
(e.g. fear, hostility, and joy) indicate that emotions and ER could possibly be two distinct factors 
as PF was  a precursor to one emotion (i.e. hostility), had a reciprocal relationship with another 
emotion (i.e. fear), and both PF and the emotion (i.e. joy) did not significantly influence the 
other longitudinally.               
   The predictive status of PF with regard to PSS has further illuminated the relationship 
between intrapersonal ER and interpersonal ER.   Marroquin (2011) had proposed that 
intrapersonal ER (i.e. PF in this study) is likely to be influenced by interpersonal ER (i.e. PSS).  
However, in a study conducted to investigate the influence of emotional competencies and PSS 
on help seeking behaviour, emotional competencies were still considered important in 
explaining help seeking behaviour even when the adolescents reported high levels of PSS 
(Ciarrochi et al., 2003).  The findings in this study lend further support to the studies conducted 
by Ciarrochi and colleagues and provide a more conclusive understanding of the link between 
intrapersonal ER and interpersonal ER.  Emotional competencies are not only important in 
determining help seeking behaviour but they are also important in explaining how adolescents 
perceive people in their social support network and derive satisfaction from their social 
supports.  It seems that as an intrapersonal ER variable, PF, to a certain extent, can explain the 
hesitation in soliciting social support when it is most needed.  Implications for the different 
relationships between PF and each emotion and PF and the amount of and satisfaction with 
social support are discussed below.    
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7.1  Longitudinal Relationships between Psychological Flexibility, 
Specific Emotions and Perceived Social Support  
7.1.1  PF as a Precursor  
The predictive status of PF supports previous research that suggests that PF acts as a 
generalized psychological vulnerability (Forsyth et al., 2003; Kashdan et al., 2006).  People who 
are high in PF are usually more accepting and have more attentional resources for engaging in 
behavioural options that are personally and socially adaptive.  When people are low in PF, there 
is a tendency to engage in cognitive behaviours that attempt to control and avoid psychological 
events and therefore thoughts and emotions are prevented from being processed and understood. 
Moreover, attentional resources become narrowed and people are unable to look outside for 
further guidance in order to select a helpful or more adaptive course of action.  Avoidance 
efforts culminate in preventing people from living their lives with purpose and meaning.  
Consequently, individuals with low PF tend to suffer from affective, cognitive, and social 
deficits that can lead to psychological distress and reduced positive functioning.   
7.1.1.1  PF and Hostility 
PF was found to predict hostility in this study.  It appears that those adolescents who 
were low in PF at Time 1 were likely to become increasingly hostile at Time 2.  Prior research 
on anger, which shares characteristics with hostility, indicate that the expression of anger is 
usually internalized or directed towards the self (anger-in) or away from the self (anger-out) 
(Spielberger, Reheiser, & Sydeman, 1995).  Internalized anger often involves the suppression or 
denial of the emotion in order to prevent its outward expression within a social context 
(Shipman, Zeman, & Stegall, 2001).  Suppression paradoxically increases the importance, 
frequency, or intensity of the very content that is being avoided and can result in unfavourable 
social consequences such as the involuntary display of angry facial expressions, physical 
gestures, or aggressive movements (Boulanger et al., 2010).  In conclusion, PF acts as a 
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psychological vulnerability in relation to hostility and decreases in PF are likely to contribute to 
increases in hostility. 
The predictive relationship between PF and hostility can be viewed from the original 
vulnerability stress model that states that all people have certain levels of vulnerabilities that 
predispose them to any psychological problems (Ingram & Luxton, 2005).  Low PF could be 
acting as a vulnerability factor for hostility in this study.  This is the first study (to the 
knowledge of the researcher) to show that levels of PF (as a psychological vulnerability) predict 
hostility longitudinally.  Prior research has mainly attributed harsh parenting, parental hostility, 
and socialization in the family as determinants of hostility (Kerr & Schneider, 2008; Lewis, 
Collishaw, Thapar, & Harold, 2014).   
Additionally, gender did not moderate the relationship between PF and hostility.  
Gender differences were expected as boys are known to be more hostile than girls (Hart, 1999).  
In other longitudinal research where gender differences were examined, girls were more prone 
to anger and boys were more prone to hostile attribution in relation to child-to-parent aggression 
(Calvete, Gamez-Guadix, & Garcia-Salvador, 2014).  Furthermore, no significant mean 
differences were found between boys and girls for hostility.  It seems unclear as to why gender 
differences were not detected at the single variable level and also when modelled longitudinally 
with PF.  Further gender studies investigating hostility and ER are warranted in order to make 
more definitive conclusions.    
7.1.1.2  PF and PSS 
PF was also found to be a precursor of the perceived amount of and perceived 
satisfaction with social support.  Those who were low in PF reported a smaller network size and 
less satisfaction with social support one year later.  Individuals who tend to avoid private events, 
will also tend to avoid interactions with people (Boulanger et al., 2010).  Regardless of the kinds 
of resources provided by the social support network, engagement in experiential avoidance 
makes people avoid other people and situations due to factors such as fear of negative 
evaluations (as found  in social anxiety; Tull & Gratz, 2008).  Avoidance eventually leads to a 
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range of other problems such as loneliness, an inability to contact positive events, and 
confirmation of previous beliefs that one is socially inept (Kashdan et al., 2013).  From an RFT 
perspective, people become ineffective because they are unable to contact direct environmental 
contingencies from where feedback can be received and awareness can be obtained in order for 
behavioural modification to occur accordingly. 
Other predictors of PSS, such as self-esteem and personality-relationship transaction 
quality, have been found to be reliable predictors of perceived social support satisfaction and 
network size in adolescents over the long term (Asendorpf & van Aken, 2003; Marshall et al., 
2014).  Although self-esteem and relationship quality are important individual characteristics, 
the practical utilisation of these variables to improve social support is questionable.  For 
example, interventions for boosting self-esteem are largely ineffective (Baumeister, Campbell, 
Krueger, & Vohs, 2003).  The reason for this may be that increasing self-esteem (or improving 
relationship quality) also depends on a host of other factors such as the ability to self-regulate 
emotional responses with corresponding behaviours in socially adaptive ways (Trentacosta & 
Shaw, 2009).  The PF construct works as key self-regulatory processes and the current findings  
that PF predicts PSS provides added value in prevention and intervention programs.  Programs 
that seek to increase PSS should also seek to increase PF levels as it is  increasingly being 
supported by research (Hayes et al., 2006; Ruiz, 2010).         
7.1.2  Emotion as a Precursor   
When an emotion is a precursor of PF, then PF processes are likely to be used as 
strategies for coping when those emotions are elicited.   It can also be said that PF processes 
perpetuates or exacerbates the experience of those emotions.  The SEM results were consistent 
with the argument that emotions and ER are facets of a single process as the experience of 
sadness and shame preceded response tendencies.  These findings are supportive of the claim by 
Campos et al., (2004) that emotions can determine the regulation strategy or strategies used to 
respond to an emotion.  PF processes have mainly been viewed as a psychological vulnerability 
and have been assumed to precede psychological symptoms due to its development in early 
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childhood (Lipkens, Hayes, & Hayes, 1993; Roche, Barnes-Holmes, Smeets, Barnes-Holmes, & 
McGeady, 2000).  Additionally, accumulated research from the stress and coping literature has 
also shown that depressive symptoms can be a precursor to cognitive vulnerabilities in normal 
adolescent populations (Calvete, 2011; Garber, Keiley, & Martin, 2002).  Similarly, in another 
longitudinal study that examined cognitive style and depression in adolescents, it was found that 
early symptoms of depression predicted the development of negative coping styles which in turn 
have predicted further increases in depressive symptoms (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1992).  By 
extension, the experience of certain emotions can be a precursor to psychological 
vulnerabilities.   
7.1.2.1  PF and Sadness 
With regard to sadness, increases in sadness may drive adolescents to withdraw from 
the external world in an attempt to avoid the expression of sadness (Zeman & Garber, 1996).  
Children learn from a young age that outward displays of sadness are unacceptable in 
comparison to more acceptable displays of anger when provoked by peers (Dodge, Pettit, 
McClaskey, & Brown, 1986).  Likewise, displays of intense experiences of physical pain are 
more acceptable than sadness or anger (Zeman & Garber, 1996).  Withdrawal from the outward 
expression of emotions can increase the intensity of the emotion internally (Fuchs & Thelen, 
1988).  The external use of avoidance to restrict the expression of sadness can also transfer to 
the internal use of avoidance as a means of coping with sadness internally (Boulanger et al., 
2010).  When an emotional expression is suppressed, the frequency and intensity of the emotion 
is paradoxically amplified in the internal world (Feldner, Zvolensky, Eifert, & Spira, 2003).  
According to RFT, when thoughts and beliefs are suppressed in the presence of a negative 
emotion, the relational network expands in a way that additional links between the thought and 
emotion are introduced in the form of cues.  Because of the bidirectional principle in RFT, the 
psychological functions of thoughts will evoke the psychological functions of emotions and vice 
versa.  In the case of sadness, RFT would suggest that attempts to control or suppress sadness 
will strengthen the links between sadness and associated cognitive appraisals such that when 
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sadness appears or rebounds, the unwanted thoughts will also appear.  The experience of 
sadness in the past may have already become associated with a predisposition to cope by 
avoiding internal experiences and therefore the attempt to control, alter, or withdraw has already 
become tightly intertwined with sadness.  Consequently, the frequency and intensity of sadness 
tends to self-amplify.         
 The implication of the relationship between sadness and PF is that persistent sadness 
and/or recurrent sadness could possibly contribute to other possible negative indicators such as 
reduced emotional reactivity as seen in depression (Blumberg & Izard, 1986; Rottenberg & 
Gross, 2003).  Additionally, sadness and its accompanying appraisal of loss are usually 
considered a central theme in depression (Roseman & Kaiser, 2001).  Moreover, when sadness 
is regulated by withdrawing, then there may be reduced or delayed help-seeking behaviour 
because of the low awareness of the detrimental effects of the emotional state (Judd, Rapaport, 
Paulus, & Brown, 1994).     
Gender differences were found mainly at the single variable level. Significant mean 
differences were found between boys and girls with girls found to have higher levels of sadness 
than boys.  These findings are similar to findings from past research in which girls tended to 
express and exhibit more sadness than boys (Fuchs & Thelen, 1988; Zeman & Garber, 1996).  
However, in the current study, although there were gender differences for sadness, gender did 
not moderate the relationship between PF and sadness longitudinally. 
7.1.2.2  PF and Shame  
The relationship between PF and shame in this study are somewhat consistent with 
another longitudinal study in which avoidant-coping fully mediated the relationship between 
shame and depressive symptoms in adolescents (De Rubeis & Hollenstein, 2009).  Shame-
proneness is especially prominent during adolescence as this developmental period is 
characterized with excessive focus on the self in terms of being worthless, powerless, small, and 
exposed (Lewis, 1995; Tracy, Robins, & Tangney, 2007).  Coping with shame often entails 
withdrawing from a situation but can also extend to withdrawals from internal experiences due 
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to its painful nature.  The findings in the present study are consistent with the model presented 
by Muris and Meesters (2014) where two levels of appraisal of shame are relevant: the primary 
appraisal and the secondary appraisal.  The primary appraisal of shame is closely linked with 
identity and is an appraisal of social acceptance or rejection.  Exaggerated and intense shame 
make people want to avoid the feeling and the associated situation because it is closely aligned 
with the individual’s global perception of self-worth and makes them feel vulnerable to the 
outside world (Lewis, 2007; Tangney & Dearing, 2002).  Withdrawal and avoidance are natural 
responses for cutting off exposure to the external world for the purpose of hiding vulnerabilities.  
When shame is experienced, adolescents may cope by engaging in cognitive fusion and 
experiential avoidance.  The emotion shame involves an attachment to a conceptualized self that 
can be dysfunctional.  For example, feelings of shame that one is incompetent can become a 
belief that one is globally incompetent.  This is an indication of engagement in cognitive fusion. 
The global feeling of incompetence can become fused with a conceptualized self and 
discrepancies between the real self and ideal can become the focus of attention.  In this way, the 
fusion with a conceptualized self can become globally pervasive and can influence the way one 
conducts his/her life.  The external avoidance of a situation may lead to the avoidance of the 
experience of shame internally due to feelings of discomfort.  Consequently, these feelings do 
not get resolved.  Experiential avoidance actually serves to exacerbate the problem and prevents 
the emotion from being processed and understood.  Feelings of shame are likely to become 
more intense and frequent owing to the bidirectional principle in RFT and attempts to suppress 
or control them.  Heightened feelings of shame can be so painful that the emotion is likely to be 
substituted with emotions such sadness, anger, or hostility and after a prolonged time period, 
severe forms of sadness, anger, and hostility can manifest as depression (Heaven, Ciarocchi, & 
Leeson, 2009; De Rubeis & Hollenstein, 2009) .         
  The secondary appraisal of shame involves reacting in relation to the social 
environment.  These reactions are highly dependent on the relationship between the past and 
present context in which shame has been experienced and includes individual characteristics 
such as temperament and gender (Muris & Meesters, 2014).  The secondary appraisal of shame-
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proneness is particularly relevant in adolescence because of the increasing shift away from 
socializing within the family and the increasing affiliation with  peers.  Feelings of wanting to 
hide from observers are considered a safeguard against being viewed in a negative light and 
against future rejections.  Shame is often experienced as how “others” perceive and evaluate 
them and therefore this imposition on the self is tied to values and standards of a particular 
audience.  Feelings of shame are often bypassed through defensive and avoidant behaviour and 
manifests as dysfunctional behaviour that can ultimately take the form of psychopathology.       
Shame-proneness has been shown to be associated with the use of avoidant coping 
strategies irrespective of gender (De Rubeis & Hollenstein, 2009).  Similarly, no differences 
between boys and girls were found in the longitudinal relationship between PF and shame in the 
current study.  However, significant mean gender differences were found for shame alone, with 
girls reporting considerably higher levels of shame than boys.  Past research has found that girls 
are more prone to shame due to physical changes and body image concerns (Rudolph et al., 
2006).  
7.1.3  Reciprocal relationship between PF and emotions  
 The relationship between PF and fear was found to be reciprocal.  The reciprocal 
relationship is consistent with other models of stress  in which cognitions and emotions 
reciprocally influence each other over time (Hankin & Abramson, 2001).  The reciprocal 
relationship between PF and fear indicates that a decrease in PF predicts an increase in fear.  
Similarly, an increase in fear predicts a decrease in PF.  This cycle of mutual influence can also 
be understood in terms of a process in which the intensity of an emotion increases when greater 
unwillingness to experience the emotion is already present.  The verbal/cognitive appraisal of 
the emotion increasingly dominates the ability to contact other meaningful aspects of the 
emotion (i.e. the adaptive purpose of the emotion) or distance oneself from evaluations that are 
rooted in historical feelings, interactions, sensations, thoughts, perceptions etc. (Stewart, 
Villatte, & McHugh, 2012).  As fear increases, it is likely to have a counter influence in the 
form of greater amounts of unwillingness to experience fear and therefore PF and fear mutually 
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influence each other.  In other words, the reciprocal relationship between PF and fear is likely to 
be reflected as a fear of fear.  A test of differences in the predictive strength between the cross-
lagged paths (PF to fear vs. fear to PF) was performed and causal priority was established with 
PF being a stronger predictor of fear.  The greater strength in the path from PF to fear implies 
that when adolescents are already low in PF, they tend to be more fearful towards events or 
circumstances that elicit fear and this in turn feeds back into the loop that makes them more 
psychologically inflexible (emphasis added).     
 The adaptive function of fear experiences often results in a flight or fight response 
which initially involves avoiding or escaping circumstances that is assessed as actually harmful.  
If the situation does not afford an avoidance response, then the only alternative left is to fight.  
A fear experience is avoided even more with the addition of verbal threat information (Davey, 
1997; Field & Schorah, 2007).  Essentially, when cognitive/verbal information predominates in 
fear, there is a possibility that fear can give rise to anxiety.  The continuum from fear to anxiety 
involves physiological responding and avoidance and is separated by the occurrence of the 
actual event (Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 2005).  When a person describes their anxious 
behaviour and circumstances, it also involves associations between private verbal stimuli (e.g. 
negative self-evaluations, judgmental social comparisons etc.) and bodily sensations (e.g. 
physiological arousal) that make it even more aversive.  From an RFT perspective, verbal 
information that already has a threatening quality can be transformed further and take on an 
even more threatening meaning due to possible instances in the historical past/context in which 
fearful events led to disastrous consequences.  In other words, when fear is associated with 
cognitive fusion, there is often an excessive use of avoidance or escape responding due to the 
aversiveness of private events (Friman, Hayes, & Wilson, 1998).       
 Findings of the reciprocal relationship between PF and fear lends further support to 
earlier correlational research between PF and anxiety-related disorders (Hayes et al., 2006; 
Kashdan et al., 2006; Roemer, Salters, Raffa, & Orsillo, 2005; Tull et al., 2004).  Furthermore, 
the stronger effects of the path from PF to fear also provides further insight about PF as an 
individual vulnerability in predicting fear and by extension in predicting anxiety-related 
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problems.  In particular, the fear of fear and anxiety sensitivity has been indicated in panic 
disorders, GAD, and social anxiety (Roemer, Salters, Raffa, & Orsillo, 2005; Tull et al., 2004; 
Tull, Rodman, & Roemer, 2008).   
Gender did not moderate the relationship between PF and fear longitudinally.  At the 
single variable level, significant mean gender differences were reported for fear.  In particular, 
girls reported higher levels of fear than boys.  This is consistent with prior research in which 
gender role orientation seem to influence the experience of fear in girls more than in boys 
(Ginsburg & Silverman, 2000; Muris et al., 2005).  More specifically, boys are expected to be 
courageous and brave and therefore displays of fear are often discouraged (Ollendick et al., 
1995).  
7.1.4  No relationship status 
 The findings between PF and joy indicates that even though the constructs are 
moderately correlated cross-sectionally (r = .33), they do not predict each other longitudinally.  
The non-predictive relationship between PF and joy suggests that the two constructs seem to 
vary independently of each other over time.  There is no evidence from the results that changes 
in one precede changes in the other.  There may be a few explanations for the lack of a 
longitudinal relationship.  The first explanation can be taken from research in the area of 
positive psychology.  Two central concepts in positive psychology are subjective well-being 
(the balance between positive and negative affect and life satisfaction) and psychological well-
being (having meaning and purpose in life including autonomy, personal growth, acceptance 
etc.).  The two factors are different as each have distinct factor structures even though they are 
correlated (Keyes, Shmotkin, & Ryff, 2002).  A similar comparison can be made between joy 
and PF in the current study.  Although the present study did not measure subjective well-being 
and psychological well-being directly, the positive and negative emotions represented an aspect 
of subjective well-being and PF represented an aspect of psychological well-being (i.e. 
acceptance and its opposite avoidance).  Joy and PF correlated with each other but they seem to 
be different constructs and have the potential to influence psychological outcomes differently. 
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 To gain an understanding of the relationship between PF and positive emotions, the 
relationship between positive and negative emotions needs elaboration.  In past research, 
positive and negative emotions have often been shown to be related to each other via the 
regulation of negative emotions.  Essentially, while suppressing and avoiding negative 
emotions, positive emotions are also likely to be suppressed and prevented from the realm of 
awareness (Kashdan et al., 2013; Kashdan & Rottenberg, 2010).  However, several emotion 
theorists have hypothesized that negative and positive emotions operate differently and that this 
also extends to their independent regulation (Diener, Lucas, & Oishi, 2002; Russell & Carroll, 
1999).  In support of this assertion, studies in adults have demonstrated that negative and 
positive emotions were independent predictors of physical health (Pressman & Cohen, 2005) 
and adaptive functioning (Fredrickson, 2002).  Additionally, research is also accumulating to 
support the separate role that positive emotions (the lack of it) play in psychopathology (Gruber, 
Oveis, Keltner, & Johnson, 2011; Kashdan, 2007; Rottenberg, Gross, & Gotlib, 2005).   
 Research investigating the relationship between positive emotions and ER is still in its 
nascent stages and therefore a precise role of the relationship between them in psychopathology 
is still unclear.  For example, Kashdan et al. (2013) found that both low PF and diminished 
positive emotional experiences were independent predictors of social anxiety disorder but in the 
same study, the presence of experiential avoidance did not only lead to less negative emotions 
on a daily basis but also led to deficits in the experience of positive emotions.  The researchers 
attributed the findings to biased attentional processing that inhibits access to reward stimuli in 
the presence of negative emotions and therefore deficiencies in experiencing positive emotions 
were also observed.  In conclusion, PF and positive emotions can be said to be independent of 
each other but there could be an indirect longitudinal relationship between them.  While PF 
processes influence the experience and processing of negative emotions and are also influenced 
by them directly, the absence of a significant longitudinal relationship between PF and positive 
emotions could be indirect and via the influence of the suppression of negative emotions.  In 
other words, PF processes can be said to influence positive emotions in the presence of negative 
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emotions, however, in the absence of negative emotions, PF processes are likely to be unrelated 
to the regulation of positive emotions.   
7.2  Strengths and Limitations 
This study has several advantages.  Longitudinal studies help to advance knowledge of 
the interaction between risk and protective factors and improve the quality and certainty of 
findings.  The current study has contributed significantly to the existing research by clarifying 
the role of specific emotions in determining mindful emotion regulation, irrespective of valence 
of the emotion.  Additionally, the varied relationships between discrete emotions and PF, has 
contributed to more clarity of the role of specific emotions in determining where mindfulness 
and acceptance variables are likely to occur in the emotion generation process model. 
Nevertheless, there were several notable limitations in this study.  The first is concerned 
with self-report studies involving emotions and ER.  Dampened affect and/or its intensity is 
likely to influence the self-report of emotional experiences and self-reports of ER strategies 
used.  Those who experience higher levels of negative affective are most likely to suppress and 
avoid those experiences and as a result they may not be aware of how they are responding to 
their emotional experiences.  Some adolescents in this study may have responded while 
experiencing emotional distress, however, structural equation modelling analyses control for 
such situational or person-situation interactions (Finkel, 1995).   
A second limitation regarding the emotion variables in the study is that only one 
traditional positive emotion, joy, was included in the study and therefore no comparisons among 
different types of positive emotions were possible.  There is a possibility that other kinds of 
positive emotions may be associated with PF over time.  However, high correlations among 
positive emotions, for example joy and happiness, suggest that they are less differentiated and 
have often been used as substitutes (Weiner, 1985). 
Third, limitations with regard to the measurements used are also relevant.  Although the 
PANAS-X has adequate psychometric properties, it has predominantly been used for the 
purpose of measuring the higher order factors of positive and negative affect.  Theoretically 
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based measures of discrete emotions (e.g. differential emotions theory and appraisal theories of 
emotions) are more specific and better distinguish between highly correlated emotions such as 
shame and guilt or anger and hostility.  However, these measures are also longer and due to time 
constraints, more pure and elaborate measures of discrete emotions were not practical.  
Additionally, although the AFQ-Y has been shown to be psychometrically sound, the AFQ-Y 
has not been used as extensively as the adult versions, such as the AAQ and AAQ-II.  The 
association between the AFQ-Y and other measures of avoidance or acceptance (apart from the 
AAQ and AAQ-II) are still not known. 
Fourth, despite the advantages of longitudinal research designs, there are some 
limitations in the current study.  First, only two time points have been used in the current study 
and the causal structure for the relationship between the variables cannot be determined with 
certainty.  In other words, a pattern of variances and covariances is hard to gauge (Cole & 
Maxwell, 2003).  Associations between variables accumulate slowly over time and they may 
strengthen or weaken over time dependent upon individual dispositions or environmental 
experiences.  The current study only provides a snapshot of the dynamic processes between PF 
and different emotions and PF and PSS between two time points in the space of 12 months.  
Second, causality can be implied mainly from longitudinal data; however, the reciprocal 
relationship found in the current study does not provide a clear direction of a causal chain of 
events.  Although findings of reciprocal relationships are consistent with theory and findings 
from other longitudinal studies, there is still a lack of understanding with regard to the initial 
causal point that may have originated at an earlier point in time.  There could have been other 
omitted or unmeasured variables that may have actually caused the two variables being 
modelled to covary, thus giving the perception of causality (Little, Preacher, Selig, & Card, 
2007).  But to a certain degree, the potential for the influence of a third variable was mitigated 
due to SEM that controls for measurement error, correlated errors, and disturbances (Finkel, 
1995).  Measurements of variables do not occur in a vacuum as they involve characteristics of 
the situation that people being measured are involved in but the advantage of latent constructs is 
that versions of the trait-like variable can be obtained by controlling for measurement error, or 
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in other words, omitted or unmeasured variables (such as the situation or person-situation 
interactions on the occasion of testing) that may have influenced the actual variable being 
measured (Steyer, Schmitt, & Eid, 1999).  Moreover, an analysis of the full cross-lagged panel 
controls for measurement error, correlated errors, and disturbances, which theoretically 
mitigates any influences of unmeasured or omitted variables.  Additionally, the 1-year gap 
between measurements allows for sufficient time to observe trait-like characteristics of the 
variables or any other notable changes to the trait-like characteristics. 
7.4  Theoretical Implications and Future Research   
7.4.1  Theoretical Developments 
 The current study has advanced theoretical knowledge at several levels.  First, this study 
has provided insight on the relationship between a mindful ER variable and emotions and  the 
relationship between intrapersonal and interpersonal ER.  Second, more specific relationships 
between psychological vulnerabilities, specific emotions, and perceived social support have 
been clarified.  Third, the magnitude of correlations and the longitudinal relationships between 
PF and specific emotions have provided some clarification that the PF measure possibly 
assesses psychological processes rather than just negative affect.  In the ensuing paragraphs, the 
theoretical implications are organized based on the levels mentioned above as theoretical level 
implications are also tied to the implications at the variable level.   First, emotions and ER are 
discussed, followed by intrapersonal and interpersonal emotion regulation. 
The findings in this study are most consistent with the differential emotions theory 
(DET; Izard, 1997) and the appraisal theories (Lazarus, 1991; Roseman, 1984).  DET states that 
each emotion has a different function and therefore emotional responding is likely to be 
different.  Similarly, the appraisal theories suggest that each emotion has different effects on 
cognition, physiology, and behaviour.  The finding that some emotions with the same valence 
are regulated differentially provides additional evidence (as proposed by Izard, 2010) for the 
notion that specific emotions are important in determining ER processes.  However, the 
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variations found in the relationship between each emotion and PF also suggests that it cannot be 
conclusively determined whether emotions and ER processes are two separate constructs or 
different facets of a single process.  Campos and colleagues argued that ER and emotions are 
different facets of a single process.  The suggestion by Campos and colleagues that emotions are 
regulated as well as regulating is most consistent with the findings of this study.  In contrast, the 
findings are also consistent with suggestions by other researchers that ER and emotions 
represent a two-factor model (Gross & Barrett, 2011).  The pattern and magnitude of 
correlations between PF and negative and positive emotions were not high enough as to suggest 
that they were assessing the same underlying construct.   
This study has further strengthened the argument for examining discrete emotions as 
proposed by a consensus of emotion researchers in a survey conducted by Izard (2010).  
Theoretical debates between models of emotion are ongoing with some emotion researchers 
favouring a discrete emotions model and others in favour of a core affect system model (see 
Barrett, 2006, for review).  Barrett (2006) questioned the utility in examining discrete emotions 
because there have been empirical inconsistencies found for each emotion component and 
because the disconfirming evidence was more consistent.  Instead, Barrett (2006) proposed that 
emotions have an underlying general affect system called the core affect system.  In contrast, 
other researchers claimed that the inconsistencies may have largely been due to artefacts of the 
research design and the influence of other processes (e.g., the presence/absence of the intensity 
of the emotion) rather than the discreteness of each emotion (Cacioppo et al., 2000; Roseman, 
2008).  An important argument made in favour of the discrete emotions model was that varied 
ER strategies are used to manage emotions and that it is likely that each discrete emotion is 
regulated differently (Izard, 2010).  To a large degree, the findings in this study confirm that it 
is important to investigate discrete emotions as the different  relationships between PF and each 
emotion has shown that  discrete emotion determines when it is regulated or when it regulates, 
irrespective of valence of the emotion.     
The current study has also contributed somewhat to elucidating the discriminant validity 
of the measurements used to measure the PF construct.  The AAQ and AAQ-II are adult 
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versions of measurement for the PF construct and have not been used in this study but the AAQ-
II has been shown to be highly correlated with the AFQ-Y (Fergus et al., 2012; Schmalz & 
Murrell, 2010).  The AAQ has been shown to lack discriminant validity especially with regard 
to negative affect.  A recent study has shown that when a factor analysis was performed using 
the PANAS and the AAQ-II, the pattern of correlations were identical for the two scales thus 
questioning the discriminant validity of the AAQ-II and by extension the PF construct (Wolgast, 
2014).  However, in the study, the higher dimensional levels (i.e. positive and negative affect) 
were used for the analyses.  The current study, to a certain extent, has provided some 
clarification as to whether the PF construct is different enough in relation to negative affect.  In 
the current study, instead of combining all negative emotions into one negative affect variable, 
different negative emotions were modelled separately with the AFQ-Y.  Correlations between 
the AFQ-Y and negative emotions were in the medium to large range (r = .30 to r = .54).  
Although the correlations are considered moderately high, they are not high enough to conclude 
that the AFQ-Y and negative emotions are measuring the same underlying construct.  Hemphill 
(2003) provided some guidelines for interpreting the magnitudes of correlation coefficients 
based on published results of psychological assessments from 380 meta-analytic studies.  The 
correlation coefficients were found to be relatively evenly distributed in thirds where one third 
was less than .20, another third was between .20 and .30, and the last third was above .30.  In 
this analysis, Hemphill (2003) tried to provide an empirical basis for Cohen’s (1988) original 
guidelines for interpreting the magnitude of effect sizes in the order of .10 as small, .30 as 
medium, and .50 as large.  The magnitude of correlation coefficients between PF and each 
emotion in this study ranged from .30 to .54.  Most of the correlations were in the moderate 
range.  Correlation coefficients of the same underlying construct are usually expected to be at 
the level of .80 and above.   
Apart from statistically-based evidence, the distinctness of the PF construct and 
negative affect can also be gauged from the different relationships between PF and each 
negative emotion.  PF was a precursor of one emotion, two emotions  were a precursor of PF, 
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and PF had a reciprocal relationship with another emotion.  The differences in the relationships 
between PF and emotions of similar negative valence suggest it is capturing more than just 
negative affect (Gloster et al., 2011).  Moreover, the structural overlap between the AFQ-Y and 
the PANAS-X can be said to be minimal as the PANAS-X is a measure that contains words 
rather than sentences.   Furthermore, with regard to the findings between PF and joy, the non-
predictive association between the variables support previous theoretical assumptions that in the 
presence of positive emotions, people can still exhibit inflexibility, while in the presence of 
negative emotions, people can respond more flexibly (Kashdan & Rottenberg, 2010; Schmaltz 
& Murrell, 2010).    
 The results also provide an advanced understanding of PF processes in relation to the 
continuum between well-being and psychopathology.  In the past, PF has predominantly been 
investigated in cross-sectional studies.  Cross-sectional studies typically indicate that there is a 
relationship between variables but are unable to confirm more definitively as to how they may 
be related and how the relationship between variables may have an effect on well-being and 
psychopathology.  In contrast, longitudinal studies can provide a more precise understanding of 
the relationships between variables and offer important insights on how variables can influence 
each other from the perspective of their risk and protective profiles.  The longitudinal design of 
this study has provided additional confirmation that the PF construct can potentially act as a 
psychological vulnerability and can also perpetuate psychological processes that have already 
been set in motion.  For example, cross-sectional studies have shown that low PF is a correlate 
of many negative psychological outcomes but the direction of these relationships has not been 
determined before.  Given that both negative affect and PF have been found to be associated and 
are established risk factors for negative psychological outcomes, the longitudinal design of the 
current study has provided a clearer picture of reciprocal relationships between PF and each 
specific negative emotion.  This knowledge is important for maximizing the effects of 
interventions when designing prevention and treatment programs (Kraemer et al., 2001).  It can 
be said that when people are low in PF, they may be more likely to experience fear and hostility.  
Likewise, in the presence of low PF, adolescents are likely to perceive low social support which 
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in turn can affect interpersonal relationships and hinder help seeking behaviours.  In these cases, 
interventions that target PF processes will be effective.  The precursor status of PF is also 
consistent with prior research suggesting that low PF is a psychological vulnerability (Kashdan 
et al., 2006).  
Furthermore, people who experienced sadness and shame have been shown to 
experience fusion between private events associated with these emotions.  This is likely to lead 
to coping by avoidance or suppression of internal experiences.  The predictive role of emotions  
in this study can be viewed from the perspective of the response styles theory proposed by 
Nolen-Hoeksema (2004).  According to the response styles theory, when individuals experience 
certain emotions, they are likely to respond by using coping strategies that can contribute as a 
maintaining factor for future emotional difficulties beyond the effects of initial biological and 
psychosocial stressors.  For example, children and adolescents may experience sadness and 
shame but these emotions have the potential to escalate into clinically significant psychological 
disorders due to ER processes.  Emotion regulation processes, such as low levels of PF, are 
likely to act as maintaining factors for sadness and shame.  It can be concluded that the kind of 
ER strategies employed can potentially become maintaining factors for psychological 
symptoms.     
In this study, the proposed view that PSS was possibly a precursor of intrapersonal ER 
was not found.  Marroquin (2011) proposed that social support could be viewed as an 
interpersonal ER variable and is possibly a precursor of intrapersonal ER.  According to this 
model, intrapersonal ER is influenced by social interactions and relationships (Campos et al., 
2011).  However, in this study, PF was found to be predictive of PSS and is therefore more 
consistent with the findings of Ciarrochi and colleagues (2003).  These researchers found that 
emotional competencies (various intrapersonal ER variables) were deemed more important in 
determining help seeking behaviour even at higher levels of PSS in adolescents aged 14-15 
years (Ciarrochi et al., 2003).  There are several plausible explanations for the findings being 
contrary to the interpersonal ER model of Marroquin (2011).  The first explanation is that the 
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effects of social interactions and relationships in the family on intrapersonal ER may have 
already occurred in childhood.  In other words, intrapersonal ER may be the result of emotion 
socialization during childhood.  Secondly, in adolescence intrapersonal ER may be a more 
dominant means of coping whereas seeking support may be a secondary level of coping.  In 
childhood, the caregiver regulates or attempts to regulate emotions for the child, but adolescents 
are capable of regulating their own emotions as a result of cognitive development. 
7.4.2  Future Research 
While this study focused on investigating PF and discrete emotions, more longitudinal 
studies are needed in order to investigate the role of PF processes and its positive and negative 
consequences in the longer term.  This was a snapshot of only two time points and perhaps a 
longer time frame (many waves of data) with appropriate time lapses in between measurement 
points should be considered for exploring potential emotional feedback loops.  It is likely that 
once an emotion is triggered and the regulation of these emotions commences, the shaping of 
emotional behaviour takes place.  Once the behaviour is learned and enters the behavioural 
repertoire, an individual may gradually learn to anticipate behaviours that will up-regulate or 
down-regulate emotions, thus forming a feedback loop (Baumeister, Vohs, DeWall, Zhang, 
2007).   
 Another direction that may be worthwhile investigating is the mediating or moderating 
effects of PF and emotions on psychological outcomes in a multi-wave longitudinal study.  The 
differentiation between discrete emotions and PF could be examined further with outcome 
variables such as biological and psychosocial stressors, emotional reactivity, psychological 
well-being, and psychopathology.  In cross-sectional mediational studies, the effects of being 
low in PF have contributed further to negative social, physical, and psychological outcomes 
above and beyond the direct effects of the stressor (Boulanger et al., 2010; Greco et al., 2008).  
Future studies should examine the role of PF as a maintaining factor in psychopathology.  In 
addition to outcome variables, more empirical studies are required to examine discrete emotions 
and PF by using emotion measures that have clear theoretical bases and construct boundaries 
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and guidelines for appropriate use.  For example, the blurred boundaries between anger and 
hostility have produced inconsistencies in interpreting and understanding the role of these 
emotions in well-being and psychopathology.  Measures such as the STAXI-2 (Spielberger, 
1999) and the MMPI-2-Anger Content Scale (Butcher et al., 1989) for instance are clearly 
distinct from hostility and are well-normed measures used in clinical and non-clinical settings.  
Similarly, other measures of psychological vulnerability that are highly correlated with the 
AAQ and AFQ-Y should also be considered in order to distinguish between the contribution of 
the PF construct and other similar measures.  For example, measures such as the fear of anxiety, 
anxiety sensitivity, distress intolerance, and other avoidance measures can help clarify pathways 
to psychopathology and at the same time aid in distinguishing between PF processes and other 
psychopathological vulnerabilities.       
In addition to examining PF and emotions, perceived social support can also be 
included in the model as the association between different emotions and perceived social 
support is still unclear.  According to the stress-vulnerability framework, emotions and their 
dysregulation contribute to disease and ill health along with concurrent deficiencies in social 
support (Broadhead et al., 1983; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984).  With some clarity gained about 
the reciprocal relationships between PF and emotions, a broader picture could be obtained on 
adolescent functioning and well-being by examining interactions between PF, emotions, and 
perceived social support.  For example, hostile attitudes in adolescents are strongly related to 
decreased perceptions of family support and therefore, further investigations could be conducted 
to determine the role of PF in the relationship between hostility and social support.   
In the current study, only one positive emotion was examined and therefore it would be 
worthwhile exploring the relationship between PF and other positive emotions  Investigations of 
the function of positive emotions in light of the broaden and build theory (Fredrickson , 1998, 
2001), the approach motivation theory (Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2008), and the reward-related 
states theory (Berridge, 2003) have mainly been examined in adults.  Models that describe and 
explain the functions of positive emotional states are also highly applicable in adolescents and 
may provide insight on adolescent well-being and some of the risk behaviours relevant in 
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adolescent development.  In particular, the dysregulation of positive emotions is marked by 
deficits in or low levels of positive emotions, imbalances between the experience of positive and 
negative emotions, the inability to differentiate between high approach and low approach 
motivation emotions, or elevated reward-seeking and sensation-seeking tendencies (Gilbert, 
2012).  Additionally, other mediating or moderating variables of the relationship between PF 
and positive emotions should also be explored as the presence of negative emotions seem to 
dampen the experience of positive emotions.  Other positive psychological indicators such as 
savouring (Bryant, 1989), problem-focused coping (Folkman & Moskowitz, 2000), 
temperamentally capable of recruiting positive emotions (Lyubomirsky, Sheldon, & Schkade, 
2005), and resilience (Tugade & Fredrickson, 2007) could possibly act as mediators or 
moderators.   
7.5  Summary and Conclusion 
 Adolescence is a challenging time with biological and social changes potentially 
disrupting emotional and social well-being.  Trends towards more negative emotions over the 
one year period were observed but these did not reach significance, although a significant 
decrease in the experience of positive emotion (joy) was observed.  Mid-adolescence is a time 
when adolescents typically report higher levels of negative emotions and lower levels of 
positive emotions (Henker et al., 2002; Larson et al., 2002).   Likewise, deficits in social well-
being are experienced when perceptions of the availability of social support decreases.   
Adolescents in this study reported significant decreases in their perceived social network but 
non-significant decreases in perceived satisfaction with social support.     
 Both negative and positive emotions and PSS are known risk and protective factors in 
adolescence.  Emotion regulation has been identified as a potent risk factor in the development 
and maintenance of well-being and psychopathology.  Psychological flexibility is increasingly 
being viewed as a mindful ER variable and low levels of PF can also be considered a risk factor 
for emotional and social well-being in adolescents.  The relationship between different risk and 
protective factors is increasingly being considered important for understanding psychological 
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difficulties and their persistent influence in psychopathology.  The findings in this study suggest 
that PF is a psychological vulnerability (precursor ) as well as a coping style  for different 
negative and positive emotions.  PF was also found to be a predictor of perceived social support.  
The varied findings of the longitudinal relationships between PF and each emotion and between 
PF and PSS have added to the theoretical understanding of the relationship between ER 
processes and emotion theories and between intrapersonal and interpersonal ER.      
 This research is novel in its use of a longitudinal cross-lagged panel design for 
developing a more detailed understanding of PF as a construct that measures ER processes.  All 
three variables are known to represent modifiable risk and protective factors in adolescents and 
therefore the direction of influence is an important first step in identifying which processes 
should be targeted in prevention and intervention programs for adolescents.  Mindfulness-and-
acceptance-based therapies are a promising treatment modality for adolescents.  PF can be 
improved when individuals engage in mindful and accepting behaviours (Hayes et al., 2006).  
As PF increases, greater awareness and insight is gained and individuals become more adept at 
directing behaviours towards increasing quality of life in the longer term (Hayes et al., 2006).       
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Appendices  
Appendix 1: Youth Experiences Survey and Demographic Information  
 
           
        
YOUTH EXPERIENCES 4 
 
Dear Student, 
Some of you may remember the surveys you completed for us in 2003, 2004, and 
2005. Over this time you have helped us better understand what young people think 
and do. We would appreciate it if you will continue to share your thoughts and 
feelings with us. This survey will take about 50-70 minutes to complete. 
 
We would like to invite you to share your views with us about a range of issues that 
affect young people: attitudes to school and family, your expectations about the 
future, and your attitudes to fellow students. Students will also be asked to nominate 
other students who show specific positive (e.g. kind and friendly) behaviours. The 
information you provide will be used for research purposes only and not 
normally given to the school.  Information will only be passed on to the school in 
exceptional circumstances. Please do not write your name or address on the survey.  
Your questionnaire has a code that allows us to match this year’s survey with ones 
you did earlier. We also plan to match your questionnaire answers with your school 
grades later this year.  We track students by code and not by name. 
 
All information provided will be treated in the strictest confidence.  You can withdraw 
from this survey at any time, and this will not be reported to the school.  Simply 
answer each question on the survey without discussing your answer with anyone else. 
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If you have any concerns or complaints regarding the way the research is or has been 
conducted, you can contact the Ethics Officer, Human Research Ethics Committee, 
University of Wollongong on (02) 4221 4457 or your Year coordinator. 
 
 
Thank you for your help. 
Associate Professor Patrick Heaven 
Associate Professor Wilma Vialle 
Dr Joseph Ciarrochi 
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Dear Student, 
 
Because we intend to survey you again next year, we need to match your Year 10 
and Year 11 questionnaires.  Remember that your individual answers are intended for 
research purposes only. 
  
To help us, please write your name here: 
 
Now detach this page from the rest of the questionnaire. Your teacher will collect it. 
 
DO NOT WRITE YOUR NAME ON THE REST OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Please ignore any pale grey text like this in the box below throughout 
the questionnaire. It is just to help us put together the information later. 
  
University use only 
 
SN      
 
EN       
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PART 1 
Please provide us with the following background information: 
 
1. Which school do you attend?  (Please circle a number below): 
1. St Joseph’s, Albion Park 
2. Magdalene College 
3. St John’s, Nowra 
4. John Therry High School 
5. Holy Spirit College 
6. Mt Carmel 
 
2. What is your sex? (Please circle the correct number):    1)  Male       2)  Female 
3. What is your birth date? _______(day)_______(month)_______(year) 
4.  What is the initial of your first name?  _______ 
5.  What is the initial of your last name/surname? _______ 
6.  What is the initial of your mother’s first name? _______   
7.  Are your biological parents presently: 
1)  Married              2)  Separated              3)  Divorced              4)  Other 
 
8.  Do you intend continuing with school next year in Year 11? 
 1)  Yes, I intend to continue with school next year 
 2)  No, I intend to complete my schooling at the end of Year 10 
 
9.  How old are you this year? __________ years 
 
10. What is your religious faith?  (Please circle a number below) 
1)  Catholic     2)  Protestant     3)  Muslim     4)  Jewish     5)  Other     6)  None 
   
                                                                   Please turn over 
University use only 
1. school 
2. sex 
3. dob (ddmmyy) 
4. code 
5. code 
6. code 
7. marital 
 
University use only 
 
SN      
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Appendix 2: Action and Fusion Questionnaire for Youth (AFQ-Y) 
 
We want to know more about what you think, how you feel, and what you do. Read each sentence. 
Then, circle the number that tells how true each sentence is for you. 
 
 
Not at 
all True 
A little 
True 
Pretty 
True 
True 
Very 
True 
 
1.  My life won’t be good until I feel happy       
2.  My thoughts and feelings mess up my life 0 1 2 3 4  
3.  The bad things I think about myself must be true 0 1 2 3 4  
4.  If I feel sad or afraid, then something must be wrong with me 0 1 2 3 4  
5.  I don’t try out new things if I’m afraid of messing up 0 1 2 3 4  
6.  I must stop thoughts and feelings that I don’t like 0 1 2 3 4  
7.  I stop doing things that are important to me whenever I feel 
bad 
0 1 2 3 4  
8.  I must get rid of my worries and fears so I can have a good life 0 1 2 3 4  
9.  I do worse in school when I have thoughts that make me feel 
sad 
0 1 2 3 4  
10.  I can’t be a good friend when I feel upset 0 1 2 3 4  
11.  I am afraid of my feelings 0 1 2 3 4  
12.  I do whatever I can to make sure I don’t look dumb in front of 
other people 
0 1 2 3 4  
13. I try hard to erase hurtful memories from my mind  0 1 2 3 4  
14.  I wish I could have a magic wand to make all my sadness go 
away 
0 1 2 3 4  
15.  If my heart is beating fast, something must be wrong 0 1 2 3 4  
16.  I can’t stand to feel pain or hurt in my body  0 1 2 3 4  
17.  I say things that make me sound cool 0 1 2 3 4 
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Appendix 3: Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS-X) 
Below are words that describe different feelings and emotions. Read each word 
and indicate to what extent you have felt this way during the past month.  If a 
word describes you a lot, circle 5. If it does not describe you at all, circle 1. Just 
pick a number that you think best describes how you have felt over the last month. 
 Very 
slightly or 
not at all 
A little Moderately Quite a bit Extremely  
1.  Afraid 1 2 3 4 5  
2.  Scared 1 2 3 4 5  
3.  Frightened 1 2 3 4 5  
4.  Nervous 1 2 3 4 5  
5.  Jittery 1 2 3 4 5  
6.  Shaky 1 2 3 4 5  
7.  Angry 1 2 3 4 5  
8.  Hostile 1 2 3 4 5  
9.  Irritable 1 2 3 4 5  
10.  Scornful 1 2 3 4 5  
11. Disgusted 1 2 3 4 5  
12.  Loathing 1 2 3 4 5  
13.  Sad 1 2 3 4 5  
14.  Blue 1 2 3 4 5  
15.  Downhearted 1 2 3 4 5  
16.  Alone 1 2 3 4 5  
17.  Lonely 1 2 3 4 5  
18.  Happy 1 2 3 4 5  
19.  Joyful 1 2 3 4 5  
20.  Delighted 1 2 3 4 5  
21.  Cheerful 1 2 3 4 5  
22.  Excited 1 2 3 4 5  
23.  Enthusiastic 1 2 3 4 5  
24.  Lively 1 2 3 4 5  
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Appendix 4: Social Support Questionnaire (SSQ) 
The following questions ask about people in your environment who provide you with 
help or support.  Each question has two parts. 
 
For the first part, list all the people you know, excluding yourself, whom you can 
count on for help or support in the manner described.  Give the person’s initials and 
their relationship to you (e.g. brother, sister, close friend, mother, etc.).  Do not list 
more then one person next to each of the numbers for each question. For some 
questions you may be able to list more people than for other questions. 
 
For the second part, circle how satisfied you are with the overall support you have.  
If you have no support for a question, circle the words “no one”, but still rate your 
level of satisfaction.  Do not list more than nine persons per question. Try and 
answer each section. 
 
LOOK AT THE EXAMPLE BELOW: 
(Do not fill in the question in this box) 
Who can you trust with information that could get you into trouble? 
(This student lists three people: school counsellor; a friend; a brother, mother) 
No one  1) T.N. (counsellor)  4) mother  7) _______________ 
  2) L.M. (friend)  5) _______________ 8) _______________ 
  3) J.J (brother)  6) _______________ 9) _______________ 
 
How satisfied are you with this support? 
(This student is fairly satisfied, so circles 5) 
6 – very 
satisfied 
5 – fairly 
satisfied 
4 – a little 
satisfied 
3 – a little 
dissatisfied 
2 – fairly 
dissatisfied 
1 – very 
dissatisfied 
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Now please answer the following questions as best as you can: 
 
Question 1 
 
a.  Who do you feel really appreciates you as a person? 
 
No one  1) _______________ 4) _______________ 7) _______________ 
  2) _______________ 5) _______________ 8) _______________ 
  3) _______________ 6) _______________ 9) _______________ 
 
b.  How satisfied are you with this support? 
 
6 – very 
satisfied 
5 – fairly 
satisfied 
4 – a little 
satisfied 
3 – a little 
dissatisfied 
2 – fairly 
dissatisfied 
1 – very 
dissatisfied 
 
 
 
Question 2 
 
a.  Who can you count on to help you out in a crisis situation, even though  
     they would have to go out of their way to do so? 
 
No one  1) _______________ 4) _______________ 7) _______________ 
  2) _______________ 5) _______________ 8) _______________ 
  3) _______________ 6) _______________ 9) _______________ 
 
b. How satisfied are you with this support? 
 
6 – very 
satisfied 
5 – fairly 
satisfied 
4 – a little 
satisfied 
3 – a little 
dissatisfied 
2 – fairly 
dissatisfied 
1 – very 
dissatisfied 
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Question 3 
 
a.  Whose lives do you feel you are an important part of? 
 
No one  1) _______________ 4) _______________ 7) _______________ 
  2) _______________ 5) _______________ 8) _______________ 
  3) _______________ 6) _______________ 9) _______________ 
 
b.  How satisfied are you with this support? 
 
6 – very 
satisfied 
5 – fairly 
satisfied 
4 – a little 
satisfied 
3 – a little 
dissatisfied 
2 – fairly 
dissatisfied 
1 – very 
dissatisfied 
 
 
          
Question 4 
 
a.  Who can you really count on when you need help? 
 
No one  1) _______________ 4) _______________ 7) _______________ 
  2) _______________ 5) _______________ 8) _______________ 
  3) _______________ 6) _______________ 9) _______________ 
 
b.  How satisfied are you with this support? 
 
6 – very 
satisfied 
5 – fairly 
satisfied 
4 – a little 
satisfied 
3 – a little 
dissatisfied 
2 – fairly 
dissatisfied 
1 – very 
dissatisfied 
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